THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
OF NAPOLEON III
BY
THEODORE ZELDIN
MJi , D Pi/iL.
Research Fellotti of St Anlaity's College
and sometttne Scholar of Cltnst Church
Oxford
LONDON
MACMILLAN & CO LTD
Nnv YORK • ST Martin’s frees
1958
Copyright © by Theodore Zeldin 1958
MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED
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PREFACE
Tins book is based \cr>" largely on unpublished sources.
*1110 answers to the problems with which it deals could
not be found in other books and the author therefore had
to spend a good deal of time searching for nciv materia!.
He was fortunate in finding the pnvatc papers of many of
the leading figures of the period. It was not simply a
question of tracking down their owners, for then he some-
times had TO search dusty attics and dark cellars for the
documents themsclies. The hunt for one manuscript
ended in a chalet in tlie Alps, where, after the strong-
boxes whose kejs had been lost had been forced open in
\ain, it was discoxercd lying unguarded on top of a W'ard-
robc. The hunt for one owner began in a clue he picked
up from a conversation with a shopkeeper and was not
successful until he had followed it up through a whole
senes of dingj’ offices of merchants and auctioneers in the
narrow back streets of Pans.
The author found valuable material m the public
archives as welJ. Much has remained unused there because
it cannot be understood without a very detailed knowledge
of the men of the period; and the conclusions which
appear in this book could therefore be drawn only after
investigating the affairs of tiny villages and unravelling the
intrigues of a vast number of people now totally forgotten.
In this way he has used the particularly rich collection of
correspondence on the election of 1852, which provides a
unique picture of French politics m the nineteenth century.
Many documents, however, have been lost or destroyed and
there was nothing similar for the rest of the reign. The
author, therefore, had the idea of going to the archives of
The Political Systeiu of Napoleon HI
the Post Office and there indeed he found copies of a huge
quantity of confidential telegrams, which, though not as
full as the missing letters, yet contained much informa-
tion. When nothing more could be found in Paris, he
sought out the archives of the prefects in the provinces
and with their aid was able to carry the story to its end
and to explain the decline into which Napoleon’s political
system fell.
He wishes to thank here the descendants of the states-
men of the second empire who most generously allowed
him to make use of their private archives and who supplied
him with much valuable information and reminiscence :
M. and Mme M. Barrois, M. le Comte and Mme la
Comtesse de Bertier de Sauvigny, M. J. Buffet and Mme
B. Buffet, M. P. de Cassagnac, General Comte de Cham-
brun, M. le Marquis and Mme la Marquise de Chasseloup-
Laubat, Mme Duchon d’Espagny, M. de Forcade la
Roquette, M. D. Maitre, M. Meynis de Paulin, M. le
Comte and Mme la Comtesse A. de Montalembert, M. C.
Schneider, M. le Marquis de Talhouet-Roy, Mme Troisier
and Mme de Warn. He wishes to thank also the many
historians, writers, and others both in England and in
France who advised and helped him in the course of his
work. He owes more than he can say to many of them,
but he hopes they will excuse him from filling several
pages with their names, just as he hopes that those he has
mentioned will forgive his acknowledging so briefly all the
kindness and hospitality they have shown him.
VI
CONTENTS
Peeface V
CEUtr
I, How MEN SURVIVED iN POLITICS AND HOW NEW MEN
ENTERED IT (1814-1870) I
II. How THE FOUNDATIONS OF A NEW BONAPARTIST
PARTY WERE LAID (1852) 10
III. Where Napoleon found the recruits for his
PARLIAMENT 28
IV What politics meant to the members of parlia-
ment 46
V. How THE ELECTION Of 1S57 ENCOURAGED A CON-
SERVATIVE REACTION 66
VI. How THE GOVERNMENT WON ELECTIONS IN ITS EARLY
YEARS AND IVHV IT LAITO CEISED TO WIN THEM 78
vn. Why LIBERAL CONCESSIONS WERE MADE IN i860 100
VIII. How PeRSIGNY sought to meet the CHALLENGE OF
THE left (1863) III
IX. Whv Ollivier and Morny becajie advocates of a
LIBERAL EMPIRE AND HOW THE AUTHORITARIAN EMPIRE’S
MAJORITY IN parliament DISrNTEGRATED 120
X. How THE ELECTION OF 1869 S}I 0 \VED THE COLLAPSE
OF THE old system 135
XL Who supported the liberal empire and what its
THEORY OP representative GOVERNMENT WAS >43
XII What the three parties which opposed the empire
represented, what BoNAPARtiSM STOOD FOR, AND HOW
IT CONQUERED A FOLLOWING 1 54
Maps illustrating the development op Bonipartism 169
Bibliography i 77
Index 1S9
vii
ABBREVIATIONS IN THE FOOTNOTES
PVCL Proch-Verbauv des stances du Corps Ldgtshtif, 1852-1865
CRCL Comptt-Rendu des stances du Corps Ldgtslattf, 1853-1860
ACL Annales du Sdmt el du Corps L^gtsUitif, 1861-1870
M.U. jMoniteur urtst'ersel
B N Btblwtkegue Natwnale
B.N N A Fr Bihhothhque NaUonale, Nouvelles acqutstUons
franfaises in the department of manuscripts
A.N Archives Nationales
A D- Archn'es Ddpartmentales
The abbreviation A N is not repeated before documents obviously coming
from the National Archives and which have an official abbreviated ediSj
VIZ F, C , BB
NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS
The members of the various parliaments in France in the
nineteenth century had different titles at different times :
deputes, constituants, representanis, inemhres du corps legislatif.
To simplify matters, all these have been translated not
‘deputies’ (which would be proper only for those who were
members of Chambres des Deputes, and which, in the context
of this book, would suggest the parliamentarians of the
Orleans monarchy) but ‘M.P.s’. This does not, of course,
imply that they had the same characteristics or functions as
M.P.s in England.
During the second empire, 25 French francs were equal
to one pound sterling ; and French money has accordingly
been converted on this basis ' into contemporary English
money and not into present-day values.
X
CHAPTER I
How men survived in politics and how
new men entered it
(1814-2870)
Marshal Bugeaud, the conqueror of Algeria, on his
return to Paris after his victories, was summoned by King
Louis Philippe. ‘I Wish to have a talk with you,' he said,
‘since you are the man who knows Algeria better than
anyone else ’ The king then proceeded to talk himself
without stopping for nearly two hours ; after which he
shook Bugeaud’s hand and said, ‘Thank you, I am de-
lighted with the conversation we have had’. Some time
later Louis Napoleon, as President of the Republic, sum-
moned Bugeaud likewise. He greeted him with words very
similar to Louis Philippe’s. He then listened to Bugeaud
for two hours without interrupting him and without saying
a word. After which he shook his hand and said, as Louis
Philippe had done, ‘Thank you, J am delighted with the
conversation we have had’.*
This story illustrates the problem of the second empire.
How can one hope to understand a man who spoke so little
and who wrote even less ? There is no great collection of
letters in fifty volumes for him, as there is for Napoleon I,
to show not only what his wide aims were m broad outh'ne,
but also how far his detailed administration corresponded
to them. It is all very well to echo his words that he stood
for the peasants, for prosperity or for glory, but the char-
acter of his regime cannot be determined merely from his
grand generalisations and high-sounding claims. It is more
' Oilivier’* diary, J .3 186^
1
The Political System of Napoleon III
important to know what this regime was than what it said
it was.
Now Napoleon could not govern without the co-opera-
tion of ministers, administrators and a horde of subordin-
ates, who possessed individualities of their own, who left
their own stamp on the period and who inevitably influenced
the formation and the execution of policy. But who were
these men ? The Bourbons, it is said, were supported by
the aristocracy, the Orleans by the bourgeoisie, the republic
by the masses ; who then supported the second empire ?
Much has been written about its general but very little
about its officers and its army. ’ The object of this book is
to deal with this problem, to discover who these supporters
of Napoleon III were and so to show the real foundations
of his power. In order to obtain as precise an answer as
possible, it will deal more particularly with the members
of his parliaments. These men have long languished in
obscurity, but through them it will be possible to explain
the nature of the Bonapartist party. Through them also
it will be possible to see why the second empire came to be
transformed from an authoritarian into a liberal govern-
ment.
This transformation is one of the most interesting
puzzles of the century. In 1852 Napoleon III, having
dissolved the National Assembly, became the practically
absolute ruler of France. He proclaimed the end of
the parliamentary system which the country had practised
since the fall of the great Napoleon and which, he
asserted, was responsible for bringing it down from its
former great heights of glory. He re-established his uncle’s
organisation of personal government: he would rule
through ministers chosen at his pleasure and through pre-
fects who would reflect his omnipotence in the provinces
in the manner of the proconsuls of ancient Rome. He
would nominate the celebrities of his reign to a senate,
whose task would be to watch over the maintenance of the
How men survived in politics and how new men entered it
constitution and keep things as they were. His civil ser-
vants m the council of state would prepare the laws, which
would be submitted to a legislature elected by universal
suffrage, having the right to reject them, it is true,
but with strictly limited powers of amending them and
whose debates would be published only in abbreviated and
censored form. In two plebiscites the masses confirmed all
his acts
Gradually, however, Napoleon increased the powers of
the legislature and by 1870 he appeared to have yielded up
the government to it and to have re-established the parlia-
mentary system. Did this represent an abdication on his
part before the demands of the growing opposition, an
acknowledgement of his failure and an attempt to give up
his power m order to keep his throne ? Or was it the result
of a change of heart ^ I5 the history of his reign the story of
his conversion from an autocratic dictator into a disciple
of the liberal creed ? This book will seek to give the
answer.
It is generally assumed that Napoleon HI owed his
election to power to his name, to the legend his uncle had
created, but not to the work of any party of his own, which
m 1848 just did not exist. It is well known that after the
fall of the second empire a strong Bonapartist party con-
tinued to flounsh for twenty years. \Vhy was this so ?
How could it be that the mighty first empire should by
contrast disappear, leaving only a few misguided con-
spirators faithful to Its memory ?
The answer is to be found in the different ways the tw'O
empires fell In 1870 the whole body of the supponers of
the regime w'ere violently expelled and smeared as the col-
laborators of * the despot'. A sharp line was dra^vn betw een
them and those who had not served Napoleon and they
were thus made into a party as much by their enemies as
by themselves. Something very different happened in
3
The Political System of Napoleon 111
1814. Napoleon I was overthrown but his followers were
not. They arranged the Bourbon restoration and were
absorbed into the new system. Even when they were
largely expelled from office as the government mov'ed right,
they kept their place in the regime and merely became its
left wing. They cast off their Bonapartist slough and
emerged transformed as liberals. ‘Bonapartist, then
liberal,’ as Balzac says, ‘for by one of the strangest of meta-
morphoses, the soldiers of Napoleon nearly all became
lovers of the constitutional system, Colonel Guiget was
during the restoration the natural president of the organis-
ing [liberal] committee of Arcis.’ ' In 1830 most of these
liberals came into power and changed their name once
more, to Orleanists. Hence it was that the Orleans mon-
archy secured the return of the ashes of Napoleon, built
the Invalides to house them and erected his statue in the
Place Vendome. Its parliament paid perpetual homage to
his memory ; it protested when an M.P. dared to refer to
him simply as ‘Bonaparte’, and infuriated republicans
complained in vain that his example was cited too often.^
It dismissed an official for having led a mob in 1815 to drag
a bust of the emperor into the mud.^ Its House of Peers,
which in 1840 tried Louis Napoleon for seeking to over-
throw the government, is said to have included no less than
4 ministers, 6 marshals, 56 generals, 14 councillors of state,
19 prefects, 7 ambassadors, and 21 chamberlains of the
first empire, and 38 men who had publicly recognised the
accession of Napoleon II after the Hundred Days.+
It was, however, no paradox that they should condemn
I ed. Boutcron and Lognon (1949), 283-4.
tV, % M.U. 1841, 1538. The abbreviation M.P. is used
throughout this book as the most convenient translation of the various
names given to the members of the lower houses of parliament of the nine-
teenth century : deputes, memhres du corps Ugislatif, reprhentants, etc. See
note on translations on page x. a j, x ,
5 M. Rousselet, La Magistratiire sous la monarchic de juillct (1937), 37.
Aux m&nes de l empereur, la pairie reconnaissante (1840), Lb (51) 3137.
SapterTlT®^ ^ Orleanist, legitimist and republican see below,
4
UoTV men surz'h'ed in poUtics and how new men entered it
the he]r of the emperor. Their position was quite dear.
They ^\ere ‘Napoleonists’, not Bonapartists, They were
proud of their maker, who was the creator of their titles,
their distinctions and frequently of their wealth, they
honoured him and they punished those who blasphemed
him ; but they were satisfied that he should remain among
the gods and leave them to govern themselves in peace
through their own ‘puppet king*. As a senior cml servant
said, ' Bonapartism was excited by the sound of the homage
done to Napoleomsm, and a child came to Boulogne to fail
against France as his uncle had failed against England, . . .
[Now] that Bonapartism is placed under lock and key in
the castle of Ham it is possible to pay perfectly peaceful
honours to th e personal glory of Napoleon.’ * Bonapartism,
wrote a contemporary, was no longer based, as it was in
the first part of the restoration, on loyalty and devotion to
the dynasty. ‘No member of the former imperial family
can today flatter himself that he is the object of the chival-
rous cult which the Bertrands, the Lacazes, the Montholons
and the Labedoyeres formerly professed for their illustrious
master. The monarchy of July, by adopting the glories
and the misfortunes of the empire, has acquired a right
to their loyalty, and it is among the companions at arms
of Napoleon or among their sons that Louis Philippe to-
day finds his most declared partisans and his staunchest
supporters.* *
Louis Napoleon had thus to seek his allies among the
opponents of the monarchy, and since he could not base
his party on men who were seriously involved in the politics
of his day, he had to base it on ideas which appealed to the
masses. He advocated universal suffrage against the closed
franchise of the monarchy ; and as the inevitable ally of the
republicans he preached the restoration, not of the empire,
• T Taschereau, rflreiprelrce (1848), 140-1
* Gustave de Roiliaud, Oe Vital dn pariit ert Franct (1839). (51)
=944. =3*S
5
The Political System of Napoleon III
but of tlie consulate and the republic.' The revolution of
1848 was a triumph for him and for all the opponents of
Louis Philippe, and not simply for the pure republicans.
The legitimists were offered a scat in the provisional
government ; they flocked into the constituent assembly ;
and the reaction in the following year was directed almost
as much against them as against the republicans. The
clergy blessed the trees of liberty not from any affection
for the new form of government, but rather because it
meant the end of Louis Philippe’s Voltarian system, and
they showed it quite plainly by canvassing for their own
legitimist or clerical candidates at the elections.^ In the
same way members of the imperial family were elected as
part of the general movement and Louis Napoleon’s old
tutor was appointed conimissaire of the republic in Manche.
1 he peasants who voted for Louis Napoleon in December
1848 voted a few months later for the reddest republicans,
as though for one and the same cause.
Yet there is a myth that he was elected to the presidency
as the candidate of the opponents of the republic, the ‘ party
of order’, adopted by them as a useful tool to overthrow
the regime which had brought him back to France. In
fact he was not elected because he was their candidate, but
he was their candidate because they saw he was bound to
win. They had no choice in the matter, said Thiers, the
masses were all for him. T. he size of his majority may have
caused some surprise but his victory was certainly not un-
expected.^ Had the party of order been able to win merely
on the principle of order, Thiers would have stood himself.
Many of my friends’, he wrote, ‘want me to accept [the
> H. Malo Thiers Upz), 273 ; J>. Ollivicr, Lc 19 yanvicr (1869), 148 ;
(1900), 373 ; B. Jcrrold, Life of
, r 470 : Napoleon III, OCuvres (1856),
and 30’ ^"t’othn III^ el le prince NapoUon (1923), u
F.iDoux, 12. 10. 1848, Montalcm-
btrt papers , Barada to I hiers, 29.10.1848. B.N.N.A.Fr. 20O17 IT. 255-6 ;
J 3 ar£intc, (1890-18^9), 7. 385. '
6
Hok men mrvwed in poUtia <ind hota nm men entered it
c^didature for the presidency] to oppose a candidature
«hich they regard as detestable, that of Louis Bonaparte
ey think, and I think so too, that I alone could be opposed
to Bonaparte in the name of the principles of order. But
1 f can stand against him, I doubt whether I tan succeed,
at least at present. , . ■
As president, therefore, Napoleon did not represent
the party of order. The whole conception of this party is
iti any case misleading All governments, even the republic,
proclaimed themselves the representatives of the party of
order and labelled all opposition as anarchy. All opposi-
tions in their turn called the governments in power tyrants
and thieves and announced that they themselves were
Seeking liberty and order — the two always went together.
In 1850 Napoleon said, ‘Order for me is not a meaningless
word which everyone interprets as he pleases. For me
order is the maintenance of what has been freely elected
and agreed to by the people, it is the national will triumph-
ant over all factions ’ * The party of order thus means the
party of whoever invokes its name and it is therefore of
little value as a description of the basis of Napoleon^s
power.
A phrase more useful to understanding it, and to under-
standing the meaning of the revolutions between 1814 and
1870 in general, is ‘new men*, the universal cry which
rose from the victors of every revolution. The parliamen-
tarians and the senior civil servants who had supported the
previous government were declared corrupted by their
contact with it and their places were taken over by ‘new
men’. Immediately after every revolution the ministers
were besieged by place hunters seeking the booty of victory,
very often basing their claims to favour simply on their
Opposition to the fallen government.^ And this search for
' Bibl Thitfs.FondsThiers, i*f*Sine,No 24, f Go, Utterof 17 to 1848
* Napoleon HI, CEuvres, 3 133-4
> Fg Ste-Herroine’a file (F(ib)I i73(4l, letter of 2871S4S Mes-
grtgny, M.P , 15,3 j8j6 in Rambourgt’* file, F(«bp 172(2)
B
7
The Political System of Napoleon III
jobs was as much ihe cause as the result of revolutions.
‘The moral disturbance’ of the time, said Tocqucville in
1842, was due to this ‘growing, unbounded and disordered
passion’ of the country.' Men talked of ‘the fever of am-
bition which devours every head and which excites every
mind’, as though it was ‘impossible to live any longer today
outside public employment’. = An economist went so far
as to claim that there was nothing in these perpetual revolu-
tions but a struggle for place. ‘As cvciy place has at least
five candidates, and every candidate hopes that a revolution
will turn out the actual possessor, above a million of our
most active talkers and writers arc always agitating to over-
turn the existing constitution for the purpose of ejecting
those who hold its places.’
This is of course an over-simplification which ignores
the thousand different motives which cause men to act as
they do, but there can be no doubt that revolutions did
have this uniform characteristic of putting new men into
the administration. Now this was required not simply by
the ambition of the victors, but also by two independent
circumstances. In 1830, in 1848 and in 1870, just as the
kings abdicated without resisting, so likewise their followers
retired voluntarily, invoking their loyalty to their sovereign
in order to escape being forcibly evicted. The jobs were
simply left vacant. Secondly, every government which did
not want to be sabotaged in the provinces had to fill the
civil service with its supporters, quite apart from the need
to reward these supporters. The faithful must be given
power to breed yet more faithful. ‘ If there are no royalists
m Franee, wrote Chateaubriand in 1815, ‘we must make
royalists. ... A bishop, a commanding officer, a prefect,
a public prosecutor, a president of a court of martial law,
a commander of police, and a commander of the national
^ M.U. 1842, 108-9.
3 o' 1^42, 196-7, speech of Monier dc La Sizeranne.
IN. bcnior, Conversations with Thiers (1878), i. 191-2.
8
How men survived in politics and how new men entered it
guard . let these seven men be for God and the King, and
I answer for the rest ’ ’
Looked at m the light of these facts, the careers of the
politicians reveal signs of a pattern wliich makes the mean-
ing of the period clearer. The sen'ants of Napoleon I, the
supporters of the Hundred Days, the men persecuted and
dismissed by the Bourbons, become the opposition candi-
dates of the restoration and the satisfied members of Louis
Philippe's parliaments. Their opponents come into their
omi in 1848 and fill the parhaments of the republic.
Finally, on the fall of the second empire, legltumsts,
Orleanists and republicans all emerge from their enforced
retirement to dispute the spoils of power The revolutions
thus bnng old men back into politics as ■well as introducing
new men into it, and they are as much kaleidoscopes re-
mixing old parties as generators of novel forces.^
How does the second empire fit into this pattern? It
is no gap in the history of France, as the republican his-
torians, assert. Like most governments issuing from revo-
lution, it is based to a certain extent on new men, but it
has strong ties with the regimes which preceded it. It
thus represents an alliance of new and of old forces, and
this book will seek to show its nature and its meaning.
’ Quoted by S Charlety, La Resiauratian (1911), 109.
^ Cf M U i8aj, 1551
9
CHAPTER II
How the foundations of a new Bonapartist
party were laid
(1852)
After the plebiscite had acclaimed his coup d’Stat, Napo-
leon, though apparently master of the nation, did not
consider his task complete. He still needed allies for the
government of the country. He did not believe that it was
enough simply to have the peasants behind him, ‘When
one bears our name,’ he wrote, ‘and when one is at the
head of the government, there are two things one must do :
satisfy the interests of the most numerous classes and
attach to oneself the upper classes.’ ' The politics of his
period had two levels : that of the masses and that of the
politicians. The people could provide a solid basis for his
government but they could not govern themselves and
they could only delegate their rights to him. Napoleon
therefore needed men to help him : he had to form a new
ruling class.
The way he did this can be seen in the parliamentary
elections of 1852. He summoned a legislature to consist
of 261 members, each representing a constituency of some
35,000 electors. All men over 21 could vote and stand.
Napoleon, however, announced ‘official candidates’ and
used all the resources of his prestige and his influence to
urge the people to vote for them. Most of these candi-
dates were successful and many of them were even elected
unopposed. The election has therefore been regarded as
a farce and the parliament which issued from it as a packed
' E. d’Hauterivc, Napoleon HI et Ic prince Napoleon, 58-9.
10
How the foundations of a Bonapariist party teere laid
congress of loyal party men, A study of the correspond-
ence m the government’s files reveals, however, that this
view is erroneous and that the election was in fact highly
important. It was the provincial counterpart of the plebi-
scite and It effected great changes among the local rulers of
the country It shows, too, how Napoleon did not seek to be a
mere dictator of the masses and how he did not call a parlia-
ment merely in order to fill it with puppets or nonentities.
‘You Will have noticed what is happening,’ wrote Persigny
to Falloux. ‘We, who have no friends except below, if we
wanted nothing but power, we would have done two
things : kept the salary for M.P s and allowed the civil
servants to sit in parliament. We have done the opposite
and given the legislature to the upper classes. We have
openly supported and chosen our candidates, but from the
highest ranks of society, from the great landowners,
wealthy mayors and so on ’ *
The minister of the Interior sent instructions in general
terms to the prefects and asked them to recommend men
to him who would be suitable as M P.s, men who would
not only vote for the government but would bring real
strength to it, and whom he would nominate as its ‘official
candidates’ at the election. The prefects at once showed
that they had varying views as to what kind of men should
be chosen, and as to what the purpose of the election should
be. A few ardent ones wanted none but pure Bonapartists
in parliament and a clean sweep in the country, 'In
Haute-Garonne,’ wrote Pietri, ‘as in a great number of
other regions, the administration has until now left the
conduct of political affairs to the old parties.. Instead of
putting itself in contact with the people, it placed itself
under the tutelage of the chiefs of these parties and thought
it had done a lot when it succeeded in grouping them
' G Goyau, Un Rortunt ifainitti l6o M P i were pa.d under
the republic. Under the Orleans monarchy civil lervanta •nerc atfowKf to
iw JIJ P..» wJilMiut hai-m^ to ^ve up their joU
The Political System of Napoleon HI
around it under the name of men of order. No one, except
perhaps M. de Maupas, had dared hoist the flag of Louis
Napoleon here. This humble attitude of the administra-
tion fortified the influence of the old parties by discrediting
the authorities and made any frankly Napoleonic candida-
ture impossible.
‘The elections of 1849, therefore, were simply the
result of this situation . . . which the administration had
so unfortunately accepted or created. Our business today
is not to fall into the same mistake but to give the author-
ities sure and devoted auxiliaries. The coup d’etat of 2
December has changed the situation but it has not been
able to break the parties completely in which the elements
of opposition will for long continue to exist. In my
opinion, the legitimist party in particular will never rally
honesdy to Louis Napoleon. While submitting to him,
it will seek to undermine him silently, fully ready to seize
the most favourable moment to act against him openly.
If this is so, the candidates to the legislature ought to be
as far as possible men entirely devoted to the prince. I do
not conceal from myself, M. le Ministre, the difficulties we
shall perhaps encounter in securing the triumph of their
candidatures in a department where the influence of M.
de Remusat and the legitimist party has always been
considered preponderant, but these difficulties do not appear
to me to be insuperable.’ ‘
Many prefects pointed out that the policy of seeking
notables presented political problems, since most notables
had already taken part in politics and wei'e for that reason
undesirable. They were either hostile or they suffered
from the unpopularity of their fallen rdgimes. The great
landowners were, moreover, nearly all legitimists. One pre-
fect said that his department had some men who were
important through their social position, their fortunes,
even their careers, as well as through the personal considera-
F(ic) n 99, Haute-Garonne, prefect, 20.1.1852.
12
How the foundations of a Bonapartist party were laid
tion and legitimate influence which they enjoy and who
therefore would also have had a right to seek the confidence
of the people in every other situation except that in which
we are today. But that is not the problem any more. If I
have understood your meaning properly, il/, le Mtnistre,
my report must aim at indicating the men who by their
outstanding services to the cause we serve and by their
personal devotion to prince Louis Napoleon, who incarnates
the needs and the wishes of the country, ought to be put
forward for the favour of the electors. I must therefore
first of all declare to you that to obtain the affection of the
masses in my department it is necessary to be above all and
exclusively Napoleonic • whoever m the present state of
things, stands without fulfilling this condition will certainly
fail e\en though he may have a great deal of public esteem
and consideration. The problem is thus simplified . , . ’
So the prefect says and he proposes Maupas, the minister
of Police, and Maupas’ father and tv\ o generals — these men
being the local Bonapartist celebrities.* In fact, of course,
the problem had been made more difficult, for three of
them, as public servants, were not eligible to stand. It was
not as easy as that to find Napoleonic candidates
The advice to destroy the power of the old gang came
from other prefects too. ‘The mission of the administra-
tion,* wrote one, ‘which is a delicate and difficult mission,
must be to form what I shall call the government party.
Until now the administration has been under the thumb
of the factions, now of one, now of the other. People have
spent a lot of intelligence on this deplorable game but they
have founded nothing. The time is favourable to recapture
the high position which the government ought never to
have lost : it must control the passions of the masses and
not follow or elude them. . . . To enjoy the confidence of
Our rugged peasants, an energetic government is needed
\'hich proves to them that it knows how to punish and
' F(ic) II 98, Aube,
>3
The Political System of Napoleon III
how to protect.’ > Again and again the prefects repeat
that what is required is new men, free from ties to fallen
governments.^
Not all the prefects, however, were as brimful of energy
or as eager to create a new party of which they would be
the heads. The weaker and more conciliatory among them
were easily impressed by the influence of the old parlia-
mentary hands and believed them to be irremovable. An
official of the ministry of the Interior complained indeed
that the new prefects ‘ are inclined in favour of candidates
who have previously been successful in elections and deny
too easily the chances of new men ’.3 But these prefects
insisted that the government should choose popular men,
to avoid producing a reaction against it or provoking the
candidature of some popular local man.'* The prefect of
Bouches-du-Rhone, insisting that it was impossible to
ignore local conditions (which in his case of course meant
the strength of the legitimists), demanded that the official
candidates should be men ‘who will represent best the
natural sympathies of the districts, while at the same time
giving the government the guarantees of sincere adhesion
and devotion which it has a right to demand ’.s
This attitude degenerated among some prefects into a
simple desire to back the winner. They discussed with
heat the chances ’ of the various candidates and as a result
some were chosen because ‘ they had the best chances ’ almost
irrespective of other considerations.'' There were, how-
ever, limits to what the government would tolerate in a
department where the prefect proclaimed himself helpless.
2 II 100, Hautc-Loire, prefect, 14.1.1852.
^ F(ic) II 98, Ardennes, prefect, 7.2.1852; 99, Haute-Garonne, un-
dated note; 99, Illc-et-Vilaine, prefect, 9.1.1852; 100, Lot, prefect,
14.1.1852; 102, Seine-Inf., prefect, 10.2.1852; 103, Var, prefect,
^ F(ic) III, Corrtze 7, note.
l'(ic) II 103, Var, prefect, 6.2.1852; 99, Ille-et-Vilaine, prefect,
19.1.1852 ; 102, Sevres, prefect, 20.1.1852.
* F(ic) II 98, B.-du-Rh6ne, prefect, 27.1. and 5.2.1852.
F(ic) II loi, H.-Marne,Pcrsigny,6.2.i852; 98, Aveyron, L. Jaoul to
Lalvet-Rogniat, 27 .1 . 1852.
Uats iht foMniaiioni of a Eotjaporttst party xcere laid
It could not accept men who had been prominently hostile
to it. ' i^o^^ ever honourable the character of the candidates
you propose may be,’ wTote Pcrsigny, ‘it is impossible for
the government to accept the former M,P,s who voted
in favour of the quaestors’ bill’ in 1851, hostile to Louis
Napoleon.* Men. ’tarnished with the original sin of the
protest of 2 December* w'cre impossible unless they have
good proof of conversion.* Persigny rejected one man
because the prefect had forgotten his relations with Ca-
vaignac, ^^hose aide-de-camp he had been; and another
for fear that he ^^ould inevitably fall under ‘the influence
of the salons of Paris’-^ Objection was raised agamst
others on the ground that they were related to leading
politicians of the opposition.-* There w'ere thus many
opinions as to what kind of candidate the government
should support One man, however, probably combined
the most popular qualifications when he applied for the
title of official candidate on these grounds ; that he was the
son of a prefect of the first empire, which made him
‘Napoleonic' ; that he was a new man, and therefore not
a member of any Orleanist clique ; that he had distinguished
himself on 2 December, which meant be had rendered
services to the cause and identified himself openly with it ;
that he was recommended by influential men, which put
him in the right set and guaranteed his sincerity; and
finally that he had good chances of winning *
Now who was it who chose the official candidates and
who thus recruited the party } There were In fact many
influences at w'^ork There is little evidence of any participa-
tion by Napoleon himself. It was he who chose the candi-
date for Corsica, where devoted candidates abounded and
* Pfn) II 99, IJIe-et.VJjinc, 5 g tSs2
> F(ic> n toi, Ojse, prefect, 3 z 1852, and go. Eure-et-Loir, prefect,
II l iSsz * Ffic) 11 iQo, Alter, Perstgny, zi 1 1852
* F(ic) tl loz, Seme, letter of Leroy de St-Atmud ; gg, Eure-et-Loir,
prefect, 20 i i8sz ; 102, S^vreJ, prefect, teJegram, ti z t$ 5 Z
’ F(ic> 11 99, llfrauJi, note of 13 3 1852 by nrun
15
The Political System of Napolcoii III
where only his decision could put an end to their rivalries ;
but there are only two other cases where he is actually
known to have intervened.' In later elections the official
candidates were generally approved by the council of
ministers on the recommendation of the minister of the
Interior, and the minister of the Interior is found ‘taking
the orders of the emperor ’ on whom he should recommend.
Perhaps Napoleon was too busy with other things in 1852,.
perhaps he acted simply by word of mouth, but what is
certain is that he did not draw up a list of 200 men to be
packed into the parliament.
Curiously enough the minister of the Interior was not
the man who made the parliament either. Persigny, it is
true, set the tone of the election but he was less important
in the choice of the official candidates. He was essentially
the theorist of the election, the inspirer of the fight, the
spirit behind the rousing of the masses and the denuncia-
tion of the enemy. His telegrams to his prefects, full of
life and ener^ and sincerity, were as the stirring battle
cry of a captain to his troops. ‘ Concern yourself only with
the masses ’, he wrote, ‘ It is theyAvho will make the election.
Ask them resolutely to support men devoted to Napoleon.’
I maintain that the action of the administration ought to
be decisive in the forthcoming elections. If there is need,
issue an energetic proclamation to support the friends and
repulse the enemies of Louis Napoleon and the inhabitants
of the countryside will answer your call.’ ‘Do not bother
about [a certain opponent]. I am certain that the action
of the administration will be decisive. Proclaim aloud the
candidates of the government of Louis Napoleon. Appeal
to the sentiments of the people. It is the masses who make
elections today and not the old influences.’ ^ A draft of
a letter he wrote six months later for the local elections
' F(ic) III Corsica 5, 6.2.1852; F(ic) II 98, Aube, 15.2.1852; 99,
iiure-et-Loir, Persigny, 13.2.1S52.
- F(ic) II loi, H,-Pyr. 13.2.1852; 99, Eure-et-Loir, 13.2.1852; 98,
Charente, 13*2.1852, telegrams.
16
How the fomdatians of a Bonnpartkt party w^re hid
shows what the purpose behind all this was, ‘ It matters
little', he wrote, ‘that a few notorious enemies should be
elected to the corned general, uhat matters is that there
should be no canton where the hand of the government has
not at least sapped the foundations on which the old in-
fluences rested, . . Overthrow the hold of the old in-
fluences on the minds of the people. , . . Do not fear to
fight against the old parties . . our business above all is
to create a party.’ i
Yet though his theory was full of fire, he showed a
great deal of moderation in detail and was always ready to
make concessions in departments uhere the opposition
was strong There is, no evidence at all of his trying to
cram the house with pure Bonapartists, and m fact he was
extraordinarily cold to these men. The proposals he made
were seldom orders. He would say to the prefect, ‘Mr X
seems suitable, give me your opinion’; or ‘Has he any
chances ?’ He repeatedly gave proof of his willingness to
compromise and to listen to advice. He had, it is true, his
hkes and his dislikes and he would not yield on everything.
He was willing to accept, for example, a legitimist only ‘if
there is no Napoleonic candidature’ in the constituency.*
'The government', he wrote, 'wishes to show moderation
in its choices but not beyond a certain limit,'*
Here is a letter which illustrates his policy and at the
same time shows his cordial relations with his prefects
‘My dear prefect ... I am overwhelmed with the best
information and after having weighed all the circumstances
and consulted the government, here is what I think I must
write to you. There are nvo names in your list which
the government cannot accept, M. de Mepieu and M. de
Faugier. The former is a respectable and moderate legiti-
mist who I do not doubt must be rallied since you support
I FCic) 11 5 $, undated dnift by Persnjny.thesboxeare alternative crossed-
outphtaiM * fftc) JI too. Loirs, to.r 185^
* F(ic) II 9S, n -du-Rh3ne. I’etsigny'a tetegTnin. crossed'out sentences,
tj a iSj»
t?
The Political System of Napoleon III
him. But the same will happen to M. de Mepieu as has
happened to so many others ; as soon as he gets to Paris
he will be easily drawn in by the men of the salons who
corrupt all who go near them. Besides, in a department
such as yours, we must beware of the prejudice which
prevails against members of the nobility and of the legiti-
mist party. As for M. Faugier, he is not a reliable character :
we know him and he would abandon us at the first oppor-
tunity.’ Persigny went on to suggest that the prefect should
do as Persigny advised, but that he should pretend that he
was doing it on his own initiative, so as to keep intact his
authority as prefect. He ended by expressing the hope
that the prefect would shortty be promoted. What is more,
the prefect in the end got his own way.^
If the masses were legitimist, Persigny was willing to
make concessions, but they were so in only a few depart-
ments. ‘There is at Montbrison’, he wrote, ‘a very re-
spectable legitimist society which is not well placed to
judge the opinions of the people. It would gladly see
M. Maudre [made M.P.] but the people would not. M.
Bouchetal-Laroche is a devoted man who will suit the
sentiments of the masses better and you ought to be able
to ensure his success.’ Persigny would thus hold firm
when he thought the opposition leaders in a particular
department were merely officers without an army. ‘ In the
department of which you are in charge, the action of the
government ought to be decisive . . . you ought to be
able to ensure the success of your candidates.’ 3 He was,
moreover, no fire-eating advocate of force. On one occasion
he was compelled to adopt an opposition candidate, a M.
Lemaire, who had protested against the coup d'etat : he
made a virtue of the necessity and showed he could use
such an opportunity to win over a former enemy. He got
• F{ic) II loo, Is&re, Persipiy’s draft, 5.2.1852.
^ F(ic) II 100, Loire, Persigny’s telegram, 20.2.1852.
3 F(ic) II loi, Cantal, Persigny’s telegrams, 14. and 17.2.1852.
18
The Political System of Napoleon TIJ
official who is not authorised in advance to promise him
his support. It is besides painful for the head of a depart-
ment to avow to anyone that the government does not
leave the conduct of its politics to him.’ ’ The government
could not, of course, give the prefects a blank cheque as a
matter of principle but in practice it was difficult, and in-
deed unwise, not to accept their proposals whenever
possible.
Their strength can be seen, for example, in Pas-de-
Calais. Here the government had insisted on a certain
man being made official candidate. The prefect had ob-
jected to him in vain : the man was made official candidate,
but the prefect nevertheless supported the man he had
recommended, who was duly elected. It was the prefect
who organised the elections on the spot and he would not
do his job properly if he was not satisfied with the candi-
dates he was supporting. It was the prefect, moreover, who
supplied the bulk of the information on which the govern-
ment based its decisions and, given a bit of energy and
ability, he could therefore generally get his own way. One
prefect thus sent very detailed information on the men he
wanted made official candidates, with full and cogent
reasons for his choice. Within a day Persigny replied :
‘The government is willing to accept your list. I thank
you for the precision and the clarity of the documents with
which you supply me.’^ Haussmann in Gironde likewise
knew what he wanted, insisted on his proposals, and com-
pelled the minister to yield.3 Another prefect refused
absolutely an influential candidate urged on him very
strongly by Persigny on the ground that this man was not
the son-in-law of a senator but merely the husband of a
senator’s adulterine daughter, and that the people would
not vote for such a person,'^ Yet another whose proposals
' F(ic) HI, Gironde 4, 7.2.1852.
* I'(ic) III, Nord 6,7. and 8.2.1852.
^ F(ic) III, Gironde 4, 14.2.1852, Persigny.
■* F(ic) II 102, Somme, prefect, 9.2.1852.
20
JIov) the fomdaiions of a UonapayU^t party zecre laid
were rejected in Pam wrote to Napoleon; 'If I am not
given complete liberty of action, I beg you, Monseipieur, to
be good enough to transfer me and appoint me to another
prefecture.’ Persigny yielded and replied : ‘ I esteem your
character and your devotion too highly to insist further I
therefore leave you free to act as you wish The prefect was
all politeness , he made concessions m turn and accepted
one of Persigny’s proposals. ‘I have acted thus’, he wrote,
‘out of respect for the hierarchy ... I shall be \ery glad
to find an opportunity to give you this proof of my regard ’ '
In the difficult departments where the legitimists had
powerful influence over the masses, the government did in
fact give the prefects great independence almost from the
Outset. To FimstCre, for example, Persigny WTote; Tn
view of the difficulties you are experiencing, the govern-
ment approves the candidatures of MM. de Mesonan and
Conseil and leaves you entirely free to choose the others ;
and he made this note for the ministry ■ ‘ Give the prefect
a blank cheque’ * The government thus showed that it
agreed with the view of the prefect who wrote ; 'I suppose
that at Paris the political question dominates all others ;
but w'hen you are on the spot, when you live among the
landowners of the region, when you feel local interests at
every step, it is very difficult not to take them into account
It was only the prefect who did not know his o^vn mmd
who i lmp«ea upon by the There
is a case in which Persigny wrote to a prefect : It is impos-
sible to decide on such vague information as you give me
What do you propose for each constituency ? A week
later he gave up m despair. ' Since it is impossible to choose
the candidates of the government on the basis of your
reonrts here are the ones who are adopted . . .
^The result was that in almost half of the departments
2.i8S2, 99 . Ille-et-Vibtne,
' = i 8 S 2 ’ F(.c)Il98,A.9.S 3 1852
; S5rfCv...
21
The Political System of Napoleon III
for which there is evidence, the prefects’ suggestions were
accepted. In the remainder, about half of their proposals
were accepted. In all, therefore, at least two-thirds or
three-quarters of the official candidates were proposed by
the prefects. But this does not mean that they alone made
proposals. The letters from generals, senators and influen-
tial patrons of every sort which poured into the ministry
were quite as numerous as theirs. Many candidates thought
they stood no chance unless backed by powerful friends,
and yet their testimonials were seldom decisive. Baroche
for example, got his candidate accepted in Seine-et-Oise,
where he had built up influenee, but many more of his
recommendations were fruitless. It is noteworthy that
Napoleon forwarded all the letters he received in favour
of candidates to the ministry of the Interior without com-
ment. Though unsolicited advice was, naturally enough,
frequently ignored, Persigny did seek out the opinion of
colleagues and men he trusted who could give him informa-
tion about the departments from which they came. The
prefects likewise consulted their sub-prefects, who in turn
made inquiries of important mayors and notables, and a
few even called meetings of them to choose the official
candidate by vote.
The significance of this method which Napoleon
adopted, of choosing his candidates through the administra-
tion, is that it meant a break with the practice of the republic
and a disavowal of the Bonapartist party which had grown
up in that period. The system had been to work through
committees which had their heyday under the republic.
In 1848 the Bonapartists had formed a committee like
everybody else. Its headquarters were in the rue Mont-
martre, and Persigny and General Piat were its chiefs.
Through their friends they appointed correspondents in
the provinces, and they were active during the elections of
December 1848 and April 1849. After the coup d’etat,
Morny, using the same system, had urged the prefects to
22
How ihefomdatiom of a BonapartUt party mere laid
establish Bonapartist committees in all arrondissements,
cantons and communes, to ensure the success of the
plebiscite by distnbuting ballot papers and propaganda. A
central committee was formed m Paris at the ministry of
Public Works, complete with statutes and \vith the title
of ‘National Electoral Association’ Marshal Exelmans,
Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, was its presi-
dent; General Pelet was the chairman of the executive
committee; and Napoleon de St-Albin, founder of the
Society of lo December in 1848, was one of its most active
supporters. Early in 1852 this association issued a circular
thanking and congratulating its helpers for their work in the
plebiscite and appointing one man m each department to
organise committees in all its subdivisions down to the
commune. It is unlikely, however, that it found agents in
anything like all the departments, for it obtained its re-
cruits in a very haphazard way. Any man who wished to
further the cause would, of his own accord, print a few
thousand ballot papers and distribute them in his district.
During parliamentary elections he would write to some
great Bonapartist to ask whom he should support and he
would in this way be brought into touch with the central
organisation Only rarely did it recruit more than scattered
individuals, as happened when the Bretagne Insurance
Company came forward and put its 300 agents at the
association’s disposal
Now the association set about choosing its candidates
for the election and it got busy collecting information in the
established manner The reports which poured in from
its correspondents were put together by Gallix, a Pans
journalist, and Roustain, deputy mayor of the Latin
Quarter of Paris and deputy professor of law, Meanw'hile
its agents m the departments were active. General Rey,
for example, ‘ Central President of all the Napoleonic com-
mittees of Isere smce the month of November 1848’, began
to search for ‘ Napoleonic candidates known as such, senous
The Poliiical System of Napoleon III
men with public opinion on their side’. He had his plans
all worked out. He intended to discuss the names he
thought of with the prefect, and to add whoever the prefect
suggested. He would then send his list with biographical
details to the minister of the Interior for decision. The
chosen candidates he would support in his Napoleonic
newspaper, which he had founded in 1848 and which he had
always kept independent of the administration. Great was
his surprise therefore when suddenly ‘from outside the
Napoleonic supporters’ candidates were chosen and an-
nounced by the prefect without consulting him — candi-
dates whom he considered absurd and ‘anti-Napoleonic’.'
The committees found themselves the rivals of the prefects.
This rivalry was not essential. In Haute-Saone, the
prefect had organised three election committees before the
coup d'etat, one for each arrondissement, in preparation for
the legislative election which was to have been held in
1852. The organisation was elaborate and the aim precise.
It was designed to support the revision of the republican
constitution. It was headed by a ‘committee of initiative’,
composed of local officials, councillors, professional men,
officers of the national guard and leading landowners, all
paying an entrance fee of 10 francs, or about 8 shillings.
They would draw up a list of possible candidates, which
they would submit to a larger meeting of representatives of
the communes. They would choose the representative
themselves but would include the mayors, priests and
schoolmasters. The vote of this meeting would decide who
the candidates would be. The men who attended it would
then return to their villages to distribute ballot papers,
posters and propaganda. This evidently is an excellent
system of testing and influencing public opinion, and at the
same time a system which the government could control.^
Yet the government from the start set out to destroy
‘ F(ic) II 100, Isfere, Gen. Rey to minister of Interior, 31 .1 .1852.
^ F(ic) II 103, Haute-Saone file.
24
How the fomdations of a Dofiapartist party were laid
these very committees which had done so much to help
put it into power ‘Until now,’ wrote Momy to the pre-
fects, ‘the custom in France has been to form electoral
committees, and meetings of delegates. This system was
very useful when men voted for a list. The system of
voting for a list created such confusion and such a need to
w^ork together, that it w’as essential to act in committee.
But today these sorts of meeting could have no adi'antage,
since the election 'vdl be of single names. They would
only have the inconvenience of creating premature ties,
appearances of acquired rights which w'ould only embarrass
the people and deprive them of all liberty. Please dissuade
the partisans of the government, therefore, from organising
election committees ’ *
Now why did Momy urge the abolition of committees
whose formation he had ordered only a month before ? *
The mam reason must have had a lot to do with the type of
men w'ho formed these committees. They were all essen-
tially men of httle standing, petty bourgeois, small-time
politicians ■ a head caretaker of the Stock Exchange, a
wholesale merchant, a postmaster, a carting contractor,
notaries, barristers, retired soldiers. Now these men
thought their time had come, their cause had tnumphed,
and they, its leaders, should get the spoils, the decorations,
the jobs, the seats in parliament. But the government had
made its policy clear, it wanted the support of the upper
classes. It was embarrassed therefore, when, for example,
Moiiavon put up hts candidature, the leader of the Bona-
partist committee m Latour du Pin, it is true — but a mere
stripling, a notarj^’s clerk who WTote poetry for the local
paper. These committees gave such men ideas of ‘ acquired
rights* which the government would not recognise; ihcir
reward could not come at the election, and they were
disbanded.
‘ FO**)*nq.i»o 107,8 t.iSjj
' Cf lit**} JO IJ jSjl.
The Political System of Napoleon III
The prefects, moreover, would not tolerate that the
government should divide its favours and that there should
be two channels of influence, one through the administra-
tion and one through the part3^ Thej' wrote jealous (and
amusing) rebukes to the committees to let them know their
place. They complained to the government that it was
‘strong enough by itself, and serv'cd sufficiently energetic-
ally by its prefects, to keep the initiative in and the conduct
of the elections in its own hands’.'
The result of the dissolution of the party was that the
influence of the smaller Bonapartist politicians on the
choice of candidates was almost entirely removed. They
could not refrain from continuing to send comments and
advice ; frequently written with difficulty in half literate
hands on cheap paper; but the title ‘recommended by
the committee’ ceased to carry weight. The secretary of
the association himself, having failed to be adopted as the
government’s candidate in two difl'erent departments, stood
as ‘opposition Bonapartist candidate’ against Baroche’s
Orleanist brother-in-law.
The official candidates were the government’s candi-
dates and were probably approved by the council of minis-
ters. Persigny always talks of himself as being ‘personally
favourable’ to a particular man and says that he only makes
proposals to the government. But in practice his advice
and that of the prefects was generally accepted.-
These were the makers of the parliamentarians of the
second empire. It is a conclusion of considerable interest.
It shows how the course of events was determined only
slightly by the rulers in Paris, and to a much greater extent
by the administrators in the provinces. It shows the im-
portance of studying the subordinates as well as the leaders
• F(ic) II loi, Nievre, 18.1.1852; 100, Isfcre, 8.1.1852; 103, Var,
prefect to National Electoral Association, copy, 19.1.1852; F (ic)III,
Calvados 6, prefect, 15.1.1852.
* F(ic) II 100, Maine-et-Loirc. Persigny, 15.2.1852; 100, Haute-
Loire, Romeuf, 6.2.1852 ; F(ic) III, Doubs 5, Persigny, 19.2.1852.
26
How the fotmdations of a Bonapartist party were laid
of the government. These men appear to be in the back-
ground to historians seeking the general trend of great
events, but the people of the day saw far more of the
subordinates, and to them it was the leaders who appeared
to be in the background. Politics is thus brought to a more
real level. The same will happen when it is seen not simply
what the parliamentary constitution of the period was, but
also who w^ere the men who put it into practice.
The Political System of Napoleon III
both unsullied and a notable ; for the unsullied withdrew
into retirement and obscurity, obtained no favours and
built up no influence. It was for this reason that the pure
Bonapartists had great difficulty in getting seats, for, unless
they were linked very closely with Napoleon personally, as,
for example, Dr. Conneau was, the prefects objected that
they were unknown and Persigny, thinking that they would
consequently have ‘poor chances’, would not press for their
adoption. The man who had the greatest difficulty in
being adopted as official candidate, who had to move
heaven and earth to succeed, was, oddly enough, Belmontet,
who had devoted his life to the Bonapartist cause. He
could not believe the opposition he encountered. ‘No,’
he wrote in despair, ‘M. de Persigny will not do this injury
to the old devotion of Belmontet ! No, the head of the
Napoleonic party will not dishonour the right of one of its
first soldiers ! ’ ^ Granier de Cassagnac, who was to become
the staunchest of Bonapartists, only just got adopted in
Gers after trying several other departments. In Calvados,
a Bonapartist was adopted but then dropped in favour of
an Orleanist, on the ground that his chances were poor.
Thil and Napoleon de St-Albin of the Exelmans com-
mittee were rejected as were the Bonapartist newspaper
editor in Hdrault and the law professor of Caen, president
of his town’s ‘2 December committee’.^ The trouble with
them was that they were not notables, not polished, well-
mannered men, as a prefect said, able to ‘go into society
Almost half of these Bonapartists were tainted with the
favours of previous governments, and particularly that of
Louis Philippe. Morny is the most famous of these, for
though Louis Napoleon’s half brother, he had been con-
servative M.P. under Guizot ; but a more typical example
of the species is Duboys. His father had been an officer
and a judge during the first empire ; an M.P. during the
' F(ic) 11 102, Tarn-et-Garonne, 11.2.1852.
^ F(ic) III, Calvados 6, 15.1.1852.
^ F(ic) 11 102, Somme, ministry note.
30
Where Napoleon Jaund the recruits for his parliament
Hundred Days and then persecuted by the restoration ;
'the memory of the emperor was a cult for him’. Duboys
himself was a school-mate of Louis Philippe’s son ; in 1830
he was given a job in the magistracy and he rose to be
advocate general of Angers, He was Bonapartlst by birth,
perhaps, but Orleanist by his generation.' Many Bona-
partists became fully naturalised Orleanists in this way
Rambuteau’s name, said a prefect, w^s linked with the
empire, but rather more so with the monarchy of /uly.
Persigny refused to accept as official candidate the son of
Soult, marshal of the empire but also Louis Philippe’s
minister. The more recent memories were inevitably the
strongest. A bare half of the Bonapartists were ‘pure’ and
free from all other loyalties.
To whom, then, could the government turn to augment
these slender ranks ? Everybody’s answer ^vas, the new
men, ‘who have not been members of any previous parlia-
ment and who are consequently free and independent’.*
Moray had urged that the government should scoop up
the cream of self-made men who had recently risen to im-
portance, who represented the youthful energy of the
country, but who had not yet been corrupted by politics
Typical of these ivas Conseil, a merchant of Brest who,
having made his awn fortune, prepared to enter parliament
on his own imtiatn^e. ‘M. Cornell’, wrote the prefect, ‘is
not an eminent man but is 3 wise and moderate man of
sound judgment and perfectly recommendable in all re-
spects The government would be able to count on him.’
He was accordingly adopted as official candidate,* as were
some fifteen others, merchants, industrialists, lawyers of
the same class as himself.^ The new men were sometimes
really non-pohtica! choices, as was, for example, a retired
■ BB (63 II 134, his file
* F(ic} n 58. A'ntyron, Calvet-Rogniat’s note on himself
’ Ftitf II P5i prefect of Finistire, jO l 185a
Industrialists Lefebure, Devinck, Descat, QuestiS, Balay, Gamier,
Charlier, Dugas Merchants Mortani, SchyVr, Fleury, Bow Daw-jers;
David, Ferret, Jolhvet Doctor Girou
3 *
The Political System of Napoleon III
forest commissioner described simply as a ‘government
man’ or an artist, son of a tailor, who had , been sent to
study art in Paris by his native town and who, now famous,
a member of the Institute and officer of the Legion of
Honour, was chosen to represent this town merely because
he was the local celebrity.- Others, however, came from
parliamentary^ families and were merely personally new
men .3 An example of the way such men joined the Bona-
partist ranks is Bryas. His father and his uncle had been
M.P.s; but he had married into another department into
a family apparently related to Ducos, the minister of the
Marine. Drawn by these new eontacts, he ‘burnt his
boats with the old parties’, founded a newspaper to support
Napoleon, and came into parliament as a new man devoted
to the cause.'* In all there were about forty new men.
They were reemits. . Allies were found in twenty-five
members of the Orleanist opposition, of whom a dozen had
been M.P.s. Many of the opponents of Louis Philippe
had naturally come into their own in 1848 : many of them
were re-elected in 1848 and 1849 and thus, when the crisis
of 1851 came, those who accepted Napoleon’s solution to it
were kept on to serve in the next parliament. They were
the outs come in. In so far as the republic and the empire
were a reaction and a fight against Orleanist influence, the
opponents of Louis Philippe were Napoleon’s obvious
allies. Taillefer illustrates the evolution of these men well.
He was the son of a regicide M.P. of the revolution. He
was by birth the enemy of the Bourbons : the revolution of
1830 which was very left to start with, therefore brought
hini into the general council of his department. He in-
heiited the leadership of the local radical opposition from
his father, and in 1846 at length succeeded in being elected
F(ic) II 102, Bas-Rhin, prefect, 6.2.1852.
“ Lemaire of Valenciennes, Nord.
4 ^**P°***^®> Debelleyme, Etcheverry, Reinach.
Tj. , , 15.1.1852 and 10.2.1852. Others are Aym^,
Kich6, O^ait Louvet, Plants, Camel, Gareau, Ledier, Veauce, De Voize,
Marrast, Du Marais, Reveil.
32
iVficre Napoleon found the recruits for his parliament
to parliament. The revolution of 1848 destroyed his
Orleanist opponents and raised him to the presidency of
his general council. His wheel had come full circle. ‘I
am pure’, he wote, 'of all contact with the governments
which have preceded your own. None gave me a favour,
not even a ribbon for my buttonhole. I want to drop my
political anchor, to make an end of it, and to make it with
you.’ *
Finally, there were about 70 men who were even more
independent of the government 35 of legitimist origin, 2
catholics, 18 conserv'atives (government men ready to serve
under most regimes) and 17 Orleanists.^ The classification
of these men between the parties is sometimes difficult
and arbitrary, but they were in any case very independent
allies whom the government accepted not from choice and
not from the supposed desire to create a ‘party of order’,
but from necessity and from policy. It had no love for
Orleanists, and Persigny complained of a man, prefect
throughout the reign of Louis Philippe, as being ‘an in-
corrigible Orleanist'.’ Five of them were accepted after
hesitation and resistance on Persigny’s part Another four
came from Pas-de-Calais : they were M.P s in 1851 and
' F(ic) m, tiordogne s. Taillefer, JO I 1852 Cha^seloup, Lem^rcier,
Eidault, EilUult, Delthid, Le Gorrec, Cheque, Desjobett, Dei4vau, Debre-
tonne, SalJandnouie Eschassenjui. I.«inercier son, Ste-Hermine, Patieu,
Mouchy, SoulUS Gistlard. Clemiont-Tonnerre, Lanquetin, Le^avasseur,
Bertrand, Faugier, Ouvrard Three opponents of the restoration, Bavous,
Lecomte, F Favre
* Legitimists Jouvenel, Andelarre, Bourcier, Ravinel, Paitouneaux,
Rochemure, La Gu^ionniere, Wendel, Torcy, Durfort de Cisrac, BClcherde
Chauvignd, O'Qum, Barbentane, Gouy, Cara>on, Chauviti-LenardiSre,
Loimet, Jonage, Bigaud, Remade, Cornier, Uzfes, Calvitre, Halt hois, Morte-
mart, Flaviguy, Mepieu, Argent, TromeUn, Parmenttcr, Dodos, Pongdrard,
Roques, Arjuzon, Chaielies
R C.S Montalembert and La Tour
Conservatives Demestnay, Crarnmont, Lelut, Boissv, Lemaire, Durand,
Renouartl de Bussi^re, Migeon, David of Sevres, Janvier, Fortoul, SeydoUit,
Clebsattd, Lacave, TaJhouet, Chanterac, Tnier
Ofleamsts Vautier, Leroy-Beaulieo, Monier, Renouard, Chauchard,
Hetlincourt, Lequien, H^rambault, Lefefaure, Hermant, Randomg, Bigrel,
Taunac, JVIercier, Goum, Roulleaus-Dogagr, Bertin (I 'A-V , defeatedi, Du
Miral
* F(ic) II 99, rault, Roulleaux-Dugage to Mithel Chevalier, 13 . 2 , i S52
33
The Poliiical Syslem of Napoleon III
the consen'ative prefects thought their re-election inevit-
able. Some of these men, and some of the conservatives,
had co-operated in the movement for the revision of the
constitution, but most were merely accepted by tame pre-
fects. In the eastern Pyrenees Durand, the department’s
leading landowner, was adopted because he had long op-
posed the domination there of the republican Arago family.
Now that the Aragos were defeated, it was liis turn to
represent the department in parliament. Another man,
who had been M.P. for fifteen years, was supported by all
parties because of his ‘good will and devotion to the in-
habitants’.’
What is most interesting, however, is the government’s
policy towards the legitimists. All sorts of circumstanees
favoured their entering the parliament. The law giving
M.P.s no salary and excluding civil servants from their
number restricted membership to rich men. Morny’s
circular demanded the election of great landowners, Per-
signy’s said that their political antecedents should be ig-
nored. The list of politicians expelled after the coup d’etat
included no legitimists ; a decree of 22 January 1852 con-
fiscated the property of the Orleans family. All this pointed
in the same direction. The prefects wrote to the ministry
in puzzlement that nearly all the great landowners were
legitimists. ‘It is to be feared’, wrote Haussmann, ‘that
membership of parliament will be the privilege of the great
landowners and that the legitimist opinion will come out in
great strength. Its partisans do not conceal that they do
in fact count a lot on this result. It will be, moreover, the
first time that we have seen the systems of unpaid M.P.s
and of the exclusion of officials applied at the same time.’ ^
The prefect of Finistere was equally puzzled. ‘ The govern-
ment’, he wrote, ‘is evidently dealing carefully \i7iinager^
with the legitimists. . . . What ought my conduct to be ?
F(ic) II 102, Tam-et-Garonne, Janvier.
^ F(ic) III, Gironde 4, 15.1.1852.
34
Where NapoUon found the recruits for his parliament
Can I launch a frontal attack on the opponents ? . . ,
Ought I, on the contrary, to seek to appease, to conciliate,
to convert the recalcitrants ?’ >
The reasons for this attitude to the legitimists can only
be guessed at. Did Napoleon fear their strength, for they,
unlike the Orleanists, had great influence on the masses }
Were they natural allies against the Orleanist, was it an
inhentance of common opposition to Louis Philippe ^
Persigny was the friend of Falloux and there is a draft in
his hand saying: ‘The government, at my request, decided
not to oppose M. Bucher de Chauvignfe {a legitimist], the
friend of M. de Falloux’, who was duly made official can-
didate.* Did he have a general sympathy for them ?
Probably the government acted in this way not from
policy but simply at the dictate of circumstance. The
legitimists included uncompromising ultras but also
moderate men whose legitimism had become theoretical,
hereditary, a mark of good breeding, like the membership
of an exclusive club There was hope of rallying them.
They had been out of office and deprived of influence long
enough to begin to despair. The marquis de Beausset-
Roquefort, M P. before 1830, said that he would be eter-
nally grateful to the minister if he would do him the veiy
great service of adopting him as official candidate, ‘ because
It would enable me to re-enter the political career m a
decent manner. . You know me well enough to be able
to affirm that my co-operation will be honest, with-
out any mental reservations, and my fidelity as complete
as that of the most devoted friends of the government It
is not of the men who remained loyal m 1830 that distrust is
possible Some of these legitimists had already ‘rallied*
when they were adopted by the government ; some com-
mitted themselves to support it when they accepted its
I F(cc') II g5, Ejniitfre. 1 $ # 1S53
* F{ic) H 100, Mauie-et-Loire, IS
1 F(ic) II gS, S -3 iSjJ, to niioj^ler of Intwjor
35
The Political System of Napoleon III
patronage; the rest, it was hoped, would ‘rally’ in the
future.
Their varied attitudes can be seen in two examples.
‘Though I am a legitimist by principle,’ wrote another
marquis, ‘ I have never adopted the Policy of the Party. I
did not emigrate into the provinces in the first years of the
Monarchy of July, nor later contract those monstrous
alliances which overthrew it. As a Government Man and
a Man of Conciliation, I moved towards the Conservative
Party which carried me into Parliament [in 1846]. ... In
a spirit of conservatism and in the interests of the country,
I loyally supported the De Facto Government, which had
none of my personal sympathies. . . .’ * Another type
can be seen in a farmer, who ‘ is not a man of the salon —
he is a country gentleman who wants the decoration I
asked for him. You will do anything you please with him.
He will vote for the government without saying a word.’*
The legitimists were, however, not sought out : it was
merely that the prefects thought them the best candidates,
and this accounts for about half of them. Flavigny, for
example, was believed to be irremovable. ‘His superior
position, the immense consideration he enjoys, and the
just influence he has won by the innumerable services
which for the past twenty years he has not ceased to render
to the district and to people,’ appeared to make his choice
inevitable .3 The other half of the legitimists represented
departments where their party was considered so powerful
that the government decided to support moderate members
of it in order to avoid openly hostile ultras. The prefects
insisted that some compromise with them was essential.
‘The numerical strength of the legitimist party’, wrote one,
‘ does not allow me to doubt that it would be master of the
election in the department of Herault if it decides to unite
' F(ic) 11 loi, Orne, letter from Villedieu de Torcy to sub-prefect,
26 . 1 .1852, and copy of another in prefect’s letter of 3 .3 . 1852.
= F(ic) II 100, Isiire, prefect, 7.2.1852.
^ F(ic) II 99, Indre-et-Loire, Quinemont’s letter.
36
U 7/ere Napoleon found the recruits far Ms parliament
for the purpose, . , , I regard it a duty imposed on me
both by gratitude and by wise policy, to contain with tact
but with firmness this formidable party, al\vaj'3 ready to
accept . , . jobs which give influence, m order to make
them scr\c the success of their personal views and their
eternal hopes of the future. I had therefore to get down to
seeking candidatures ivliich were not the expression of the
legitimist opinion, but which at the same time ivould not
be sufficiently hostile to it to be the signal for a fight in
which ihcir numbers would defeat us ’ ' hlichel Che\'alier,
who was influential in tf«irault, told Persigny, ‘The legiti-
mists are too strong in the department for us not to give
them their share, and of all their men the best for the
president is hi . . A few prefects even suggested
abstaining from putting up an official candidate rather than
suffer certain defeat,
There was of course resistance to this policy of yielding.
Ought not the government to have a candidate 'of its
choice, chosen by it and recognised as such, so as to counter-
balance the legitimist influence In one department the
prefect had urged this policy of yielding, Fortoul, the
minister of Education, protested ‘If you want legitimists
to represent Bouche^-du-Rhdne, you have only to follow
the advice of AI. de Suleau fthe prefect]. But if you choose
Ah Gtiien [whom Fortoul preferred, an OrJeanJst it appears,
who was not m fact adopted] and if he accepts, you will
create a great . . . governmental influence m a part of the
country which has too Jong been abandoned-’ The prefect,
however, claimed that ‘the most certain method of dissolv-
ing the old parties in this department is to borrow their
leaders whenever they frankly accept the new order of
things, and the number as well as the opportunity of these
borrowings must be determined, it seems to me, by the
real strength of the local influences which we wish to win
* rCic) II 9g, Hirault, prefect, 20 and >6 J 1852
* Ibid , pencil note by Persigny of a conversation ivith Cnevaiier
^ Ibid , note by Hoc
37
The Political System of Napoleon III
over’.’ On the other hand, in certain parts of the country
the legitimists were unpopular and the nobles disliked.
The government compromised. In only one case, that of
Card, did it deliver up the department entirely to the legiti-
mists, but here there were special circumstances. Persigny
regretted his decision as soon as he had made it and attri-
buted it to incorrect information. Usually the legitimists
were given a third or half of the seats in their strongholds.
One seat in Vaucluse, for example, was given to a Bona-
partist, ‘which would be an advance on the road of Napo-
leonic principles’, but the second was given to a legitimist
‘to conciliate a considerable party and to obtain the even
more considerable support of the clergy’.^
When the government in this way chose men openly
calling themselves legitimists, was it impotently admitting
enemies into its parliament ? Sometimes it was and some-
times it was not. It had two ways of winning a hold on
such enemies : the system of official candidates and the
professions of faith. When a man publicly accepted the
patronage of the government, he became a declared col-
laborator if not an actual convert. He owed the government
something in return for its patronage. As a legitimist said,
‘ It is a question of honour . . . for me to support whether
I like it or not, a government whose support and help I
solicit ’.3 Another declared that a legitimist who accepted
the title of official candidate ‘would appear to me to lose
his dignity and his independence’, and he agreed to accept
it himself only if the government allowed him to write to
the leaders of his party to assure them that his independence
was inviolate.'’
A man who accepted the patronage of the government
separated himself from his old party, but did not therefore
’ F(ic) II 98, Bouches-du-Rhone, note by Fortoul, and prefect,
10.2.1852. “ F(ic) II 103, Vaucluse, prefect, 15.1.1852.
3 F(ic) II 98, Ardbchc, sub-prefect Largentifcre to Chevreau jnr.,
7.2.1852.
■* F(ic) III, Card 5 , Calvil;re to minister of Interior, 23.2.1852.
38
Where Napoleon Jound the reef uiu Jar hts parliament
become a slave of the government. Persigny did not de-
rnand promises of obedience but simply that ‘the candi-
dates should in their circulars express themselves clearly
in favour of the new order of things This circular might
take such a form as this , * I am firmly convinced that to
desert the cause of Louis Napoleon in the present or m the
future would be to desert the cause of France and of
civilisation. In a word I make profession of devotion, of
loyalty, of respect and of sympathy, absolutely and without
mental reservations, for the prince and for his government.’
The author of this declaration was a legitimist, to one of
whose children the comte de Chambord had stood god-
father.* The aim was not to make such men puppets but
to compel them to burn their boats and to ostracise them-
selves from their former party. They would thus be
forced to stay on Napoleon’s side since they were traitors
to their old friends.
These then were the official candidates, but their mere
choice did not ensure their election. Many people seemed
to think, it IS true, that a seat m parliament was a job m
the government’s gift, but it should by now be clear that
the government did not consider its task to be so simple.
The election of 1852 was, in fact, a serious affair. The
smallness of the vote in favour of the government is not
realised. There were
9,809,834 electors
6,233,582 voted
5,195,178 for government candidates
820,745 opposition candidates
131,765 for miscellaneous candidates
75,894 votes were blank or annulled >
' F(je) II 100, Marne, rersiguy, 7 2 1851. 102, Somme, Pmifmy,
><>.2 1852.
’ F{ic) n 102, Sa6ne-et-Loir*, Barbentane
* FCicjlljS- The figures of the opposition and the mweeKaneous men
given here arc corrected ones The clerk in this document put the figures
of Vienne m the wnsrig column
to
39
The Political System of Napoleon III
Thus, though the government may have got 83 per cent of
the votes cast, only 53 per cent of the electorate voted for
it and it therefore got a bare majority. The total of opposi-
tion candidates elected was small : 4 republicans and 2
legitimists. Only 5 official candidates had to undergo a
second ballot because they did not get the votes of a quarter
of the electorate. But within their constituencies govern-
ment candidates were, in addition, defeated in whole dis-
tricts.' Moreover, in twenty-six departments, that is in a
third of the country, the government candidates were re-
turned by a minority of the electorate. The opposition
figures do not sound impressive but in fact they were not
spread out evenly over France. There was no serious
contest in two-fifths of the constituencies, there was some
contest in another two-fifths, but the strong opposition
was concentrated in the remaining fifth where over half
(57 per cent) of the opposition votes were cast. In these
latter constituencies, the opposition obtained 471,000
votes against the government’s 835,000 ; and it is all the
more remarkable because these constituencies are concen-
trated in clearly marked areas — the west, the north and
the south- east. 2
The abstention varied enormously in different regions,
and it was particularly overwhelming in the towns. For
France as a whole the figure is 37 per cent but in Cette
(Hcrault) 77 per cent abstained, and the official candidate
was voted for by 12 per cent of the electorate. Some large
towns voted no differently from the countryside {e.g.
Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Lyons, Auxerre, Rouen,
Napoleon-Vendde) but two-thirds abstained in Strasbourg,
Sedan, Lisieux, Amiens, Bourg (Ain), La Rochelle and
Aix ; 54 per cent in Marseilles, 75 per cent in St-fitienne,
' Towns : Brest, St-fiticnne, Marseilles, Bdziers (Hcrault), Crest
(Drome), Beaune (Cote-d’Or), Elbeuf (Seine-Inf.), Auxerre (Yonne). In
one-third of the communes of Loire- Inf. (3) ; in three of the cantons of
Aveyron (2) ; in two of Corrfeze (2) ; in one arrondisscment of Creuse (i).
C. 133O-9. 2 See the map on p. 172.
40
Where Napoleon found the recruits for his parliament
8i per cent in Vierzon (Ciier). The contrast between town
and country can be seen, for example, in Gironde. In the
constituency of Bordeaux intra-murosyo percent abstained ;
in Bordeaux extra^muros 53 per cent abstained; m the
three rural constituencies only 42, 43 and 46 per cent didd
This abstention of the towns had a definite political signifi-
cance. In the election of 1849, the abstention was roughly
the same in total, 33 per cent, but it was greatest in the
country and least in the towns.^ The elections show that,
though all the nation may have voted in favour of Napoleon
at the plebiscite, it was vety divided when it had to descend
from general principles to local details.
The opposition was certainly not silent. It faced in-
numerabie obstacles ' its ieadem had been persecuted, its
newspapers suppressed, its printers and its canvassers
obstructed. Yet not a few managed to tour their constitu-
encies and distribute their propaganda, to ‘move heaven
and earth to succeed'.’ The Timesy which was no friend to
Napoleon, reported that in the capital at least ‘no impedi-
ment was placed m the way of any party’ ; in some con-
stituencies every poster of an official candidate had one of
its opponent’s beside it and in others there were no posters
but instead very active agents distributing ballot papers/
Who then were the 350 opposition candidates ? The
smallest number among them were Orleanists. and those
Orleanists who did stand were generally not very hostile
to the government. The way they thought can be illustrated
by this story. In the department of Ain, Momy had
accepted an Orleamst but Persigny had later rejected him.
The man whom the government chose, a legitimist called
Lormet, ignored the Orleamst gentlemen who had been
used to managing elections, and left the propaganda entirely
‘ F{ic) 111, Gironde 4 ,,, T! t O /n
* G Genique, VBlecUon di rAsstmbUe U^islatne tn (Paris,
Igzi), 32
^ F(ic) llr, Corrire 7, « 3 3^53 . Ftir) II pS. C6tts-du-Nord,
i8 2 185a -* The Times, i and 3 3
41
The Political System of Napoleon III
to the prefect. The local judge went to see the prefect and
told him that the notables, ‘society’, had had a meeting,
that they were ‘profoundly hurt by the attitude of M. de
Lormet towards them, they regarded it a duty to protest
against a candidature which was put up as a defiance ; and
that they had just got M. de Courcelles [a former Orleanist
M.P.] to stand. . . . We cannot withdraw ; it is a duty
which is imposed on us by our regard for our dignity before
the eyes of the population of the town of Bourg. . . '
These men were simply furious that their old control of
local politics was being challenged. Most of the Orleanists,
however, abstained for the same reason that they abstained
in 1848 : they were stung by the coup as they had been by
the fall of their monarchy : they were overawed and struck
numb by the astounding result of the plebiscite.
The ‘ reds ’ also largely abstained ; and together with
the Orleanists they probably account for the great absten-
tion in the towns. They had, however, more candidates
than the Orleanists, and theirs were openly hostile. What
is remarkable about them is the way they got large votes
from little effort. They won a seat in Lyons despite the
arrest of their leaders, despite their having no election
committees or even newspapers in which to announce their
candidatures. In Marseilles the republican candidate ob-
tained 5000 votes even though he had put himself up only
two days before the election. Their method generally was
to pass the word round among their friends at the last
moment, that they would vote for some great republican
in exile or some locally well-known leader. In this way
they obtained considerable votes for absent candidates.
Sometimes they gave their votes to an opposition candidate
of another party. The government was much impressed
by their discipline.^
■ F(ic) II 98, Ain, prefect, 32-2.1853.
^ BB(3o) 403 , procureur geniral, Grenoble, 1 8 . and 26. 2. 1852, 9. 3. 1852.
F(ic) III, Nord 6, prefect, 16.3.1852. F(ic) III, Meurthe 6, prefect,
6.3.1852.
43
Where Napoleon found ike recruits for his parliament
There was some opposition which merely represented
personal or local rivalry One opponent was a popular
solicitor who had headed the poll in 1848 and 1849 and
who was simply a 'good chap' without political significance.
Another stood because the official candidate was a stranger
to the district. A third was a man with ‘a numerous
clientele of men to whom he has rendered sendees and w’ho,
without bothering too much about his political opinions,
go about praclatming everywhere his obligingness and the
readiness with which he places his credit at the disposal of
everyone In Dijon the mayor was the official candidate ;
his opponent was the deputy mayor who had just been dis-
missed after a quarrel The mayor of Crest was so proud
of the decoration he had received for his conduct on 2
December that ‘he felt himself obliged to stand The
legitirmst who was elected in Maine-et-Loire owed a great
deal to the fact that his constituency consisted of two
arrondissements ; he came from one of them, and the
official candidate from the other Their struggle was thus
to a considerable extent a matter of local rivalry. The
victor was a young man of an old local family, who had
ahvay^s lived m his country bouse and devoted himself to
local improvernents, social welfare and religious institu-
tions. On his election he hastened to inform the prefect
that he had no intention of becoming ‘an opposition man*.^ '
The strangest opposition came from the legitimists. As
m the reign of Louis Philippe, their official policy was
abstention, m order to prevent the party from collaborating
and so disintegrating. Many, however, refused to allow
their influence to rust from disuse and to abandon the gams
made since 1848. The editor of the legitimist ne^vspaper
in Finisthre told the prefect that his party would do all it
could to overthrow Louis Napoleon and that it hoped to
* BochardinAin.AuliaeinCantal. Ftic)H99,rn*e,pref«ct.lS -* 1S52
» F(je> JII, Drfijne j, prefect, a 1853
' F(tclUi< 3 Ci,MMne-ei- Loire, prefect, 4- Mid 30 j 1S52.
4 $
The Political System of Napoleon III
succeed.' Their activity became intense ; meetings were
held, candidates chosen. Then suddenly in many parts of
the country they fell silent. Their candidatures were with-
drawn. They may have received some threat from their
king, or they may have been unable to agree on whom to
put up. Even so, despite these withdrawals, their opposi-
tion was powerful. They had candidates in all the con-
stituencies of three western departments and all together
they put up about thirty-five important candidates, mainly
in the west and south.
It is a stock belief that the second empire was established
with the co-operation of the church. However, whatever
the policy at Paris may have been, in the provinces the
clergy were frequently hostile. The bishops opposed the
official candidates in at least four departments of the west
and even circulated orders in favour of the legitimists, which
their clergy read out from their pulpits. Where a candidate
was anti-clerical or unpleasing to the church for any reason,
the clergy did not hesitate to oppose him, as happened in
seven departments.^ In Moselle and Ardeche they lent
their aid against the protestant official candidates. Very
often, of course, the church did support the government,
but it was no obedient instrument and a very uncertain ally
from the beginning.
The elections of 1852 show what the second empire
meant. It did not represent a mere dictatorship of the
masses, but sought to combine aristocracy with democracy
and to build society in the shape of a pyramid, with the
people as its base and a hierarchy of merit at its top. The
driving force within it was ambition and worldly honour
open to all was its reward. It enabled the peasants to vote
for the left — for the revolutionary who had defied the
' F(ic) II 99, Finistcre, prefect, 13.2.1852.
^ Prefects’ reports F(ic) II 99, Finisttre, 12.2.1852; 100, Loire-Inf.,
28.2.1852; 103, Vendde, 25.2.1852; 99, I.-&-V., 25.2.1852; 98,
H.-AIpes, 28.2.1852 ; 98, C.-du-N., 13.3.1852 ; 101, Cantal, 21.2.1852 ;
102, Somme, 27.2.1852 ; 102, S 5 vres, 3 .3 . 1852 ; P.-de-C. ; Aveyron ; cf.
103, H.-Vienne, 23.2.1852.
44
Where Napoleon found the recruits for his parliament
constitution and against the old gangs and the nobles —
but at the same time to vote for the right, for order, for
property, for the family and for religion.
The elections show, too, how the seed of the liberal
empire was within it from the start Its supporters in-
cluded notables capable of participation in power, many of
whom had already tasted the pleasures of parliamentary
government under the monarchy of July. The demand
for the liberal empire from withm the parliament is there-
fore to be expected That from outside it is to be expected
no less. The old parties did not acclaim it and it was only
a question of time before they rea^^oke from their stupor.
The totvns it never conquered, and they remained latent
enemies within it The opposition of the end of the reign
was no less the revival of long-silent foes than the dissatis-
faction of a new generation. Its early years are no Jess
interesting or important than the \ioIent struggles amid
which it ended
45
CHAPTER IV
Whai politics meant to the members of parliament
Napoleon is asserted to have said, ‘The empress is legiti-
mist, my cousin is republican, Morny is Orlcanist, I am a
socialist ; the only Bonapartist is Persigny and he is mad
If such was the division among the leaders of the empire,
would it not be at least equal among its followers who, it
has been seen, were recruited from equally varied sources ?
Did the empire then represent no definite creed, and was it
merely a jumble of ideals and prejudices brought together
by accident and doomed to disintegrate at the first shock
of failure ? It has become a habitual pastime for historians
of this period to dissect Napoleon, to show up the divers-
ity of his background and the contradiction of his aims, and
thus to conclude that he was bound to fail. Yet his motley
qualities were perhaps necessary for a man engaged m
transforming a country in which the old and the new stood
confronted and unreconciled ; and he was, moreover, by
no means unique in his age. Disraeli was in many ways his
counterpart in England, pursuing a similar task, and bizarre
and mystical like him. Their followers were equally
divided in both countries and they both had to deal with
all extremes from the most progressive radicalism to the
highest toryism.
Now the parliamentarians of the second empire repre-
sented many different shades of opinion but the remarkable
fact is that there were very few supporters of absolutism
amongst them. The extreme right was led by Baron
Jerome David, said to be the illegitimate son of King Jerome
Bonaparte and in any case certainly his godson and a great
46
What politics meant to the memheTS of parliament
confidant of the empress. With his military moustache
and stern features suggestive of a Prussian Junker, he
looked the part of a high reactionary He spoke seldom
and poorly, and his election as vice-president of the house
represented simply an acknowledgement of the strength
he derived from his back-stairs influence and from the
vigour of hts convictions. The views of his party were
expressed by one of his followers. They were ‘conserva-
tives', he said. They believed that politics was not a
matter for the people. The electors had no business with
cabinet secrets , nor ought they to waste their time listen-
ing to inexperienced young men explaining great issues to
them instead of getting on with useful w'ork. Their task
was to elect decent people to parliament and to give them a
free hand to decide the affairs of the state They did not
deny that France loved liberty ; but by liberty they under-
stood merely equality before the law.’ Yet even this
group did not deny the theoretical merits of the need
for reform and concessions; they objected only that
progress was impossible without order m the streets and
they counselled not resistance to all change, but merely
procrastination
Many of the retired soldiers in parliament were likewise
stalwart upholders of ‘order’ but with a more positive
policy of using it to obtain glory. ‘What France wanted
above all was to resume the place m the world which its
genius mented and which its valiant legions w'ould know
how to defend,’ The empire for them represented the
antithesis of the reign of Louis Philippe, with its fear of
risks and of action ; it represented the concentration of
forces in a great patriotic movement for material and
political glory ^
The bulk of the conservatives, however, were rather the
' BaTon de Benoist, ACL 1868,4 1^6-9
^ Jerome David, CRCL i860, S64 , ACL 1861, I 231-7. ACL iS6e,
3 163-8, ACL 1869, a 49'S9
a Marquis de Nesle, ACL i86a, 2 96-7 , ACL 1863, t 97-8
47
The Politicnl Syslcin of Napoleon III
spiritual descendants of the provincial nobility of the
eighteenth century, '^riicrc wore some among them, it is
true, who had the Orlcanlst disinclination for ‘great
things’, wliich were expensive, and preferred 'great
speeches’, parliamcntar)’ government, which cost nothing
and increased their own importance. There is no doubt
that the patriotic urge to lead the world appealed to most of
them, and for this they were glad to have a Naj^oleon at the
head of the state. But they had no \ise for the social con-
sequences of Bonapartism. Du hliral, a provincial advo-
cate general till the revolution of tS.pS forced him into
agriculture, later a vice-president of the house and a leader
of another nuance of conservatism, rose in anger to deny
that the empire had anything to do with democracy. He
denounced the doctrine of the rule of the greatest number.
‘Tlic present empire’, he repeated, ‘is not democracy in-
carnate, it is not the republican idea crowned : it is mon-
archy ... it is a real monarchy.’ ' Wliat these men
wanted was a combination of monarchy with aristocracy,
which meant decentralisation, self-rule in local afl'airs, and
the central government confined to the conduct of such
matters as foreign policy. Liberty required ‘the counter-
weight of an aristocratic or monarchic government’. The
government must therefore not seek to destroy the aristo-
cracy but ought to strengthen it. ‘ When a proper govern-
ment uses the power which it has at its disposal to destroy
an ancient, useful, honourable and consequent!)' a legiti-
mate influence, it is not strengthening the principle of
authority, it is only weakening the moral force of society
and strengthening the revolution wliich can only gain
ground when the barriers which hold it back arc lowered.’^
It was impossible, they claimed, to govern a country with-
out an aristocracy. ‘What can you expect to happen to a
' CUCL 1856, 528; CRCL i860, 517.
- Anclr6 do La Chnrcnte, ACL 1864, 2. 336-S.
’ Barton do Jouvcncl, ACL 1863, 3. 179-80.
48
IVhat politics meant to the members of parliament
democracy of 38 millioji souls, increasingly leveled out
each day by social and political equality, %vithout an aristo-
cracy and so without guides, abandoned every morning to
the perils of the press which poisons it and leads H astray,
without religion, greedy of pleasure, seeding by methods
right or wrong the gold which provides this pleasure;
therefore, having I’erj’ httic time to give to the forum
and to public affairs, and yet called upon to govern itself
and all alone I In truth this phenomenon has no precedent
in any time or among any peopfe. [As I said m rS^SJ . .
France with its universal suffrage, which levels the people
out [qui en fait tine pousstere du peuple]^ seems to me to be
destined to fall incessantly from despotism into anarchy
and from anarchy into despotism ’ ^ In practical terms,
their ideal meant the rule of the provinces by the notables,
by Cornells gen&aux to be turned into new provincial
estates. To the more reactionary, this would be a means
of holding the masses in check : to the liberals it was a
way of educating them for self-government, by giving
them practice on a local scale.*
This paradise of country gentlemen was very far from
the ideal of the ‘democratic* Bonapartists. For them the
second empire was the regime of self-made men, and they
claimed that its true character was shown by Napoleon's
calling himself a parvenu.^ It represented above all the
principle of equality, ‘dear to all men risen from the ranks
of the people',* ‘It has on its side universal suffrage and
a glorious parvenu represents admirably all those who want
to parvenift that is to say, democracy ' * The nobility had
been dethroned in 1830, the Bourgeoisie m 1848, all that
remains today is the people and at its head, the emperor of
a ‘crowned democracy’.** ‘The best characteristic of the
■ LQUvetto OUt^'er, s6 lt> 187*. OUmer papers
* Pinard, ACL 1870. 2 355*8 Chas$eIoup.Laubat’s project for local
oouncila, 1S71, la hJ» papers a Tajllefer. CRCL 185S,
» Laroche-Joubert. ACL 1S70, 5 374
1 Tsillefer, M U. 1853, 554 “ Pir£, CRCL 1S59. 19^'?
49
The Political System of Napoleon III
imperial government is to have delivered public affairs from
the hands of minorities and newspapers into those of every-
body . . and the essential thing about the regime was
that ‘it was the government of all substituted for the
government of a few’. Its merit was that it knew how to
make democracy work and how to prevent it from lapsing
into demagogy. It sought to render the masses conservative
by giving them something to conserve, and by occupying
itself perpetually in improving their lot.*
It was this last aspect of the empire which appealed to
the St Simonians in parliament. Heirs of another type
of the eighteenth century, the reformers who saw in the
king the only power strong enough to fulfil their aims, they
found their ideal in this regime, directed by one man, but
concerned with the well-being of the whole nation. They
rejoiced in its gifts of cheap food, railways, roads, and
canals, the essentials of rapid economic progress; they
acclaimed it for bringing prosperity without precedent,
social legislation, the welfare state, the raising of France
to the first rank among the economic powers,^
‘ Napoleon represented for me, as a native of Ardennes,
the protest against 1815 ; for me, as a landowner, as an
industrialist, as a lawyer who knows the peasants and the
people thoroughly, Napoleon was at once the guarantee of
order and the promise of assistance within the limits of
possibility.’ ^
Yet even these Caesarian democrats did not believe that
Napoleon should rule by himself, and, as time passed,
most of them demanded that they should have a share in
his power and that parliament should be associated with
him. If they did not go to the extent of demanding parlia-
mentary government, they insisted on the government of
the country with ‘the co-operation and with the advice of
' Granicr de Cassagnac, CRCL i860, 503 and 1148-50.
= Nogent St-Laurcns, CRCL 1854, 64-7 ; Koenigswarter, CRCL 1856,
32 - 4 -
’ F(ic) II 98, Ardennes, RichiS-Tirman to ministerof Interior, 26. i .1852.
JVIiat politici meant to the wembers oj parliament
the country'.* Nearly all types m the legislature ^ere
therefore opposed to the indefinite maintenance of the
constitution of 1852.
It would be an oversimplification, how'ever, to suggest
that the new self-made men were in favour of Caesarian
democracy and that the heirs of great names or fortunes
■were m favour of decentralisation. It is in any case impos-
sible to discover the real opinions of the great mass of silent
back-benchers These men must be approached from
another angle. The reasons why they were in politics
must be explained and in this way it will be possible to
show' what politics meant to them and to foresee how they
w'ould use their power.
At least a third of all the M.P.s of the reign were bom
into politics, and their parents had occupied positions
equivalent or superior to their own; but the attitudes of
these men, the amount of support they w'ould give the
government, and what they expected to get out of politics
differed greatly. The heirs of the great names of the first
empire sat in parliament as though by hereditary right,
Sometimes they w'ere the junior members of a family, and
had to be content with a seat m the legislature while their
seniors sat m the senate ; others were there simply be^se
they could not be accommodated in the senate, ^ey
were the ornaments of the house and not the pdlars of the
regime, for few of them were powerful m their constitu-
encies, and though they would support the empire with
their votes, they brought it little independent strength.
Their presence, however, was not an isolated concession
to the memory of the past, for nepotism still flourished as a
vigorous institution The Murat family, for example, held
royal sway over the department of Lot First, therefore,
the M.P. for Lot was Lafon de Cayx, a retired prefect,
nephew' of King Murat ; and on his death Joachim Murat,
1 Taillefer, ACL 1861, t 313-U
s>
The Political System of Napoleon III
a member of the younger branch, succeeded him to hold
the seat for thirty-five years (1854-89). The department
was represented by two M.P.s, and when the second one
died, he was replaced by Denat, the son-in-law of Lafon de
Cayx, who was a retired judge. The ministers and the
great men of the regime likewise had their relations in the
lower house : Baroche put in his brother-in-law to preserve
his influence in Versailles, the ministers Vuitry, Billault,
Magne, Delangle, Magnan and Haussmann all had their
sons-in-law in it. The sons of Fould and of La Valette
and the nephew of Schneider (president of the legislature),
also had seats found for them.’ Half of these, however,
were men of real personal worth.
The tendency to make politics the preserve of a few
families was even more noticeable in the seventeen instances
of M.P.s being succeeded by their sons, nephews, sons-in-
law or brothers. This system had its merits as well as its
dangers. It enabled families to found Bonapartist dynas-
ties with great influence in various parts of the country;
and it was one way of opening the doors of parliament to
young men. But, of course, it also limited the range of sup-
port to which the regime could appeal and it drove other-
wise loyal men into the ranks of the opposition when they
saw no hope of getting a seat under such conditions.
Nepotism was, however, in no way confined to the second
empire : it flourished as is well known in the preceding
regimes, and even the republicans were as guilty of it as
anybody else. The opposition candidates of the period
contain many obscure names whose main importance was
that they were nephews or sons-in-law of this or that leader.
Some dynasties of parliamentarians were so firmly
established before 1852 that their representatives came to
• Delapalme, Welles, Quesn6, Busson, Desseiligny, Germain, Gaudin,
Haentjens, Dollfus.
2 Vast-Vimeux, Villedieu, Rolle, Reille, Gorsse, Kersaint, Guisd^re,
Corneille, Andrd, Simon, Cambacdres, Geilibert, Daguilhon-Pujol, Bois,
Rotours, Mouchy, Lefebure.
52
What politics meant to the viemhers of parhamesit
sit m the house as though politics was always the same for
them. They were M.P s though kmgs might come and go.
These dynasties varied greatly in character. A few were
of imperial ongin, and though they sat happily enough
under other governments, the re-establishment of the
empire revived their loyalty and their children would stand
in the third republic as Bonapartists. A few had no con-
nection with Bonapartism, but were converted to it. A
good example of this type is Taillefer, son of an M P. of the
revolution and M.P himself (with a two years’ break)
from 1846 to 1868. To begin with, he said after the liberal
changes of i860, 'I supported the empire because I was
convinced that it alone could save France. Now I will
support it from taste and with affection, because I like it.
I like it because it has restored to me my dignity as a
citizen by making me participate m the conduct of the
affairs of my country ’ ‘ His son was in due course Bona-
partist member for the same constituency after the fall of
the empire.
Though some ancient families were converted to Bona-
partism, it was more frequent for men to set greater store
on preserving their own dynasty m their department than
another’s m Pans They preferred to change their politics
and to move with the times Boissy d’Anglas’ father, a
latvyer of Ardeche, had entered parliament in 17S9 and
had become senator of the empire and peer of the restora-
tion. He himself became M.P. m i 8 z 8 : he started by
opposing Pohgnac and then sat loyally in the Orleanist
maionty. In 1852 more years,
agin a supporter of the de facto government. His son
succeeded him in 1877 as a republican and opportune,
Another example is the son of a bodyguard of Charles X,
M P and peer under Louis Philippe ; the nephew of a
bishop and related to a M.P- of 17S9. to a gentkroan-in-
ordinaiy to the king, to a baron of the empire, and to a
t ACL jS6i, I 3l3'U
53
The Political System of Napoleon III
peer. He had the tastes of a wealthy young man accus-
tomed to luxury and ease. ‘For him politics are a matter
of personal interest and of fashion, and not a question of
developing methodically and solidly the enlightenment or
the liberty of a people.’ > Such types moved with the
times and they, moreover, would not be henchmen of
absolutism.
These men, who were given seats by famous relations
or who inherited them from their fathers, were what may
be called politicians of the second generation, who merely
kept up an inherited status. Now, how did men get up to
this rank in the first generation ? A few made great names
for themselves and won their seats the direct way ; but
the more common method of advancement was through
long service to the state, which frequently extended several
generations back. Little jobs led to bigger jobs, and big
jobs brought good marriages which doubled a man’s in-
fluence and frequently opened the way into parliament for
him or his children. Mege, who was minister in 1870, is
a good example. His father was a solicitor who rose to be
a judge of the peace and who married the daughter of a
judge. He himself started as barrister and married the
daughter of the local principal controller of direct taxation.
It was probably as much through their influence as through
his own remarkable ability that he became a deputy judge,
then mayor of Clermont-Ferrand and so its M.P.^ Dugue
de La Fauconnerie was the grandson of a ‘general adminis-
trator of the revolution, the grand-nephew of a member
of the convention and sub-prefect of the Hundred Days ;
and his family had held many offices in the administration
and the magistracy. Now he became engaged to the
daughter of the prefect of his department, was given a job
in his office, then made a prefectoral counsellor and got
married on the strength of it. He thus became a cousin of
I 167 (26), Lc Sergeant de Monnecove’s file, prefects* reports,
2.4.1852 and 5.11.1853. 1 bB( 6) II 291, his file.
54
ir/i(7/ politics meant to the rttemhers of parliament
Baron Jerome David, and, with this strong support, was
appointed a sub'prefect He made his mark by organising
the defeat of a clencaJ JVLP. whom the government threw
out m 1863, and was decorated for it with the Legion of
Honour. In i86g he entered parliament and remained
there for many jears ‘ Boucaumont w^as the son of a
director of the domains, the nephew of a genera] who was
a IVLP., and the cousin of a magistrate who ivas also a
M.P. He was educated at the Polytechnic, and served for
almost forty years in the department of Public Works
{Fonts et Chauss^es)t nearly all of them in one department
He rose to be chief engineer and acquired great influence
and respect for his ability. In 1863 he entered parliament *
Noiv if jobs in the service of the state frequently gave
an entry into politics, how did completely new men, who
had no mfluence to back them, get mto these jobs ? The
main path was through the professions an.d especialEy
through the law. It ts a great mistake to label a parliament
as 'bourgeois* because it is full of barristers The law was
by Jong tradition the method by which the bourgeoisie rose
to nobility. Barristers had becomejudges and had founded
dynasties of judges in the proMrtcial courts of the amrien
Hgvne. Any young man of tvealth with no particular
vocation would study law, for a degree in it was essential
for entry into a great many state jobs Thus a M.P Avrote-
‘My position and my territorial wealth have constantly
obliged me to cultivate the study of law’, 3 showing hoAV
law in nineteenth-century France still held much the same
place as it had in seventeenth-century England, when the
country gentlemen crowded the Inns of Court. There
were many lawy'ers in parliament but few plain barristers
with no family backing. The barristers who were elected
were normally men who had risen to the front rank at their
t F(»b) 1 tsSUlb file . u '
* Ffi4.) ?l77C3)i fi*^ fi” iirotfief s
, It 9®, Arcltnijes file, Pierte to mituster of the Interior,
23.1 1S52
£
55
The PoUiical System of Napoleon III
provincial bars, who had been elected presidents of their
local corporations of barristers (bdtonnier de Vordre) ; who
had served their towns as mayors and who, having given
proof of their ability in politics and administration, were
sent to represent them in Paris. The opposition had a
large proportion of barristers amongst them, simply because
they were excluded from offices by their opposition. They
got their jobs in due course after the fall of the empire.
There was another method of entering politics without
influence, and that was through the army. Here again the
army was a fashionable career, and many young men went
into it for a few years before retiring to their country
estates. But no less numerous were the men who, having .
worked their way up to the rank of colonel or general, were
not illustrious enough on the national scale to be appointed
to the senate, but who were nevertheless the glory of their
departments. A retired general thus frequently went into
parliament to end his days : to rise occasionally to praise
the valour of the forces in war, perhaps to urge some reform
in military equipment, but generally to represent in silence
the conservatism of merit rewarded.
The characteristic which distinguishes the parliament-
arians of the second empire is the relatively large number of
them engaged in trade, industry and finance. These occu-
pations were, on the whole, the preserves of new men of
humble or middle class origin who had taken no part in
politics, and who were therefore free to join these parlia-
ments. Such men were the brothers Isaac and Jacob-
Emile Pereire, sons of a teacher, who had become magnates
in the great new forces of credit banks and railways. Mer-
chants making fortunes in the main ports of France,
pioneers of great factories of iron and textile, bankers,
leading printers and speculative newspaper owners rising
on the tide of popular reading, owners too of old but large
distilleries and factories of porcelain or textile : there were
many of these.
56
poliijcs ircoTit io the members of parliament
They were seldom very absorbed by politics One, a
banker, M.F. for thirty-six years until he became senator,
was proud to say that he had hardly spoken except on
finance, and had avoided ‘ polihcal preoccupations * Their
hearts were in thejr businesses. They came to parliament to
put their expenence at the service of the state and to defend
their interests, which were very much dependent on govern-
ment policy. Some, it is true, Avere conscious of their
origins, proud of the new forces they stood for, and, like
the printer Laroche- Joubert, became staunch Bonapartists.
Some were not even ncAv men at all. There were old aristo-
crats who owned mines; many a politician of a former
government expelled by revolution had gone into industiy ,
not a few were men who had reached parliament by other
means and had then begun to dabble in. finance and rhil-
Avay concessions — among whom Momy was perhaps the
classic e.xaniple and the peer.
Schneider shous the sort of men these industrialists
were, though he is outstanding rather than typical. The
son of a notary, he served his apprenticeship in a bank and
as manager of a local iron factory. Then with his brother
as the financier and negotiator, and himself as the engineer
(taught by practice and not by theory), he laid the founda-
tions of the great organisation of Le Crftusot, which became
the leading producer of locomotives, steel rails, machinery
and arms in France His brother Adolphe had married
the daughter of an iron master and IVI P-, and himself went
to represent in parliament the constituency in i^hich Le
Creusot stood. When Adolphe died, Eugene succeeded
him in his seat and held it from 1845 to 1S48 and from 1852
to 1870. He became minister of Agriculture and Commerce
during the presidency of Louis Napoleon, and then presi-
dent of the legislature iH 1867 He ivas a man of business
and not a politician • his great achievement m his eyes was
not his high offices, but the immense mdustnal organisation
1 CRCL- 1855. S 8 s- 5 , Goum
57
The Political System of Napoleon III
he had established. One day, as he was presiding over the
house, a telegram was brought to him and on reading it his
face lit up with uncontrollable pleasure. Trembling with
joy, he announced that never before had he had such
a happy moment ; he had just won a contract to sell
locomotives to England, ‘to England’, he repeated to the
applause of the house. Such were the real sources of
satisfaction and the real goals of ambition for these
pioneers.^
Finally, there was a large group of members who were
landowners. Sometimes they devoted themselves actively
to pioneering new methods, to draining marshes and estab-
lishing model farms, and they could thus be regarded as
the ablest representatives of the agricultural interest, even
though this type seldom owned very wide acres. Others,
however, were mere gentlemen of leisure, with no real
occupation, who were glad to have the use of a desirable
club in Paris when they came up for the season. Probably
every single M.P. was a landowner of sorts. There is no
French word for ‘gentleman’. The French equivalent to
it, which a man would use after his name when he wished
to show he had no occupation, is propnitaire. No great
wealth is necessary to become a proprietaire, and it is, of
course, every Frenchman’s ambition to be one. There
must have been few M.P.s who did not inherit some land.
Their political status gave them strong motives for buying
some in the constituencies they represented, as men from
the provinces who had settled in Paris very frequently did.
But there must have been few, too, who had no property
except in land ; for, quite apart from the normal attractions
of stocks and shares, M.P,s frequently took a financial
interest in local railways and similar enterprises in their
constituencies to increase their political influence. Mar-
riage with money was not uncommon either : indeed, the
careers of some M.P.s suggest that this was a golden age
’ M. Eugtne Boyer’s manuscript life of Schneider, Schneider papers.
S8
What poltHcs meant to the tmntbers of parliament
of rich heiresses. Suchet, due d’Albufera, son of the
marshal, married the daughter of the Prussian banker
Schickler. Calvet-Rogniat, nephew of the minister Capelle,
adopted by the sister of General Rogniat, married the
daughter of Jaoul, one of the richest manufacturers of
Normandy. Conversely, St-Paul, M.P., banker, director
of many railways and mines, married off his two daughters,
one to General Fleury, senator and aide-de-camp to H M.,
and the other to Bugeaud, due d’isly. The comte de
Chambrun marned the daughter of Godard-Desmarets, a
fellow M.P„ and o^vner of the glass factory of Baccarat.'
The only men who were politicians first and foremost
were perhaps the journalists. The greatest of these ivas
Granier de Cassagnac, a man of great vigour of speech and
conviction, with a career full of polemic, duels and invect-
ive, the picador of the liberal hulls, the staunchest of
Bonapartists. Entering journalism on leaving school, he
went to Pans after the revolution of 1830 with a letter of
introduction to his local M.P., Remusat. By him he was
brought to the notice of Guizot, under whose patronage
he established his reputation as a lively and vigorous writer
in the conservative cause. In 1S48 he supported Louis
Napoleon and from then, founding or buying various
papers to be his instruments, he became the leading
journalist in the defence of the empire. Elected to parlia-
ment m 185Z, he built up a tremendous influence in his
constituency and held his seat (with a break between 1S70
and 1S76) till his death m 1880, to be succeeded by his
son, a journalist of no less energy and talent.*
It can now be seen that the M.P.s of the second empire
’ RobenetCsagnyiDiiriintinaiffJ/sparlmentaires/ranfaiS G Vapefeau.
Dtctionnairt det contemporams (iSSo edition) A Poulet-MaUssis, P^ipiers
s^cr^ts el cQfT^spofidjrtce dn second empscc, 65 P-fre) 11 AvejT^fl, ptiefeet,
2g I 1853 £ OUiviet. UEmpire lAeraf, 4 72
* Robert et Cougny, op cit , Taschereau, Remte titcospecUve, ayi-i ,
Granier de Cassagnac, SoMenirs- J Dagnan, Lt Girt Ar taofide ro-
puhlique, 1S4-5, 364 ff. A Foulet-Malflssis, Fapien secrets et correspotidance
du second mptre (i83o), 48 Information from M Paul de Cassagnac
59
'Fhe Political System of Napoleon HI
were no puppets of the government, but men with a stand-
ing of their own, with individual careers, ambitions and
aims, for whom the dynasty was not everything and from
whom permanent and unswerving support could not be
expected. Indeed it was not in the government’s interest
to pack parliaments with nonentities. Dr. Conneau, Napo-
leon’s physician from the days of Ham, was made member
for the constituency in which that prison lay, for it was the
only place with which he could be said to have any associa-
tion ; but this was a unique case and a sort of joke. He was
an unsatisfactory M.P., who hardly ever visited his con-
stituency, never answered letters and built up no influence
in the government’s favour.' Moreover, a M.P. who was
too Bonapartist was inconvenient; for service demands
reward and Napoleon was lucky that he did not come into
power with more sheep than he had pasture on which to
feed them. This is illustrated in the career of Belmontet,
a Bonapartist since the restoration, a companion of exile of
Queen Hortense and of Louis Napoleon, author of much
propaganda and poetry on their behalf, the man who intro-
duced Persigny to them. He was M.P. for his native
department throughout the empire. Now he was perpetu-
ally making demands for jobs for his friends, and for
decorations for himself, as acknowledgements of his great
services to the cause. In parliament he was one of the most
uncontrollable of members. He got up, for example, to
oppose the government’s proposal to prosecute Montalem-
bert, saying that he had no fear of being accused of opposing
the government ; ‘ Thirty-five years of struggle for the
Napoleonic idea makes any justification unnecessary for
him’. There is a letter from Napoleon to him which
shows Napoleon’s attitude to this. ‘My dear M. Bel-
montet,’ it reads, ‘I have received your request for an
audience and I write to tell you why I am not granting it
to you. Ever since I have been at the head of the govern-
general^ Amiens, i9-5-i863.
6o
What politics meant to the memhers of parhament
merit, your Jangua^e both in Parts and in the provinces has
been so inconsistent with the truth that I cannot counte-
nance the opinions you have expressed by receiving you. I
am verj’ grateful for the devotion you have always shown
me, but I cannot allow you to pass yourself off as my inti-
mate confidant and as the secret agent of my wishes, , . .
I very much regret that your thoughtless conduct has pre-
vented me for many years from giving you proofs of my
old friendship. . .
These men, moreover, were not m parliament to make
money. There is an old belief that the empire was a
‘racket’ with political power exploited by adventurers for
financial gain Napoleon himself, however, died leaving
little more than he had inherited Persigny married Ney’s
granddaughter and was given a dowry of half a million
francs (/^ao.ooo) by Napoleon; and that was about the
amount he left his son on his death. BilUult built his
chateau with the proceeds of his wife’s dowry and his oum
provincial practice, before he entered politics When he
was appointed president of the legislature m 1852, accepting
was a financial sacrifice for him, for he had been earning
80,000 francs a year as one of Paris’s leading hamsters.
In iS6r Napoleon bought him a fully furnished house m
Pans for 600,000 francs on his appointment as minister
without portfolio : when Billault died he left this, his own
chateau, and very little else. Momy no doubt speculated
actively, but he probably spent more than he earned.
Forcade la Roquette once said : ‘The enemies of the empire
claim that we fatten ourselves at the expense of the people
Well, I had an income of 300,000 francs and after having
been minister five times, I have got only 25,000 ' It js
certain that his widow left only 380,588 francs capital
‘ Napoleon to Belmontet, copy, Billault papers A foulet-Malassis,
Papters corr^sponda-nce du second empire (iSSo), 335 ,
57-& and 337-4^^ 1 ACL 1S61, z 9-1 T ^ ACL ^ ^9 j ACL
i86a, 4 157-63. F(ic) 11 los, Tam-et-Garonne file, Belmontet to
Napoleon, 20 3 1852, Billault papers
61
The Political System of Napoleon III
fimile Oliivier and Chasseloup-Laubat, both men of perfect
integrity and of the highest principles, certainly did not
use politics to enrich themselves. The latter, for example,
sold his shares on becoming minister in 1859 ; and in 1869,
as president of the council of state, refused to draw his
salary of 30,000 francs. These instances, which research
has unearthed, seem to prove that in this period one did
not make money by becoming minister. Other cases, re-
lating to plain M.P.s, show how even a provincial barrister
lost financially by giving up his practice for politics.* It is
true that M.P.s were frequently offered free shares by
companies anxious to have their support in parliament ;
hut on the other hand, they had the expense of living in
Paris for part of the year ; they were expected to be
generous to charity ; and as politics became more contro-
versial, they often had to subsidise newspapers and other
forms of electoral propaganda.
The M.P.s can be divided roughly according to their
occupations in this way :
109 are known to have been landowners ^ about 19%
98 former civil serv'ants
14 officers of the royal household
39 former members of the legal civil service ■ about 26%
5 former members of the Fonts et Chaussees
2 former members of the department of mines ,
75 industrialists
4 engineers
^ about 24%
22 nnanciers
33 merchants
I worker
' B.N., A 30S94, p.72. H. de Laire to his father about Persigny, 9-5 • nnd
30.7 . 1872, Persigny papers. Notes in Billault papers and letter of Billault to
Moequard, 20.9.1859 in Billault papers. Meynis de Paulin papers. J.
Dclnrbre, Chasseloup-Laubat (1873), 15 ; notes in Chasseloup papers. Segns
papers. F(ic) II 98, prefect of Cote-d’Or on Vernier, 27.1 - 1852.
= Landowners without any other profession.
62
What poktics weant to the members of parliament
67 barnsters "1
12 notanes [ about 1370
2 solicitors
14 doctors
17 \vnters
8 teachers
3 artists
51 soldiers
7 mayors othcnvise unclassifiable
Now there are two great differences between these
figures and those for the monarchy of July First, civil
servants were now excluded from parliament whereas
they had formerly comprised from 32 to 45 per cent of the
M P.s,' This certainly widened the basis of Napoleon’s
recruitment. The large number of fonner civil servants,
by the way, shows how parliament and the civil service con-
tinued to be closely linked and bow both were verj' similar
channels for political ambition. Secondly, the number of
industrialists, merchants and financiers under the second
empire tvas far larger than, for example, in rSjh (10 per
cent) or in 1848 (14 per cent).* There were also far fewer
writers, professors, teachers and intellectuals and fewer
barristers than in 1848 The parliaments of Napoleon
contained almost as many new men as that of 1848, but
more of them had already made their mark in praaical
affairs
It is now clear what the occupations of the M P.s were,
but there is a great deal of difference within these occupa-
tions, and a 'merchant’ may well be either the owner of a
few shops or the head of a vast commercial organisation.
What rank therefore did these men have in society ? Were
they the leading and richest men of their respectn-e classes,
' S Charlety. t-a A/onafcliie deimlUt 347 . Gaugi^r m RfCT 1841,
900
* Ihid and A Chaboseau in La de 1S4S, vol 7, 39 S- 30 S.
413-15
about 7%
about 8%
65
The Political System of Napoleon III
or were the leaders already pledged to legitimism or Or-
leanism ? The answer is that they included men of all
rank and wealth. It has been possible to discover the
private incomes of sixty-five members : their accuracy
cannot be checked nor are they a representative sample in
any way. However, they show that
i8 or about 28% had 10,000 francs or less (about ;i^4oo)
24 or about 37% had 11-20,000 francs (^440-800)
8 or about 12% had 21-30,000 francs (^840-1200)
4 or about 6% had 31-40,000 francs (,£1240-1600)
3 or about 5% had 41-50,000 francs (,£1640-2000)
6 or about g% had 51-100,000 francs (£2040-4000)
2 or about 3% had over 100,000 francs (£4040)
Here are some more detailed specimens of incomes.
Baroche’s brother-in-law, the notary Delapalme, owned
about a thousand acres. An industrialist had a capital of
six to seven millions which yielded an income of 30,000
francs. One of the members for Tarn was the richest
landowner of that department. His father had made a
great fortune during the empire and then obtained the
lucrative post of receiver-general at Bordeaux. He married
the daughter of the Marshal de Pdrignon, and bequeathed
200,000 francs a year to his son, the M.P., who was thus able
to spend a great deal of money on local good works.' An
obscure M.P. of Ain owned about two thousand acres,
from which he derived an income of 25,000-30,000 francs.^
Dowries were very considerable : two former civil servants
doubled their incomes by marriage, and another two quad-
rupled theirs .3 A laivyer of Aix earned 15,000 francs
a year from his practice; he had 20,000 a year from
investments and the mine-owner’s daughter whom he
had married would inherit an equal income. He had his
‘ F(ic)II 102, prefect, 6 .2 . 1852 on Carayon-Latour ; his speeches, M.U.
'^ 47 , 3°to, 1598 and 2990; M.U. 1848, 226; M.U. 1849, 419.
^ F(ic) II 98, prefect, 6.2.1852. Bodin.
^ Frcmy and Houdetot ; Lequien and Chambrun.
64
Jl7iai poluics meant to i/te members of parhamenf
pariiamentary salary of 7500 francs and an expense allow-
ance from his town of 3000.*
The equal division of inherited property among children
and the great preponderance of small peasant ownership of
the land made the accumulation of large estates dilficult.
The practice wns for a property to be divided among
children but then recombined by marriage and so to be
perpetually reconstituted in different hands. Nevertheless,
it is clear tliat the M P.s w ere not the richest men of France,
though they included quite a few «ho uere. They were
especially not the greatest landowners, who were generally
legitimists. There were many leading industrialists among
them, but no doubt as many who had made their money
too late nere excluded. The new men of the second
empire grew old in their turn and the republic recruited
the very new men of the 1860s.
‘ nB(6) II 366, Rigaud'a fife, not* m his handwnting, e 1S55 Th*
ongtital consucutKin of 14 Januarj 1853 no ssJaiy to the iJ>embefs of
the legislature The ^^natus-consuite of *5 December iSs*. however, gave
them a salary of Jjoo frares foe each month dumg wJuch paTli4mefit was
in session
^5
CHAPTRR V
How Ihe election of iS^y encouraged a
conservative reaction
Another general election was held in 1857. It was a
quiet affair, the government and the opposition got almost
exactly the same number of votes as in 1852, and it is usual
therefore to dismiss it all as an event of little interest and of
less consequence. In fact the identical figures conceal a
great change. In 1852 the opposition was, above all, legiti-
mist, but in 1857 it was nearly all republican. Its quietness
was the most important thing about it, because these re-
publican votes were obtained with very little electioneering,
rather like subscriptions being collected from old members
of a club. The election, furthermore, shows the govern-
ment already faced with many of the problems which were
to burden it in its later struggles. In many ways therefore
the year 1857 ought to be regarded as a prominent land-
mark in the development of the second empire.
The position of the government was like that of an old
pugilist who had many years before risen conclusively
above all rivals, and whose prowess had for long been
unquestioned. He must, now and again, confirm his supre-
macy. Every little success against him will seem immense ;
his achievements have become a legend and he alone
remembers the narrow margins of his victories. He knows
that if he is compelled to perform, he will not show himself
as prodigious as he is made out to be, and his real hope is
that no one will dare to challenge him. It was in such a
spirit that the government prepared for the fight.
The control of the campaign was in the hands of
66
liozu the election of i 8 s 7 encouraged a reaction
Billault, who had been minister of the Interior since 1S54
He IS an interesting man and all the more so because he is
one of the stock types of Napoleon Hi's servants IMorny
used to say that the reactionaries and the conservatives of
the second empire were the men who were liberal under
Louis Philippe, and that the true liberals of the empire
were those w^ho had, like himself, been conservatives under
Louis Philippe ' There is much truth in this view, for
ardent reformers frequently have the reputation of being
liberal until they begin to put their theories into prac-
tice Billault illustrates the problem w'ell. He was of
middle class stock ; his grandfathers were both la^vyers ;
his father was a senior customs official, disgraced by the
restoration for his co-operation with Napoleon I. He him-
self, more endowed with intelligence and energy than with
wealth, became a hamster at Nantes at 20, a member of
Its municipal council and the son^m-law of one of its nchest
ship-owners at 25. With the backing of this influence
behind him, he was a member of parliament as soon as his
age allowed it; and such was his success that he was an
under-secretary within a few years He rose to be one of
the leading barristers of Pans, and built himself a chateau
outside Nantes In politics he sat first near Barrot, then
near Thiers, and finally formed a group of independents of
the left which included Tocqueville, Bineau, Lanjumais,
Abbatucci, Drouyn, all of whom became ministers of
Napoleon. Unhke Barrot and Thiers, his mam interest was
in social affairs. This theme, which runs through his life,
helps to explain his apparent tergiversations and his conver-
sion from an Orleanist liberal into a conservative Bonapartist.
In I S3 4 he wTOte, 'The sole aim worthy of effort in
politics is the moral and material amelioration of the
country, and really the two parties seem to have entirely
forgotten it’.= The state, he said in 1848, cannot abstain
f H'rontaJembert’s diaty, 4 and I4 4 fSs^
> BillauICs works, i. 169
67
The Political Systejn of Napoleon III
from the social life of the people. He opposed the laisser-
faire policy of Louis Philippe and insisted on the neeessity
of state intervention in economic questions.* The thread
of his development is clear when, well seated in power, he
wrote, ‘There was need to know how to be at once very
liberal in foreign poliey, and at home very preoccupied
with popular improvements, but not submissive before the
pretensions of the little oligarchy of writers and self-styled
statesmen who take the soap bubbles of their own speeches
to be free government. To speak little, to do much, ought
to be the motto of the Napoleons, just as to speak much
and to do nothing was, if not the motto, at least the practice
of the government of 1830.’^ After 1848 he enjoyed con-
siderable popularity with the left for his reforming ideas ;
and the red terror which followed did not turn him into a
blind reactionary. ‘What I ask for our country’, he wrote
in December 1849, ‘is a strong and resolute government,
respected at home and also abroad, which, while guarantee-
ing us peace in the street, knows how to make the best of
all wars against subversive ideas, that is to effect without
hesitations, for the benefit of the people, all really practi-
cable improvements .’ 3 Few men, however, became Bona-
partists for purely theoretical reasons ; what converted
Billault finally was the attraction of Napoleon’s personality,
the kindness he received at his hands and the high opinion
he formed of his ability Napoleon may have won the
masses by his name and his principles, but he frequently
won their political leaders by his own personal qualities.
In such hands the election could be expected to follow
much the same lines as that of 1852. Billault was well
aware of the difficulties. The election, he wrote to the
emperor, could not be as easy as that of 1852. Then all
^ IVI.U. 184S, 2450-1.
Billault to Princess Roccagiovine, c. 1862, Billault papers.
Profession of faith, Billault papers.
' *0 Tharrfiou, conseiller de pre/eclure, Loire-Inf., 10. i 1851,
5-2 -i 8 si, iS. 12. 1851, Billault papers.
68
fffrjc the efectxon of 1^57 exicoxtraged a reactiot:
liad been dominated by the great success of a plebiscite :
now they must expect some demagogues to be elected by
the workers m the large towns; and the legitimists and
Orleanists to wage a silent war, not openly putting up their
own candidates, but hiding behind apparently harmless
candidates. The attitude of the clergy was uncertain.
Tlie government must accordingly make sure of all ‘legiti-
mate means of influence. It is necessary at all costs that
the people should not be able to say either in France or
in Europe, that the imperial govemment has lost ground
uifh the mssses
As before, he declared, all could stand for parliament,
but the offleia] candidates would be supported with all the
means in the government’s power. ‘The government
cannot alone remain dumb and indifferent. It will tell the
country which men have its confidence. . . To the
prefects he WTote, ‘You will give them your patronage
openly and you will fight without hesitation all candida-
tures, not only those which announce themselves as being
hostile, but even those which claim they are devoted. . .
You wtl! give the candidates of the administration all pos-
sible facilities, official and semi-official.’* Whom was the
government to choose as official candidates ? Zf it chose
the sitting hl.P.s, it would close its ranks to the many men
willing to rally if given a chance, and drive youthful talent
into opposition. It decided, none the less, that it could not
throw these old M.P.S away, who had, after all, supported
it faithfully. But what of those who had shown independ-
ence and had voted against the government ? Here Btllault
acted without any systematic principles The men of sub-
stance who could lead and sustain, who had taken a fore-
most part in opposition in the last session, and who were
to direct it in later ones — these were for the most part left
' Dillauli to Napoleon, draft, g.ii 185S, BilUult papers
* Billault to Napoleon, draft, 9 ii i8j6. BiUault papers , Heeckeren to
Pmigny,6 iz 1856, Peisigny papers, circulann A D C^te-d’Or, 3 M 72,
jo.j i 8 s 7 I very confidential eireylar. 1 6 1857, ilud
69
The Political System of Napoleon III
alone. The local position of some was too strong; they
were there indeed very often because the government had
thought them inevitable in 1852 ; or else they had ties of
influence which made their positions in Paris strong.
In any case, Montalembert alone of the leaders was
abandoned. His opposition had made his situation im-
possible. On a visit to his constituency in 1856, he had
found everybody personally kind, but ‘ icily cold on politics.
No-one says anything to encourage me to hope for a re-
election and even Nicod does not hide from me the diffi-
culty which the clergy will have to fight for me against the
government.’ Montalembert had an old alliance with a
local newspaper, which continued to support him. The
clergy, however, would not help him because he was opposed
by the government. All the same, the government, under-
estimating its own strength, established a newspaper of its
own to fight him, with a salaried editor sent from Paris.
Yet even though its candidate was an obscure chamberlain
with none of Montalembert’s brilliant qualities, it defeated
him by 17,000 to 4000.' Some eight obscure M.P.s^ whose
opposition had been confined to occasional votes, were
likewise deprived of official patronage, but the fact of their
opposition played only a limited part in the decision. For
the prefects often claimed that the position of certain
M.P.s was unsatisfactory, and that their re-election would
be very difficult.^ Several of these men put up inefficacious
resistance and were easily defeated : by dint of extra-
ordinary energy only a couple managed to survive.
Then the government was faced with the problem of
Durfort de Civrac, who, after allowing it to distribute his
ballot papers for a month, suddenly disclaimed his status
’ Montalembert’s diary, 24.8.1856 ; Montalembert to Flavigny (copies),
1.1.1857 4 ,nd 29.6.1857, Montalembert papers.
^ Montreuil, Leroy-Beaulieu, David, DesmoIIes, Charlier, Levavasseur,
Migeon, Raiitbourgt.
^ E.g. F(9<.4 347, Eure, telegrams of 22-25.5. 1857 ; F(go) 588, telegrams
of 20 and 25.5; 1857.
70
The Political System of Napoleon III
opposition came. Since 1852 they had remained stunned
in silence and inactivity. How ought they to act now ?
Ought they to vote or abstain ? Ought the men who
succeeded in getting elected take the oath and sit in parlia-
ment ? Ought they to ally with the Orleanists and legiti-
mists ? The delegations of workers who spoke to the
leaders were generally in favour of abstention, for they felt
certain that they would be defeated. Those in favour of
action did not contradict this belief but claimed simply
that it was a matter of duty to vote ; had not the empire
been founded the day Louis Napoleon had landed at Bou-
logne with his eagle, even though his adventure had mis-
carried ? But, cried the opponents, our small vote will
merely strengthen the empire. No, replied the others, for
our aim is to do as the sailor, who drops his sounding lead
to discover how much water he has beneath him. In the
end, the republicans decided to vote, though they did not
determine their action on other problems. ^
There followed a campaign with two important
characteristics, only the first of which has been appreciated.
The division of the republicans between the old and
the new men and their putting up two different lists is
well known. It was all really due to Havin, the political
director of the Siecle, a paper with immense power.
The old gang refused him the constituency he wanted.
In anger he seceded and published in his paper a list of
Candidates of his own choosing. The old republicans
were thus superseded not by the strength of the young,
but b^their own lack of tact ; and it was the arrival of
this you''thful group which produced the rejuvenation of
the repuMican party. But equally important was the
second ou^t^iiiding characteristic of the election. The
policy of n«t abstaining was carried into the provinces.
From Paris a (fcircular was distributed urging the republicans
to put up as n\^i^y candidates as possible. If there are any
I Qif^vier’s diary, 25.11.1856 and 25.5.1857.
72
Hov) the election of 1837 encouraged a reaction
local democratic candidates m your department, it read,
whose past services distinguish them and whose success is
likely, support them ; if not, choose from among the M.P.s
of 184S those you consider most popular. Do not fear to
compromise these names by failure or by their getting only
a small number of votes. The ambitious may fear defeat,
but those devoted to the cause can sustam it with honour,
LedrU'Rollin from London sent a flaming circular headed,
‘No abstention; you must vote’. The forgotten shades
of the reds of 184S sprang to life. The local organisers
chose their prefects or M.P s of 1848, while some preferred
to choose a great name, which enabled them to proclaim
the nuance of republicanism that pleased them most. A
dozen chose Cavaignac, five Carnot, a few Garnier-Pages,
Lamartine or Raspail. Ledru-RoIIm's old secretary stood
m Corr^ze, Felix Pyat’s nephew m Cher.'
Apart from the encouragement to fight the election,
no practical help came from Pans; and there was veiy
httle organisation in the constituencies themselves It
was all the work of a few enthusiasts, working without
resources In Dordogne 40,000 ballot papers were written
out by hand. The mvitauon to vote was passed around
discreetly by a few scattered conspirators This is what
makes the result important, that so httle effort should have
got such a large vote of about half a million. Furthermore,
these half million votes did not represent the full republican
strength. In many departments they were left without
candidates of their own and were therefore forced to
abstain. In the undoubtedly republican manufacturing
towm of Decazeville, for example, only 640 out of 3009
electors voted.*
' 1567, sent bv pf'otureitf’ gfncrat, Rouen, I s 1857, tliiJ , prit-
cureur gentral, LimoEes, 12 fi i8s7 . thtd , procureur ghi£Tal, Bourges,
W 6.1857
* Ihtd , procureur gittiral, 30 6 1857, »8jd, procureur im-
pervil, Domfront, 23 6 1857, AD Aseiron, 1857 election file, prefect,
2.7.1857
73
The Political System of Napoleon III
There were republican candidates in about a hundred
constituencies, but only a bare handful of legitimists stood,
and a mere dozen men of Orleanist antecedents, in addition
to the usual sprinkling of dissident Bonapartists, candidates
representing local rivalries and about thirty whose politics
are uncertain. All these were small men. None of the
leaders of the legitimists or Orleanists stood. It is clear
that they believed that they stood no chance. It was not
that they thought that it was not worth joining a parliament
with such limited powers. Montalembert wrote to Fla-
vigny that he believed that the legislature could, if it
wanted to, play a very important part in politics. Buffet
justified his candidature thus: the legislature, he said,
had less power than its predecessors, but ‘its rights can
be widened and it is assuredly permissible to suppose that
the state of public opinion, the new glory our arms have
acquired, the honourable peace which has ended a national
war, bring near the moment when the constitutional frame-
work will be crowned with the liberty which its author has
promised’.' These men, however, were the exceptions.
The old leaders did nothing.
The figures of the election results were almost identical
with those of 1852. 65 per cent of the electorate voted, as
against 63 per cent in 1852. The government got 84-6 per
cent of these votes as compared with 83 per cent, and the
opposition 13' 6 per cent as compared with 13 per cent.
But though the totals are the same, the distribution is
very different. In 1852 the opposition had been strongest
in the west. Now in Loire-Inferieure, in Finistere and
in Ille-et-Vilaine, the government’s vote doubled, and
in other western departments and in Pas-de-Calais there
were also extraordinarily large increases (C6tes-du-Nord,
Vendee, Sevres, Morbihan). On the other hand, its vote
fell in many departments in the eastern half of France, as
' Montalembert to Flavigny, 27. 11.1857, Montalembert papers, copy;
BB(i8) 1567, procureur general, Nancy, on Vosges.
74
i/ojo the ehciion of 1857 encouraged a reaction
well as in the departments which were later to become
Bonapartist, viz., Gironde, the Charentes and Dordogne.
These changes are of the greatest importance. A mere
comparison of the results of 185? and 1869 would show the
same gams in the west, but they would be attributed to the
legitimists joining forces with the government for the sake
of ^ order’ against the menace of the red revolution. In
1857 there was no such menace. The legitimists openly
declared themselves hostile to the empire and counselled
abstention These increases therefore represent, not a
union with foreign allies, but the Bonapartists’ own proper
gains.
The reaction of the government to the elections was
more varied than is realised Napoleon w'as, on the whole,
not dissatisfied ‘I was very surpnsed’, he telegraphed to
the minister of State, ‘to see the summary of the general
elections inserted in a comer of the Montieur, like some
statistic, instead of being put in large letters on the first
page.' ‘The difference between 1852 and 1857', he wrote
to Billault, ‘ IS very good and ought to be pointed out. I
am pleased to recognise that your zeal and your enlightened
direction were not stranger to the success obtained. I am
very much of jour opinion. Far from falling asleep, we
must on the contrary seek to discover how we could
fight the evil disposition of the great towns Be very
severe towards the press and point out to me as well
as to your colleagues the officials who did not do their
duty.’ '
The ministers were less impressed by the huge total
majority than by the strength of the republicans in the
towns and the danger it boded for the future.'^ Billault's
report to the emperor particularly stressed this point
The election had shown, he said, that despite all that
the emperor had done m these last five years to improve the
■ -N.'innletio to BiUault jp 6 BiUaalt
papers * Cf Fould to BarocNe, i6 7 1857, Bibl Thiers, flS? f. 3 J.
75
The. Political System of Napoleon III
lot of the workers, they had not clianged but had merely
kept quiet from fear of superior force. The government
must therefore continue to keep them down. The most
urgent problem was that of Paris, whose population could
not be cured, and which must therefore be reduced in size
and deprived of its character of an industrial town.'
Haussmann sent Napoleon a long report supporting
Billault. ‘No good can be hoped for from this population
without religious or moral principles, half educated,
greedy of pleasure. . . . Many people who believe they
are exorcising the danger by refusing to see it, will try to
explain our electoral defeat [in Paris] by petty causes.
They will say that, to calm the evil passions which still
exist, we must make some concession, grant more liberty,
administer with increasing gentleness. They will counsel
above all the stopping of the [rebuilding of Paris] under the
pretext of economy and in the hope of reducing rents. . . .
The remedy of the evil does not appear to me to be the
increase of liberty which would be one more weapon in
hostile hands. We have seen the effect of methods of
gentleness ; kindness is taken for fear by men who respect
nothing but force.’ He urged the e.xpulsion of industry
and its workers from Paris and the continuation of the
programme of destroying the old part of the city, the
traditional breeding ground of revolution. -
The pressure for reaction became strong. ‘ The freedom
given to spread propaganda and to form committees has
benefited evil passions,’ wrote Rouland, ‘and the emperor
sees it clearly today.’ All his work for the masses has done
nothing to modify their socialist tendencies. ‘People are
frightened in the provinces and are beginning to cast grave
doubts on universal suffrage. In my opinion, a government
must be faithful to its principles, and if the emperor is
convinced that a strong and respected government is the
‘ Billault to Napoleon, draft, 7.7.1857, Billault papers.
^ Haussmann to Napoleon, 8.7.1857, Billault papers.
76
How the election of 1837 encouraged a reaction
salvation of this country, he must return to it in order to
destroy the germ of the agitation.’ ^
Napoleon himself wrote to Billault: ‘I think, as you do,
that we must reflect seriously about the results of the last
elections, but it all consists in finding the means to reduce
the number of the discontented in Fans and Lyons Only
these means are difficult to find. You know how a long
time ago I wanted to issue a decree or to propose a law to
prevent the building of any more factories in Paris, but you
also know all the objections which this proposal produced.
Whenever a proposal is made jn our country which is out of
the ordinary, you find almost everywhere invincible aver-
sion to it.’*
With the government thus alarmed, and wondering
what to do, It is quite clear why the attempted assassination
of Napoleon six months later, on 14 January 1858, was
followed by such severe measures. That attempt was the
work of an Italian and had nothing to do with ffie French
socialists. It simply gave the opportunity for the reaction
which the election had suggested.
’ Rouland to Baroche, Baroche papers too5r
*97 1857, copy , BjJJauJt papers.
77
CHAPTER VI
Hozv the government icon elections in its early
years and why it later ceased to win them
The overwhelming success of the government at the first
two general elections was no doubt due in some measure
to the state of public opinion, but public opinion is not
a spontaneous and independent force in politics, which
elections have the function of registering and converting
into numerical terms. It has to be organised and created,
and governments had sought to do this since the time of
the restoration. Now at length the system, long developed,
reached its zenith. It became rather like the system based
on the management of influence and interest, which pre-
vailed in eighteenth-century England. Though the methods
of Newcastle and Walpole might smell of corruption, they
did in fact enable the king’s government to function with
greater ease than in the reign of Anne, when the queen
had failed to ‘make her parliament’. So likewise did
Napoleon Ill’s system fulfil a function.
It was based, first of all, on official candidates. The
government was simply a party in power ; it must join in
the election fight like any other party, and not abstain in
the hope that M.P.s favourable to it might possibly be
returned. There was nothing radically new in this system.
The opposition claimed that formerly the government
merely recommended candidates but did not electioneer in
their favour, and the empire has therefore won a reputation
for packing its parliaments.* In fact it was merely its
extraordinary success which earned it its bad name for
■ A'pL 1863, 1. 86-7. Plichon.
78
How the government won elections in its early years
methods which, as every reader of Balzac knows, had
started long before Villfele had, in 1822, issued a circular
recommending that ^All those who are members of my
ministry must, to keep their jobs, contribute within the
limits of their right to the election of ]VI,P,s smcerely
attached’ to the government* Peyroiinet, keeper of the
seals, likewise proclaimed two years later that 'whoever
accepts a state job contracts at the same time the obligation
to devote his efforts, his talents and his influence to the
service of the government ’ * Nor was this active participa-
tion of the government a mere vice of cynical and corrupt
regimes. The minister of the Interior of the idealistic
second republic wrote this to his subordinates: ‘Ought
the government to participate in the elections or simply
confine itself to ensuring their orderly conduct ? I have
no hesitation m replying that it would be guilty of abdica-
tion or even treason if it confined itself to making out the
official returns and to counting the votes It must enlighten
France and work openly to foil the intrigues of the counter
revolution
There were men who claimed that this system would
inevitably produce 1 \I P.s who would be mere tools in
the hands of the government. Tocqueville in 1837 thus
refused the status of official candidate on this ground ‘ I
viiant to be in a position’, he said, ‘to give intelligent and
independent support to the government. . . I know very
well that there are people who forget how they got into the
house once they are there, but I am not one of these I
Wish to reach it in the same position as I wish to keep inside
it, that is, one of independence.’ The prime minister of
the day, Mol^, replied to him and justified the system in
these ivords; ‘In my opinion my first duty js to fight in
the elections as elsewhere for the opinion which brought
' S Chsrtety, La JiesIjiUTaittn, xSj * Itui 1D5
’ Circular of 8 4 184S m Billault papers, and of 10 4 184S, F{ia*)
aop7, No 47
79
The Political System of Napoleon III
me into power. ... I do not therefore admit that to be
returned through our influence would mean accepting a
yoke from which delicacy or pride could suffer, or that to
separate yourself from us later on a question on which you
could in all conscience and conviction support us, that this
would be betraying us.’ Will you be freer if you are
elected by legitimists, republicans or any other party ?
‘You must choose ; isolation is not independence and you
will be dependent more or less on those who elected you.
The ministry’s army in the elections is not composed only
of men employed by it and owing their existence to it, it is
composed above all of men thinking as it docs and believing
it good for the country that it should remain in power and
that it should defeat its opponents. It is among these men,
my dear sir, that I would have been happy and proud to
meet you.’ ‘
The first condition of success in elections was thus
active participation and the principal instruments of this
participation were the mayors. Through the mayors of
France the government could speak to every man in the
country. Each commune with one or two hundred electors
had a mayor almost always invested with its confidence, but
appointed by the state and having therefore all the weight
of government authority behind his influence. As the
state’s representative he was the leader, the guide, and the
indispensable aid to evei’y man in his village. He could
make life very difficult for any man who displeased him
and could be very useful to his favourites. He could say
to anyone who sought to go against his wishes: ‘You
want a road laid down to your farm — well, you won’t
have it. . . . You want your card signed — well, you’ll
have to go and get hold of the curate. . . , You will have
need of me, but you won’t find me.’ ^
‘The mayor holds the electors in his hand’, wrote a
‘ CEuvres complies d’ Alexis de Tocqueville publUes par Madame de Tocqtie-
ville (1866), 6. 71-5. » C. 1367, protest.
80
Ifow the government u'on elections in its early years
judge of tlie peace- .* . He has daily contacts with them,
It IS to him that they run on the most petty business, he is
their adviser and very often their conciliator; and from
this IS bom the confidence and the deference which the
electors m the communes have for their mayor, whom they
look upon as a father.’*
The mayor was in turn most anxious that his commune
should elect the official candidate unanimously, that it
might testify to the sound principles he had inculcated into
it and the supremacy he enjoyed over it. ‘A mayor who
has not enough influence over the people he administers
to make them vote for the official candidate of the gm^ern-
ment’, said a sub-prefect, ‘ought not to hold hiS post.’*
It was seldom fear of dismissal, however, which made the
mayor work for the govemraent. It was a natural desire to
oblige men who could be obliging m return, Strong per-
sonal relations with the sub*prefect were frequent, the
was often a very useful man to the mayor ; and there
were, of course, the noble mayors for whom the whole affair
was a private arrangement based on almost purely personal
considerations Like Jane Austen’s Air. Dashwood, these
men had a great respect for influential men and were glad
to place them In their debt One of them wrote thus to
hia prefect ■ ' I accept with great pleasure your candidate
AL de Chaumont'Quitiy, not because he is a chamberlain
but because he is related to the emperor whom I like and
admire, I know his wife’s family very well ; she is the
daughter of the comte d’Orglandes, a neighbour of my
brother-in-law, the comte de Semale-Cromeral, who knows
them very well You do not tell me whether you know
AI. de Quitiy personally Has he any ability or any merit }
He IS very rich and that is already something. I shall
see to the business of his election straight away. *
■ A D Haute-Garonlie 3M/34, J P • Grenade to prefect, 22 6 ( 3 s 7 .
3 Quoted C* ^347, l-enaereier 5 protest, t3bereote-ltil
* A D Sarthe, M61/16 bis, Baron de Gemasse to prefect
81
The Political System of Napoleon III
Now under the second empire more than ever before,
the prestige and power of the administration was at its
zenith and the government was the concentrated source of
all action ; the standing of the mayor, as its representative,
augmented accordingly and the government, by con-
sciously backing him up and seeking to increase his
authority, brought him, too, to the zenith of his power.' He
had solid arguments to urge the electors to vote as he
pleased. It was, first of all, in everybody’s material interest
to vote for the government. The essential basis of the
centralisation of France is the poverty of the communes.
Nominally, since they elect their own couneils, they can
do as they please ; but in practice they cannot since they
have not enough money. Their taxes go almost entirely to
the state, and it is from the state, therefore, that they must
beg back their money in order to carry out the thousand
little improvements they most urgently need and of whose
necessity they are most immediately aware.
It is essential for them to keep on good terms with the
government in order to get the subsidies they require.
These facts were put before the electors in plain language
and were generally understood. One mayor was criticised
for being too plain and thus justified himself, in a half
literate style which this translation seeks to render faith-
fully. ‘I have the honour to reply to your letter dated
30 May ult. and to certify that when I invited the electors
to come and vote for M. Segris [the official candidate] I did
not say that if the commune voted for him it would get
whatever it wanted from you, I only engaged them to come
to vote that all had a duty to fulfil this obligation which the
inhabitants of Soulaines owe to be grateful for the favours
we have received from the government, until this day for
all our undertaking, that we need to keep the good harmony
in order that we may get still more aid to finish the road
works which by ourselves are unable owing to lack of
‘ F(ic) HI, Ard&che 8, prefect, 12.11.1852.
82
How the governme 7 tt won elections in its early years
finance to be completed . . Such motives were in
fact frequently decisive. Here is how the judge of the
peace of Seilhac reported on the prospects in his canton
in the election of 1863 ‘The commune of Beaumont will
be unanimous. This commune has just voted for the
levying of an extraordinaty rate to raise 500 francs to mend
its church ; the cost of the w'ork is 800 francs. It awaits a
subsidy of the remaining 300 francs from you.’ The vote
was accordingly 133 for the government and only 2 against.
‘The commune of Pierrefitte will also be unanirnous. Like
the former it has voted an extraordinary rate of 4000 francs
for a parsonage The cost will be 6000 francs. It is asking
you for a subsidy of 2ooo francs ’ The result was 130 for,
I against ‘It is important, M, k Pr^fet, that the grant of
these subsidies should be announced before the date of the
election. . Before yesterday I visited the whole of the
commune of Chambouhve and despite all that has been
done, It will vote almost unanimously and with enthusiasm.
The change m the direction of the [proposed] road has
produced Its effect,’ Result; 528 for, 7* against.^
The mayor was, of course, the man who understood
forms and the technical paraphernalia of bureaucratic
government, and many ignorant electors carried out the
formalities of voting m the way he told them The system
of voting was different to that now' used m England. The
voter was not presented with a list of candidates and asked
to place a cross against one of them Instead he was re-
quired to put m the box a ballot paper which he had to
produce himself, bearing the name of his favounte -^ese
ballot papers were generally supplied by the candidates,
and the practice was for them to print about three times as
many ballot papers as there were electors and to J^®^^^bute
them widely. The government would send the ballot
paper of its candidate, together with a card which entitled
> AD Maine-et-Loire.SMss.tnayf “/Sonnies to piefett, 4 *
» A D CortSze, 62M. S loOs
83
The Political System of Napoleon III
a man to vote, to all electors. Every elector thus inevitably
received a government ballot paper. The ignorant among
them, therefore, frequently came to vote with their electoral
card and their government ballot paper, which they would
put in the box as though it was the only ballot paper
available.
Candidates who did not visit the communes were fre-
quently mere names. So when some poor peasant came to
the village hall with a ballot paper an opposition agent had
given him, the mayor presiding over the box would at once
spot it.
‘ Ah ! Haven’t you got any other ballot paper apart
from that one ? ’
‘Why, yes, M. le Maire.'
‘Show me.’
The elector shows several. The mayor takes the official
candidate’s and says, ‘ Here, my good man, this is the good
one, put the others down ’ Then the mayor puts it
into the box. Or he would say, ‘ Put the ballot paper you’ve
got into your pocket and take this one ; this is the good
one'.'-
Such proceedings took place when the mayor was a
paternal figure and the elector a submissive peasant. But
sometimes a more arrogant man would march into the
voting hall and demand a ballot paper. He is given
the official candidate’s. He asks for ‘another one’. The
mayor says there are no others. The man insists. The
mayor gets angry. A row would start ; and the man
would probably end up by being evicted.^ Of course, the
mayor would receive great sympathy, for was not this
desire to vote against his advice a challenge of his authority,
a doubt cast upon his knowledge of how administrative
business should be carried out ? It was for personal reasons
rather than because of political preferences that the mayors
* C. 1367* Rouxin’s protest.
■ C. 1347. A. Lemcrcicr's protest, Charente-Inf.
84
How the government won elections in its early years
lost their tempers ivjth organisers of opposition. They
looked upon it as a personal insult One mayor, no more
pompous than most, thus writes to his prefect : 'Yesterday
three men travelled over my commune, puttmg up red
posters everywhere m favour of M Casimir-Perier ; when
I and a gendarme asked them by what right they were
putting up notices on the wall of the town hall without my
authorisation, they replied in an mperUncnt manner, that
they had no need of my authorisation*.* This was a slur
on his dignity and his rage can be imagined.
The mayor was the key man in this system and it was
to a great extent he who determmed the results of elections.
To assist him, however, he had a large body of men. ‘In
each commune, the official candidate has the services of
ten civil servants, ten free and disciplined agents who put
up his posters and distribute his ballot papers and his
Circulars daily ; one mayor, one deputy mayor, one school-
master, one constable, one road-man, one bill-sticker, one
tax-collector, one postman, one licensed innkeeper, one
tobacconist, appomted, approved and authorised by the
prefect . . ’ ^ The work of these men is best described
in their own words. One schoolmaster rejoiced in ‘the
influence which I have the good fortune to exercise over
my friends and peaceful inhabitants of BelJecombe, who
never go to vote without dropping in on me to collect their
ballot papers , X had recourse to a little stratagem to
make my (fifty two) firemen vote. I had it announced, by
the beat of the drum, on Saturday evening that an inspection
of arms would he held on the morrow, Sunday, after
vespers ; and after this inspection I made a short speech
which achieved its object very well, since they all cried,
“To the vote, Long live the Emperor", etc. . Here
> AD Isire 8 Mj 3, ma>or of Valboraiaii, 27
* UAieniT du Gm, S quoted « ^ HHviution de 1S4S, >ol
iMituUur of Bellecombe to the Inspector of the Academy of fsire.
23 6.1&57, AD IsIreS^Iia
85
The Political System of Napoleon III
is a report of another of these schoolmasters. ‘Now, M.
Vhispecteiir, here is how I acted on this solemn occasion.
As secretary of the town hall, entrusted in this capacity
with the preparation of all the election documents, I was
able to exercise far greater influence on the elections. In
conjunction with the village constable, I distributed the
ballot papers I received from M. le Prefet to the electors ;
I strongly supported the candidature of M. Arnaud, the
government’s candidate. I tried to make the electors under-
stand that we must all without exception consolidate the
plans of our august emperor by a unanimous vote. Despite
this, I was compelled to redouble my zeal and energy
owing to the fact that some agitators had led astray a large
number of electors and particularly twenty electors at a
village not far away who had been earnestly solicited to
vote for M. Dupont-Delporte and were completely dis-
posed to vote for the latter and in consequence to reject
the government’s candidate. Having heard this vexatious
news, I went to malce them see the error into which they
had fallen. To prove to them that the government is good,
I gave them knowledge of a letter which M. le Maire of the
commune had received from M. le Prefet, in which it is
said that a new subsidy of 220,000 francs had just been
given to the department to be divided between the com-
munes which had suffered in the floods of 1856. In the
presence of this testimony of the solicitude of the govern-
ment, will you be so ungrateful, I told them, as to refuse it
your co-operation : and at once they all threw down the
ballot papers that had been given to them and came at once
to the town hall to vote for M. Arnaud.’ ^
The zeal of some schoolmasters knew no bounds, and,
that all might go well, the schoolmaster of La-Chapelle-du-
Bard in Isere decorated the polling-booth with flags and
exhortatory inscriptions. When the voters entered the
' Instiiuteur of Versoud to the inspector of the Academy of Grenoble;
A.D. Isfere 8M12, 23.6.1857.
86
How the government won elcettons m its early years
room they saw a notice: ‘La-Chapelle-dU'Bard : Long
live the emperor*. On the right was placed a bust of His
Majesty inscribed, 'Long live the emperor. Long live the
empress. Long live the prince imperial.' On the left
‘Through the genius of its emperor, France is today the
nation which teaches all others by precept and by example’
And finally, in front, ‘ Gratitude • Devotion ! ’ ‘
The postmen likewise played their part. The; illiterate
were frequently in the habit of asking them to read the
letters they delivered; the postmen were accordingly
briefed and were able to explain the meaning of the elect-
oral propaganda they delivered on behalf of the govern-
ment.* The bill-sticker was delegated not only to put up
the election posters, but also to W'atch over their staying
up and to replace them at once if they were torn down.*
The activities of all these men were co-ordinated by
their superiors. The judges of the peace would tour their
cantons, talk to the mayors and the notables of each village
and report on them. The mspector of primary education,
on the basis of information from the village schoolmasters,
sent daily reports on the attitude of mayors, clergy and
communes in general. The government thus knew where
It was weak. An energetic prefect might accordingly write
five hundred personal letters to inflame the zeal of influen-
tial men ivho might help m dangerous areas * The prefect
was responsible for the whole operation and would 'answer
for its success’ to the minister. The sub-prefect likewise
regarded it as a personal matter to win ; and a victory m an
election of exceptional difficultywould gain him promotion.
The elections were decided by the individual votes of
individual people, each with their own reasons for the
actions they took In every village it was known perfectly
‘ AD 8Mij, majTirof La-Chapelle-du-Bard to prefect, -j 6 1863
* A D Aveyron, 1S63 election file, mayor of Montbaiens to prefect
^ A D Is^re SAfiJ, notes of expenUrtuCe, Morel, d Gr^trble
■* Che-vreau to Billault, z 6 1863, Billault papers A D M am e.et- Loire
SMsi
C 87
The Political Systejn of Napoleon III
well how each man voted just as it very often still is today.
Every villager knows who the communists are, so likewise
everybody knew who the rioters of December 1851 had
been, or who were the priest’s devotees or the henchmen
of the local count. In theory the government knew how
every elector in the country was disposed to it, and it there-
fore generally knew the results of the elections fairly
accurately in advance.
One of the main reasons for the government’s success
in its first ten years was that the mayors’ authority was so
great that they were able to influence the doubtful to vote
the right way and to organise the faithful to come and
register their votes. It was not infrequent, of course, for
the mayor to be either incompetent or hostile and for the
government to be unable to find anyone else able or willing
to replace him. Thus in the west the local legitimist noble
was very often kept as mayor of his village. Sometimes
this was the case because there was not a single man it
could substitute, and the government was dependent on
his good-will. Sometimes it was because the noble was
anxious to continue to bolster his influence with the added
prestige of a government agent and he would offer to co-
operate with the prefect, to be a useful though uncertain
ally. In some cases, however, the prefect would find some
able, well-to-do peasant to become mayor, who with the
backing of the government would build up a strong position
and drive the noble into utter isolation and impotence in
his chateau. That was how the government made con-
quests and increased its following. Yet this shows also
how the government had weak mayors in the very areas
where it was weak in any case.
Now what chance had the opposition against such a
system ? What could they offer which the government
could not ? They could, of course, offer far more, as opposi-
tions always do. There was a man who must have stood in
well over a hundred constituencies in the elections of this
88
The Political System of Napoleon III
more modesty. The comte de Chambrun distributed an
album of engravings to enable all illiterate peasants to
appreciate his value, depicting various episodes in his
glorious and beneficent career. It showed him repressing
a demagogic insurrection in December 1851 as prefect of
Jura ; then Louis Napoleon is seen at his desk writing to
congratulate him, and the congratulation is recited. Now
he is helping the sick in the cholera epidemic ; now he is
gravely taking part in a meeting of a parliamentary com-
mittee ; now he is spealcing before the council of state and
by his skill obtaining the first railway for his department.
Scenes of rejoicing in various towns make manifest the
pleasure with which he is everywhere greeted. And his
wife is no less addicted to the public good ; she accom-
panies him incessantly on their perpetual visits to all parts
of the department. She visits the poor and the sick and
she places gifts in churches.*
These heights of illustrated propaganda were, however,
not attempted by the majority of the opposition candidates.
They confined themselves to pointing out that though they
might be undistinguished, they were essentially well mean-
ing : they promised higher wages and lower prices,
economy and less taxation but also more roads, railways
and subsidies for their own constituency ; liberty and peace
and glory.
Promises were of no avail if they were not distributed
and explained to individual voters, and for this there were
plenty of agents to hand. Almost every commune had its
quota of discontented men, rivals or personal enemies of
the mayor, old reds of the republic. It needed only one
man in a commune to write out a few hundred ballot
papers for the opposition candidate, and to distribute them
to whoever he thought suitable. In one commune, for
example, forty-two votes were cast against the government
in 1869. This, says the local judge of the peace, was due
* B.N. Ln(z7) 3836.
90
How ike government won elections in its early years
to the deputy major who had been dissatisfied ev^er since
someone else had been made mayor instead of him; he
had allied with the dismissed doctor of the canton, and to-
gether they had raised this voted Great landowners might
similarly canvass all the men ivith nhom they had relations,
and in some areas they could exercise their influence
through religious and charitable societies as well * Ener-
getic candidates would tour their constituencies, talk to as
many men as they could, and leave their propaganda and
ballot papers with suitable people. Those among them
who were Industrialists would use their workers to do the
canvassing for them. The opposition, therefore, did not
have the system or the organisation of the government and
It was, as a result, inevitably sporadic and scattered.
It w'as not so, however, m the towns. Here the govern-
ment did indeed have a major, but one who had a hundred
times as many men to look after and who therefore had
little to do with them individually. The government had,
as Pnnce Napoleon said, no ‘means of exerting pressure*
in the towns,* and the towuis thus were ideal breeding
grounds for organised opposition In the clubs, in the
cafes, where old conspirators could capture men without
the ties of the country, in the workshops where radicalism
was frequently an occupational habit, among tlie dregs of
the unemployed, and among the bourgeoisie recently
evicted from their positions of influence — from such
sources both officers and armies could be recruited
After i860 there are signs of a new spirit m some
elections. Villages which had till then follow'cd their
mayors united to the polls, do so no longer, and by iS6g
there are few communes which register unanimous \otes.
' AD Haaw-Gsrotine 21136, JP . Cadours to prefect, is 5 iEj6g
^ Eg F{tcl lU, H^rault g, tninisier of Interior to prefect, draft.
i3-«o 1858, FCit) n 103. „ ,,,
1 Jeiotne-Napolcon to Napoleon, E. d’lUutenve, NapoUun III it /*
pTMic* Napolivn, 3 86-9 S,
9 *
The Political System of Napoleon III
Why was this so ? The development of public opinion
had a great deal to do with it, of course, but no less import-
ant was the decay of the system of managing elections as a
whole. The government was wealt where the mayors were
weak. ‘The places where we cannot bring our influence
to bear’, wrote a sub-prefect in 1863, ‘are nearly always
those where the mayor is not in perfect harmony with his
municipal council. The good organisation of the munici-
palities is today the corner-stone of the governmental
structure.’ * The reason for the lack of harmony and the
reason for the weakness of the mayors is to be found in
the policy of the government itself.
First, it vacillated and yielded before the attacks the
system received. In i860 Billault had decided to appoint
the mayors before the local elections and to invite them
not to stand as candidates. In this way, he claimed, they
would be in a stronger position to dominate the rivalries of
the communes. They would be purely and simply the
representatives of the executive and could thus exert an
independent and impartial control.- This move was de-
signed to strengthen them but it had one cardinal vice,
that the mayors, the government’s most important agents
for the management of universal suffrage, were to have
their connection with universal suffrage severed and to
declare themselves doubtful of its confidence in them. In
fact, two-thirds of the mayors ignored the minister’s instruc-
tions and presented themselves for election : only about
a tenth of them were defeated. The consequent disarray
was aggravated by the government’s reversing its policy at
the next local election. It declared that it would appoint the
mayors only after the elections, from the elected members
of the municipal councils ; which was, of course, a complete
abdication to the demands of the opposition.^
‘ A.D. Isire SMi3, sub-prefcct. Latour-clu-Pin, to prefect, 5.6.1863.
- M.U. 6. and 10.81.860.
J .A.N. 45 AP I, note by Rouher to Napoleon, probably 1864.
92
ir/iy the fioieniment eeaseJ to vrtn eUcttoiis
Secondly, the government ceased to ghc Uie m3)or3
the backing uhich had been the basis of their influence.
Then, Worst of al[, the concession of the right to hold
meeting;* enabled the opposttion to set up committees
in every commune. Hence, exactly when the govem-
mciii's electoral agents were being thrown into con-
fuMOn, the opposition’s were given the opportunity to
organise,'
'I'hc opposition bad indeed by now Icamt hoiv important
tlic mayors were; they began to chase around their con-
stituencies, trying to win their support and seeking to be
declared the mayor’s candidates. Renegade majors \vho
deserted to the opposition ccascd to he uncommon ; and,
moreover, the government seldom dismissed tlicm when
they did desert. Here is the report of a judge of the peace
which shows the sort of thing that began to happen.
'Vesterday I was at the town of Lagrauli^rc I examined
it and was surprised that d/. U d/rtw had not had the
ofilctal candidature of M Mathicu posted up, even though
I had given instructions to the deputy mayor about this
I spoke to him again t he replied that df, U ^hettre had the
posters at his house. i'*^ot a single one has been put up.
. . . Yesterday morning M. le Moire had announced m
the market place the candidature of M, Mathieu very
briefly and in one single sentence, saying he was put up by
the government ; and he announced loudly the candidature
of jM. dc Jouvenel [the opposiUon candidate], thrice re-
peating that he had on three successive occasions been
elected M.t*. by the people I do not know whether he has
the right to do this. I was assured that all his family was
active, even his wife, and that diey were giving money for
dnnks fin favour of the opposition]. . - The result was
that the government only scraped a bare majonty in this
commune-*
1
t*erBigny
(O Napoleon, dr..rt, *7 7 .i 865 13 N N A ^ 13066 f
* AD Cortfci« tjeiftiad, ij.S iSOj
331
93
The Political System of Napoleon III
Wliile the government’s electoral army was disintegrat-
ing, the opposition was busy building armies of its own.
There was a mayor in every commune, but also a priest
and a schoolmaster. 'I'he candidates who opposed Napo-
leon’s papal and ecclesiastical policy often found an admir-
able force for canvassing the electorate in the clergy who
could use the pulpit, the confessional and the women, and
who did not hesitate to visit all their parishioners in their
homes.' Schoolmasters were often won by the republicans.
Local committees became common once again. The oppo-
sition discovered a weak point in the electoral law of 1S52.
It had been decreed that in order to be elected, a candidate
must obtain the votes of at least a quarter of the electorate
and more than half the votes actually cast. If this con-
dition was not fulfilled, a second vote was necessary, when
the man who got the most votes won. Now the opposition
began putting up as many candidates as possible, of what-
ever shade of opinion, in the hope of collecting enough
votes, not to get one of their candidates in, but to prevent
the government’s candidate obtaining the minimum neces-
sary number of votes. If they succeeded, a second ballot
was held at which the opposition united all their votes on
that candidate who stood most chance of winning.-
The opposition began to use the press to greater effect.
Now the press was regarded as one of the most powerful
means of propaganda and as an essential basis for a candi-
date standing for parliament. Successive regimes had all
recognised its power and had created newspapers ‘to en-
lighten the inhabitants of the countryside on their real
interests, by putting before their eyes now the grievous
results which the spirit of rebellion produces, now examples
of devotion and of loyalty given by the best citizens’.^ But
they consistently failed to capture the Paris papers with
" I 100/3, report of sub-prefcct, St-Nazaire.
^ E. Olliv.'cr, L Empire liberal, 3. 3-14. Article 6, decree of 2 . 2 ■ 1852.
^ Journal de la COtc-d'Or, quoted by S. Fizaine, La Vie politique dans la
Cote-d’Or sous Louis XVIII, 87.
94
Why the government ceased to mn elections
huge circulations and their own papers were ajwajs in a
small minority. In i86i, for example, the government
had three mam papers and two very minor ones with a
total circulation of 52,832. Even if iht Journal officieVs
17,242 is added to this figure, it remains much below that
of the 'progressive* papers* total of 91,292, the Orleanists’
36,859 and the legitimists’ and clericals’ 38,285,'' The
government inevitably had to rely on its censorship and
even more on the threat of prohibition to keep these papers
from being too hostile It was helped by the fact that they
were nearly always as much great financial speculations as
political weapons devoted to a cause. By 1869, however,
the new press law let loose the hostility of the great papers
and allowed them to distribute a daily vilification of the
government to hundreds of thousands of readers.
However, the effect of this press law was even more
important in the departments. Here the government was
far stronger than the opposition In 1862 the distribution
of the provincial press was this :
The government had 20a papers with 207,071 subscnbcrs.
The Orleanists had 13 papers with 20,069 subscnbcrs
The legitimists had 34 papers with 31,134 subscnbers.
The republicans had 13 papers with 22,981 subscnbcrs.*
As many as half the departments had no opposition paper
at all. The coup d’etat had been follow ed by a massacre of
the provincial press and most of the republican papers had
disappeared ' It was, indeed, difficult for a local paper to
survive independently. It could not hope for much income
from advenisements, since the prefect’s paper was norm-
ally given a monopoly of the legal ones which were the most
valuable. The local papers were nearly alwa} s mn at a loss
and even those of the government were subsidised from
central funds alone to an extent of 114,275 francs.*
• F{iS) *F(j 8)39*. ,r,vI^
» Mmpis’ report on the pres*, copy, 3‘a t8sj, AN , ABXIJt i 7 j
* F(iSl joy, note bf tUrtctor-gencr^l t iS(A hsute,
95
The Political System of Napoleon III
Opposition candidates considered a local paper essential
to success. What they produced was in fact a newspaper
only in name : it was generally merely political polemic
casting accusations on the government and replying to
accusations against itself. It was very frequently distributed
free of charge in huge quantities and accordingly cost a
great deal of money. The expenses might be borne by a
rich candidate alone, or by a group of friends prepared to
pay for success. Now, between the press law of 1868 and
the elections of 1869, about 150 new papers appeared in the
provinces, 120 of which were hostile, and in ten depart-
ments the opposition found itself with more subscribers
than the government. These new papers represented an
outlay of two million francs, which shows how powerful
was the opposition’s participation in politics.'
Money indeed was coming to play an increasing part in
politics, and this is the final reason for the disintegration
of the government’s system. The government had at its
disposal the innumerable subsidies, grants and concessions
which it was its job to make, but which it could store up to
use for electoral purposes. It spent very little extra money
on elections, for the only considerable item on the account
at the end of each one was that for printing circulars and
ballot papers. The former cost about ten francs a hundred,
the latter three francs a hundred ; the cost for each con-
stituency would therefore be around a thousand francs ;
and sometimes the candidates would pay this themselves.^
The government’s great advantage was that it had to pay
only the printers and that all other services were per-
formed free of charge, apart from small tips, by the civil
service. The presents the official candidates made to
charities, to churches and to schools were not of great
importance.^
‘ F(i8) 307, director-general’s note, and summary of provincial press.
^ A.D. Haute-Garonne 2M36; A.D. Isfere 8M13 ; A.D. Nord M 30/1 1.
9.9.1863.
5 E.g. BB(3o) ■SrZ'i , procttreur genial, Bordeaux, 18.5.1863.
96
Wiiy the government ceased to win elections
Now, however, there begms> to appear a new type of
candidate, who virtually bought himself a seat, smce it
was money which played the predominant part in his
election The classic case is that of Bravay, a merchant who
had made ^ huge fortune m Bgy^pt, and who had returned
to his native Card to find a severe shortage of water and
the long-prepared plans for a canal from the Rhone to
remedy it still fruitless. He announced With a great fan-
fare of publicity that he would build it He held a stupen-
dous opening ceremony at which the spectators were given
free refreshments, and thus having made himself into the
local hero and benefactor, he stood for parliament and was
elected The point of this story is made all the more
striking by the fact that, though vast sums of money w'ere
spent on entertainment and publiaty, the shares of the
canal company which he established were not in fact sold
and the land for it not even bought. Twice was his election
invalidated, but twice was he none the less re-elected.'
Similarly Daniel Wilson, a young man of 29, son of a
Scotsman who had made his fortune by introducing gas
lighting to Pans, gave lavish entertainments at his country
house, to which he brought voters in his carnages ; and he
VI as duly elected Laroche-Joubert, a great paper manu-
facturer of AngouJeme, is said to have spent a hundred
thousand francs on his election and to have sent five
hundred of his workers to canvass for him. He was re-
turned unopposed at the general election the following
year because no one felt disposed to go to the expense of
challengmg him.*
These are outstanding instances in a general tendency
to use drink and money and impossible promises to win
seats. It was an introduction, men said, of Cnglish elec-
tioneering methods mto French life : men had become
* C. 13+9. ACL 1864, I. r7^g, ACL rS^f. *. 4-6
i3.1t 166S. DO(tS} ijSi, utm, jt-s
97
The Political System of Napoleon III
cynical and said they would get into parliament even, if
it cost them one or two hundred thousand francs. The
electors were becoming more and more spoilt and their
demands were increasing.* Quite apart from the purely
corrupt aspect of this movement, the government found
the opposition playing its own game against it. The mayor
of a small commune in the eastern Pyrenees tells how he
was offered a thousand francs for his village if he would
vote for a particular candidate. He refused, he said, but
he could have done with the money. They had some good
fountains half a mile away but could not afford the pipes to
bring the water to the village. The church was in need of
repair and there was still half a mile of the road to the local
capital to be constructed. Every commune had pressing
needs such as these, and any wealthy man would be a god-
send, whatever his politics. In this case it was Pereire who
was the millionaire they picked upon.^
It was in such ways that the business of electioneering
became more complicated and more difficult for the
government. Universal suffrage, wrote Chevreau to Bil-
lault in i86z, ‘is beginning to tell us that it is no longer
willing to be guided \condtdt \ ; and if we are not all very
clever and light-handed, we shall, I believe, have many
disappointments at the general elections The govern-
ment’s problem could be solved by skill, as some demanded.
Or it could be solved by resignation and by withdrawing
from the elections in the way the liberal empire did. Yet
the system of official candidates had its use and served
a purpose in the development of French institutions. It
disciplined the electorate and thus enabled universal suff-
rage to be practised without violence and to become in-
grained in the habits of the nation. In the early years of
‘ ACL 1869, 2. 50, J. David’s interpellation on bribery ; BB(3o) 427.
procurettr pciUral, Bordeaux, 18.6.1863; BB(3o) 429, proenreur u^niral,
Douai, 17.6.1863 ; Brochant de Villers to Baroche, Bibl. Thiers 987 f. i 9 ^>
12.12.1858. ,
* ACL 1864, I. 315-16.
98
3 5.8.1862, Billault papers.
Why the government ceased to uiin elections
the empire men could still talk of abolishing it as being too
dangerous. After Napoleon there could be no senous
question of any such move. Such is the place vvhich the
second empire’s system of ‘packing* holds m the history of
France.
99
CHAPTER VII
Why liberal concessions were made in i860 *
A LIBERAL M.P. who had protested against the coup d'dtat
and withdrawn from politics recalled many years' later a
story which illustrates the state of public opinion in 1852.
‘When I had returned to the Vosges after the coup d’etat, I
received a visit from a well-to-do peasant who lived in a
neighbouring commune.
‘“Ah, well,” said he, “here you are, you have broken
with Napoleon.”
‘ “ I think,” said I, “that it is Napoleon who has broken
with me.”
‘ “How’s that ?”
‘ “ You had given me a mandate ; was it not my duty to
defend it ? ”
‘ “Yes, certainly, your conduct is very honourable and
no-one can reproach you. But we, sir, we have no
mandate.”
“‘N'9, without doubt, since you are the electors who
give the ianandate.”
Welfl, sir, I shall speak to you in all sincerity. The
commune -I inhabit is excellent ; it is composed of an
inmense m ajority of good chaps, very attached to good
cr, to pea'jce and calm. We have, however, got four or
I'ro'it^nrlT •'^60 : 'Napoleon, etc., wishing to give the
liolicv nf direct part in the formation of the general
hauu rl,. °j“]SO''eril iment and a striking testimony of our confidence in them,
Dubliqh 1 ’ that the debates of the tsvo hovuses should be
tint th should vote an address to the throne every year,
it in ‘'PPoit't ministers without portfolio to represent
ture’s order to facilitate the expression of the legisla-
creas • I of laws’, its powers of amending them be in-
100
fV/iy liberal concessions were made in iS 6 o
five stubborn fellows and one or two fools, capable of very
bad deeds if circumsunces allow them to count on impunity.
Six months ago, if, while crossing my village, where I am
regarded, although mistakenly, as the richest inhabitant, I
met one of these daring fellows, he would look at me m
a menacing way and I would sometimes even hear him
murmur : Wait, wait till jSye, The rich. You'll see .
[The triumph of the reds was expected in 1S52.] Upon my
faith, sir, I confess I W'as neither proud nor felt reassured.
Today I cross my village hold mg my head high. I look
these chaps straight in the face. People say W'e have lost
all our liberties. As for me, I avow it, I am only beginning
to find myself free ” ’ ‘
In such conditions there was no question of re-estab-
lishing parliamentary government, yet the extraordinary
thing is that the liberal empire bad its roots in the very
beginnings of the regime. ‘After the coup d'etat,* wrote
Rouher, who took a leading part in drawing up the con-
stitution of 1852, 'everybody thought it impossible not
to take into account the new political habits which the
country had acquired in the preceding fif^ years. The
legislature was given the right of discussion. Now its
power was in germ in this provision. Its whole develop-
ment was merely a question of time,’ ^
The second empire thus did not seek merely to re-
establish the institutions of the first one. Napoleon III
publicly declared that his government was to be author-
itarian Only for a time. It was his proud boast that he,
alone among the rivals for the throne of France, knew the
need to move with the times. ‘March at the head of the
ideas of your century,' he declared, ‘ and these ideas follow
you and support you. March behind them, and they
drag you after them. March against them, and they over-
throvv you.’ He stressed, therefore, that he was seeking to
• Buffet to Ollnei, OUi^wr paper*, lO 4 1896
* A.N. 4S A t> t. 'Note pouf I’eropereui’, prebabir of
lOt
The Political System of Napoleon III
lay foundations capable of supporting the development of
liberty in the future. ‘A constitution’, he quoted his
uncle as saying, ‘ is the work of time ; one cannot leave too
large an opening for ameliorations’, and he accordingly
included provisions in it for its improvement by constitu-
tional means. In this way he would enable France to
make political progress without revolution. ‘To those ,
he declared in 1853, ‘who might regret that larger conces-
sions had not been made to liberty, I would answer:
Liberty has never helped to found a lasting political edi-
fice ; it crowns the edifice when time has consolidated it.
This last phrase was seized upon by many politicians
who frequently expressed the hope that the ‘crowning
of the edifice’ would soon take place. An important
characteristic of the constitution, they pointed out, was its
elasticity which would allow the legislature to assume an
increasingly influential part in it. For though in 1851
Napoleon, victorious from the plebiscite, represented the
will of the nation, he would do so much less in a few years’
time, and the legislature, since it was frequently re-elected,
would come to represent it much better. The growing
authority which it would thus inevitably acquire must
result in a change in the balance of the constitution.^
Napoleon could hardly increase his power beyond its
position in 1852 ; but the legislature could and its influence
was felt more and more as it became a normal organ in the
machinery of law-making. At first it was consulted rather
as a matter of form, but inevitably disagreements arose and
members began to ask for increased powers of amending
legislation. More particularly in finance the government
was regularly censured for excessive expenditure by the
most devoted members, who demanded closer control in
' Discours, messages ct proclamations de Vempereur (Plon, i860), 202, 212 ;
PVCL 1853, I. 3. CEuvres de Napoleon III, r. 342.
“ PVCL 1852, 2. 83 and 107; M.U. 1853, 554-5, CRCL 1854, 86;
CRCL 1855, 207 and 316-17; CRCL 1856, 139-40; CRCL 1858, 382,
CRCL 18C0, 328.
102
Why liberal coiicessiom u'ere made in i860
the form of the right to vote the budget in individual
chapters rather than in ministnes.' With the economic
crisis of 1S57, moreover, the co-operation of the legisla-
ture became more than ever necessary to the government.
Money became scarce and the great public works of the
time, the railways, could therefore no longer be financed
by the old method of private borrowing State aid was
given to the companies and this involved the control by
parliament of a matter formerly independent of it.*
The ministers themselves discovered that the separation
of legislative and executive was inconvenient since it closed
the doors of the legislature to them and left the defence of
the government there to mere civil servants, the counsellors
of state Rouland found these counsellors of state unsatis-
factory inteipreters of his budget and twice arranged to
meet the parliamentary budget commission ‘by accident’,
for the purpose of discussing it ' as friends’.* Morny like-
wise formed the opinion that parliamentary procedure
must be reformed for the improved conduct of affairs It
was absurd, he argued, that a body which w as thought worth
consulting should be so restricted in its powers to reform
measures which it saw to be defective, and that it should
be left with the alternative of rejecting them completely or
allowing them to pass in an unsatisfactory state. ‘ Speaking
m my own name he declared to the house, * and engaging
neither the government nor anyone else, I also think some-
thing needs to be done about it.’ He began w'orkmg on
a revision of the rules of parliamentary procedure and
privately asked the five opposition members not to attack
the existing procedure any more, so that he could reform
It Without appearing to yield to them.* Finally, the Italian
* PVen iS6(i, 6 787 and 1194-6 j CKCL *859, 37s and 374, CRCL,
1834, 442, 448, 463 , CRCL 185s, ssg-fio, 585 , CRCL 1856, 69S-&. 708 ,
P'VCLi8s8, S S 93'8 f S 701-3, PVCL 1859, 5 414
“ L Girard La Poltttqui^ ties travaax publat da second empae, 196-208
* Richemotit to Persignj, 8 6 i860, Fetsi guy papers
* FVCL 1860,6 1294-6 01119101*5 111317,7 7 i860
103
H
The Political System of Napoleon HI
war and the free trade treaty had raised issues which had
produced lively debates in both houses. The government
had seen that their publication \yould help it in the defence
of its own policy and it had accordingly published the
proceedings of the senate.
Meanwhile other pressures were exerting their influence.
The novelty of the concessions of 24 November i860 has
thrown into the shade the ministerial changes which
accompanied them. The position of Achille Fould in the
history of the second empire, though ill defined and ob-
scure, was of the highest importance. During its first
eight years he was minister of State, in which capacity
he was the ‘first confidant of the initiative of the emperor
[and] also his most important auxiliary’. ‘There is now’,
wrote Persigny, ‘only one minister, or rather . . . there
is a first minister who sums up the whole government in
his person.’ ‘The emperor is in the hands of Fould
who proposes and arranges everything.’* The year i860
marked the victory of Persigny, Walewski, Haussmann and
Morny against Fould, and, which was even more important,
the abolition of his office. The ministry of State was now
divided from the ministry of the Imperial Household and
its particularly close link with the crown in this way de-
stroyed. Fould’s fall shows that the innovations of 24
November i860 marked a radical change in system. They
were also to be the inauguration of a new era, in which the
emperor, having won all the military laurels he required,
having presided over the congress of Europe and having
augmented his territory with three departments, would
devote his energy to a huge programme for the develop-
ment of the national wealth.
There can be little doubt that for all the pressures
exerted on Napoleon and all the intrigues of this crisis, it
* Sei^tor La Gu^ronni&re in A. "PowXd^Joxtrnaux et dtscoursy 1867, Ln(27)
^ 3737 * Persigny to Napoleon, draft. Sept. 1854, and Persigny to his wife,
26.8. 1859, Persigny papers.
Why liberal concersioaj acre made in i860
Has he alone who made the decision. He had left his
ministers tcry much in the dark and in aiJ probabdity he
presented his proposal to the couned of ministers all of
a sudden. Almost certainly the idea of establishing an
address to the throne h as his ow n.* Experience had shown
him the need for publicity and control in matters all of
whose detail he could not be master. One day, probably
at about this time, Napoleon was talking to the due de
P/aisance about his daj's as president of the republic.
'AhJ diosc were the da) 8 .' Plaisance said things did
not seem to haie warsened for him. "You are quite
wrong, my dear duke,’ said Napoleon. ‘At that time it
was all life and moxement around me ; today it is silence.
I am isolated, I no longer hear anj thing.’ That a desire to
free himself from the dangers of court intrigue was a
dominant motive in his decision is confirmed by his own
statement to the council of ministers in jS 6 i when he
adopted Fould's financial programme, which was the com-
pletion of the senes of reforms started by the amnesty and
the free trade treaty. "The emperor,’ wrote Baroche,
‘explaining the reasons which led him to accept M. Fould s
proposals, said, " I am certainly far from admitting that our
finances are In the almost desperate situation which the
foreign papers suggest. We are, compared to any 0/ the
European powers, in an excellent position It is therefore
not a cry f ?] of distress that I w'ant to utter. But I
could not fail to acknowledge that the impulse to spend
money on useful things is strong and easy to succumb to.
So I wanted to place a barrier against my ministers and
against myself which would not be crossed without some
previous reflection, I also wanted to destroy this notion
which they pretend to hold abroad that my government is
so absolute that I hold all the w^calth of France in my
' Diltault lo Napoleon, draft. ii iS6o, Bi Haul (papers
Napoleon, copj’, H biography of Momy
trellea L’Epine
105
Morpy to
The Political System of Napoleon III
hands, and that I can dispose of it as I please even for my
personal needs. . . . This is one of the main causes of
the fear and the suspicion which France causes abroad,
because it is believed that suddenly, without any previous
discussion, and hence without any publicity, I can secretly
acquire huge sums, for example to make military prepara-
tions. I wanted all the world to know that this was
impossible” . . N
The theory that Napoleon was merely yielding in his
weakness before the attacks of the opposition was invented
by that opposition to flatter its own importance. Napoleon
put his ministers in parliament because he felt this would
strengthen his government’s position, and not because it
was an opposition demand. Thiers interpreted the move
intelligently when he wrote, ‘The emperor’s motives are
these. First, it was impossible to continue the contrast of
France giving liberty to all the world and refusing it for
herself ; and secondly, the legislature no longer worked
properly with the system as it was.’ He explained his
interpretation more fully to the due d’Aumale : ‘The first
reason for it was the state of the legislature. I think I told
your highness several years ago that the Corps de I’Etat
[the senate, the council of state and the legislature] could
not work for long organised as they were. For when you
have recourse to assemblies, you must have recourse to the
methods of managing them, or otherwise it is best to do
without them if you can, which I think is impossible. Now
experience proves that the only means of managing them
is to give the conduct of affairs to men who have their con-
fidence or whom they merely like. Otherwise it is impos-
sible. But to think that by sending them a poor little
counsellor of state, knowing nothing, replying to nothing
and giving the houses the sort of report a civil servant
makes to his minister, you will manage to dominate them,
^ Note by Baroche, in his papers 1035 f. 29-32 of meeting of council of
mmisters at Compiegne, 22.11. 1861.
106
Why hberal contesshm a'ere made in zS6o
is a pure arid puerile illusion. Such a regime is possible
while the fear of the reds is supreme, but all fear comes to
an end, and then the mdociUty characteristic of the century
and of France reappears. This is what began to happen
last year and M. Earoche said to anyone who cared to hear,
that It was impossible to go on like that. Hence the need
to do something. So the emperor followed partly his own
inclinations and partly the way things pointed. His per-
sonal inclination has always been to think (he often used to
tell me so) that repression was by nature temporary , he
realised that sooner or kter he would ha\e to yield a little
to the reawakening independence of opinion and he found
it gave him the appearance of great wisdom to forestall
the day when concessions would no longer be voluntary.
1 think also that his very strong affection for his son played
its part in deciding him Obviously he w'anted to prepare
the future for this child. As for the way things pointed,
It had become striking; for to preach liberty, sword in
hand, to the whole w'orld, to tell the Pope, the king of
Naples, the dukes of Tuscany and Modena, and the
etnperor of Austria himself, that they were perishing or
would perish for having refused sufficient liberty to their
subjects^ and to make us live under the institutions of the
first empire and of the early part of it, too, without even the
corrective of the Additional Act, this had become an in-
tolerable contrast and almost ludicrous . . . ‘
Buffet likewise recognised that Napoleon had made a
concession long before it wds necessary. 'When for nine
years’, he wrote, 'one has seen liberal ideas discussed and
ridiculed by the immense majority of the country ; when
one has seen, as I have in the provinces, public opimon
crumble up more and more and become little by httle
stranger to the most simple notions of liberty, it is difficult
not to rejoice with seme enthusiasm at this unexpected
> Thiers io Buffet, i.i* iSSo, Bi^et papers
6.J .jS6i, copy, B N N A Fr so6»8 f S9S-7
"nuers td due d'Aumale,
toy
Thv Political System of Na/mleott III
return to the principles which arc dear to us. . . . It is
perhaps a unique opportunity to bring governors and
governed in France together, possibly for ever, in the
serious exercise of political liberty . . . and it has become
possible, thanks to the happy inspiration of the emperor.’'
It can now be seen that the concessions of i860 were a
positive measure inspired by constructiv'e policy and not
by fear. This docs not mean that its actual effects were in
fact accurately foreseen by the emperor. The reactions to
it were indeed diverse. The comte de Chambord insisted
that his legitimist followers should continue to abstain
from politics and that they should not alter their past atti-
tude.- The due d’Aumale was of course more opportunist
and pliant, and his advice to a friend was made public for
all Orleanists to know. ‘Do not think’, he wrote, ‘that I
attach no importance to the concessions which the imperial
government has just made to liberal opinion. I doubt
their sincerity and I am convinced that they contain an
ulterior motive, but they certainly have their value. I am
of the opinion that they should be used as much as possible,
that they should even be praised as a first step which holds
out hopes and which allows men to demand further con-
cessions. We shall see how they are carried out in practice
and what happens.’^
The opinions of these leaders, condemned to the in-
evitable ignorance and misinformation of e.xiles, do not
represent accurately the reactions of their followers. The
legitimists, though they professed a mystical veneration
for their king and in theory felt an obligation to obey his
commands, were remarkably independent in practice. It
is frequently the tragedy of royalists that they are at
loggerheads with their king almost as much as with their
opponents. For all the king might say, at least twenty-five
' Buffet to Thiers, B.N.N.A.Fr. 20618 f. 514-16, 30.11. i860.
2 Falloux, Memoires d’un royaliste, 2. 364.
^ Quoted by P. Guiral, Prevost-Paradal, 262.
108
Why Itberal conceniom mre made iti xS6o
legitimists stood for parliament in 1863, a number which
excludes some sixteen clericals often of the same hue The
Orleanists, on the other hand^ were of course essentially
opportunists and followers of their party from reason
rather than from sentiment. They found that if Napoleon
was turning liberal, they must play the game, and accept
him, since their avowed devotion was to principles and not
to persons. The tone of their reaction was set by Provost-
Paradol m an article in the Jbiorwf des Ddbats where he
asked, ‘Are we honest men ? In our incessant repetitions
that we place the increase of our liberties above all else
and that W'e demand above all the gov emment of the nation
by the nation, have we been merely play-acting ‘ If vve
are honest, and if we have not been play-acting these last
nine years, wrote Buffet, we must ‘accept these important
fights m good faith and use them fairly If the concession
IS not complete, it cannot be denied that it covers what is
most essential. , I ardently wish that we use these
rights which have been restored to us, but I desire no less
ardently that we do not abuse them and that by their
moderation, prudence and the dignity of their conduct, the
liberals should make the nation understand these constitu-
tional guarantees which have, since 1852, been forsaken by
public opinion even more than by the gov ernraent ’ ^
Thiers thought the same, though he was more guarded
Tt is impossible for the liberal monarchical party which
has always demanded liberty to refuse any grant of it when
It is offered What matters is not the sincerity of the offer,
but the sincerity of its acceptance. We must discuss,
since we are called upon to do so, the affairs of the state ;
discuss them sensibly and in good faith ; we must put
away all malice directed against the reigning dynasty and
discuss busmess as business, with arguments drawn from
busmess alone, and in a word, act as vve did in the first
' Quoted ibtJ 35S
* Buffet tg Thiers, Urt NJt Fr zo(nS t Si4'i6, 30 11 jS6o
The Political System of Napoleon III
year of the revolution of 1848, when we could do some real
good. On this condition we shall have the ear of the country
and we shall put the government in the wrong, if it goes
wrong. Any other conduct will be unwise, dishonest, and
inaction would be better though it would be fatal sooner or
later. Now I have not spoken of individuals. For them
it is less simple to know what to do. Those who are young
and new to politics, can have no objection to entering at
once into action. But will they suffice for the task ? I do
not think so, not because of their want of talent, but because
of their want of authority and of experience. I foresee
deplorable mistakes even with good leadership, and what
will it be like without it ? This would lead to the con-
clusion that men who have acquired a name and the habit
of acting themselves and leading others, should intervene.
But here everything becomes difficult, because the question
of dignity is immense. Even putting aside the taste for
rest which has become very powerful with me, we must not
forget where this road will lead. If the government resists,
when it sees that liberty will challenge a part of its omnipo-
tence, a revolution will follow and it is disagreeable for
those who have been in three revolutions to take part in a
fourth. If the government yields with prudence, we are
quite simply its prisoners and in good faith we must agree,
not to become its ministers, but to be its applauders.’*
‘ Thiers to due d’Aumale, copy, 6.1.1861, B.N.N.A.Fr. 20618 f. 595 '
5q 8. Cf. Thiers to Buffet, i . 12- 1860, Buffet pap"""
no
CHAPTER vin
Hoto Perstgity sought to meet the challenge of
the left
{1863)
It Has Persigny’s boast that after Napoleon HI himself he
Has the man uho had done most to establish the second
empire ; ‘ and there is a great deal of truth m his claim
In 1852 he had played a leading part m laying the founda-
tions of the Bonapartist party Now, once again minister
of the Interior, he had the opportunity of welding that
vague coalition into something more united and organic.
His role was important above all because he had a definite
policy and clear ideas on his aims and his methods The
Bonapaitcs must be established in France, as firmly as the
Hanoverians had been in England, and for this the dynastic
question must cease to be a matter of debate. It was no
good hoping that the people would vote for Napoleon ; a
party had to be created positively to support him. Elec-
tions therefore were not occasions on which the people
registered their preference for various theories or men, but
battles to annihilate the enemy and to weld together the
victors with the experience and the memoty of the fight.
Now the previous elections had shown where Napo-
leon’s weakness lay. ‘Long before the elections’, vyrote
Persigny m 1865, ‘I told your majesty that in the business
of elections, there were two distinct things to consider;
the provincial elections, properly so called, and those of
the great centres of population. That so far as the
• 'Pfiiiigny to Nspokon. 2 i . M » 3 s 9 . draft, B N N A Fr f 143-3.
HI
The Political System of Napoleon III
provinces were concerned, by appealing to the Napoleonic
sentiment, by giving clear and precise instructions, by
covering all the agents of the administration with my
responsibility, instead of hiding mine behind theirs, I
would answer for the elections there, . . . But as for the
large centres of population, I told and I repeat to your
majesty, that whatever the attitude of the popular masses,
they escape the attraction of the government by the very
nature of our administrative organisation. For, whereas
in the provinces the government has an electoral agent in
the mayor for every group of about a hundred electors, in
the large centres of the population, it has only one mayor
through whom to exert its action on twenty to thirty-five
thousand electors. In other words, whereas in a provincial
constituency the government counts on several [ i*] hundred
electoral agents, that is to say, as many mayors as there are
little communes and all of them in continual relations with
the electors, all known, honoured and respected ; — in the
constituency of a large city there is but one sole electoral
agent, but one mayor unknown to this large mass, who does
not know the individuals in it, and who is consequently
without influence and without means of action on the minds
of the electors. So it is not by direct intervention, by
word of mouth, as in the villages, that the agents of the
government can enlighten the electors on the choice to be
made, but by the sole means of the press. Hence I con-
cluded, as I still do, that it was the press which made and
will make the elections of Paris and that it was therefore
necessary to capture it at all costs.' '
Now the press could either be suppressed or won over.
It was obviously wiser to use it and Persigny obtained
Napoleon’s permission to win over the two great opposition
newspapers of the left, the Siecle and the Opinion nationale,
by making the editors M.P.s with government support.
The political director of the Sidcle was Plavin, son of a
' Persigny to Napoleon, copy, 14.9.1865, B.N.N.A.Fr. 23066 £. 338-9-
1 13
How Perstgny sought ta meet the chal!e?ige oj the left
regicide member of the convention exiled by the restora-
tion, member of the liberal opposition in the parliament of
the monarchy of July. Pursuing his course leftwards he
obtained control of the Steele, the paper with the largest
circulation in France, and became an indispensable pillar
of the^ republicans.’ Gu^roult was a St-Simonian who
had ttath the help of his friend Jerome Napoleon founded
in 1S59 the Opinion nattonale, a paper of radical and inde-
pendent but not anti-dynastic views, whose circulation had
m a few years risen to great proportions. These two men
fell in with Persigny‘s stratagem, for they had little choice .
if they refused to co-operate, their papers might be sup-
pressed For a tune all went well. Their papers drew
nearer to the government and quarrelled violently with the
republicans.* Then suddenly all was rumed. Shortly
before the elections the Opinion nationale published an
article on Mexico, whose tone was such that the council of
ministers gave it a public reprimand {averitsseinent) Soon
after, it published an article on finance and again received
a reprimand. A few days later Gu^roult came to see
Pcrsigny and explained that these articles had been given
to the paper by Fould himself, minister of Finance. Per-
signy’s policy did not have his support and the plan thus
came to nothing.’
^ This policy of digging the ground from under the oppo-
sition's feet was also attempted in another form In 1857
Persigny had cnticised the government for putting up a
candidate against General Cavaignac. The government,
he argued, should have said that whatever Cavaignac’a
intentions, it did not wish to oppose an honoured personage
who had served his country well; and had it caused its
candidate tq withdraw, it would have deprived Cavaignac’s
election of all political significance. It is likely that in the
J About 44,000 m jS 66 FC18) 194
Confirmed by P Guiral, Prevost-Patadol, 306
Perttgny to Napoleon, copy, 31.11 1S64, B N N A Fr 33066. f 30S-10.
The Political System of Napoleon III
same way attempts were made to prevent Thiers from
being opposed by the government. ‘
The sabotage which Persigny started behind the
enemy’s lines was, however, only one of his aims ; and no
mere substitute for direct attack. He believed that a clear-
cut battle was essential not only for the destruction of the
opposition but no less for the creation of the Bonapartist
party.2 The revival of the old parties represented merely
the return of the old leaders to politics and not a demand
for. liberty in the country. The proper way to deal with
them was not to conciliate them, to compromise, and to
allow them to infiltrate into power, as some ministers ad-
vocated, but to take one’s stand clearly and unmistakably
on the plebiscite and fight all its opponents. Napoleon’s
supporters, who were still an incoherent body formed of
diverse elements, would be forced to cut their ties with
these old parties and would be made into a solid party by
the attack they would experience from all sides. ^
Inspired by this belief, Persigny reaffirmed the system
of official candidates and purged it of its doubtful elements.
Some twenty-five or thirty of the outgoing M.P.s were
not recommended for re-election, on the grounds that the
government could not support men not entirely devoted
to the dynasty and to the existing institutions.'^ It is
claimed that this was a measure that gave proof of the
intolerance and narrowness of the regime, that a M.P.
had to be as a soldier and never to vote against the govern-
ment on pain of dismissal. Now it is true that most of the
displaced M.P.s had shown opposition and that most of
them were hostile catholics ; but it is certain that there was
no general expulsion of all opponents. Though Persigny
was the advocate of a thorough policy, he was greatly
' Persigny to Napoleon, draft, 16.7.1857, Persigny papers. Cf. H.
;Malo, inters, 443 ff.
^ Persigny to Napoleon, draft, February 1864, B.N.N.A.Fr. 23066 f.
-54”S- s Circular of 21 .6. 1S63, F(ja) 2122(B).
* Circular of 8 . 5 . 1 863 , lA/d.
114
How Persigny sought to meet the challenge of the left
dependent on his prefects. When therefore a prefect
asserted that if such and such an M.P. was supported by
the government, he, the prefect, would not answer for the
election, claiming that the population was disgusted and
infuriated by the M.P.’s opposition in parliament, the
minister of the Interior frequently yielded. On the other
hand, where a M P.’s position appeared to the prefect
to be strong, as was the case, for example, with Kolb-
Bemard, a veritable leader of the catholic opposition, the
government left him unopposed,*
Actually, mere continual support m parliament was
not regarded by many timorous M.P-S as automatically
assuring them of the status of official candidates at the
next general election. They knew that they were probably
even more subject to the danger of being ousted by rivals
who had superseded them m the favour of the prefect or
the minister Thus when Isaac Pereire stood in the
eastern Pyrenees, the minister announced that since he was
as devoted as the official candidate, the government would
remain neutral. The official candidate withdrew in pro-
test : he was not dropped for voting with the catholic
opposition,* In fact, many M.P.s who had voted against
the goverfl-ment niofe frequently than those now displace »
remained the government’s candidates.
In one case a M.P. was even dropped, not for too
much opposition, but for too kttle. In Fmistfere, in face
of the opposition of the legitimists and the clergy, the
prefect and bishop came to an agreement to replace him.
The M.P. could not but withdraw and his place was taken
by a local judge of the peace, a distent relation of C^e,
the legitimist Academiuan.* However, whatever the mffi-
vidual reasons for each decision, the general effect of the
announcement of the names of the official candidates vias
■ tr A U “ *770 Hvo) 375.
of Interior to prefect of Nord.
1 r iiEfi PjT-Or. : AtL ise4- « a**
* 110(36) + 31 , Benne*, t? S iSSs*
»*5
The Political System of Napoleon III
to suggest the mass abandonment of at least twenty of the
staunchest members of the catholic opposition. Some
others, having lost the support of the government, probably
retired quietly from political life; but twenty stood for
re-election and the election therefore became a struggle for
religious as well as political liberty, and a fight between the
influence of the clergy and that of the government.
Persigny could therefore enter the fray clashing his
arms in an atmosphere of thunder and lightning against
the black clergy and the red socialists and the chameleon-
men of the old parties. The activity and the energy of the
opposition made his victory all the more resounding. The
most outstanding feature of the result was his triumph
over the clergy. In vain did seven bishops come out
publicly against the government. In vain did the clergy
in some twenty-five departments enter the fray against it,
canvassing from house to house, portraying Napoleon as
the enemy of the Pope and of religion, and promising
damnation to his friends.*
No purely clerical candidate of the opposition got into
parliament. Thiers was defeated in three constituencies.
In one of them, despite the support of the Anzin Mining
Company, of which Thiers was a director and which
bought a local newspaper to help him, an actual stranger to
the department was preferred to him as being more likely
to secure the redress of local grievances.® Great names
like Dufaure, Montalembert, Remusat, Decazes, Casimir-
Perier, Barante, Odilon Barrot, St-Marc Girardin, were
soundly beaten. All but six of the expelled clerical M.P.s
were defeated, after violent battles in which both sides
brought into play all the known methods of intimidation
and influence. The number of votes the government
* J. Maurain, La Politique eccldsiastique dii second empire^ 639 ; F(i 9 )
5605 ; BB(3o) 426, note {cabinet de V empcreur'). A.D* Mainc-et-Loire,
8M52; A.D. Aveyron, 1863 election file; A.D. Loire-Inf. 1M100/2. A.
Chevalier to Persigny, 26 and 30.5.1863, Persigny papers.
2 BB(3o) 429, prociireur general, Douai, 4.6.18G3.
I16
How Pmigny sought to meet the challenge of the left
received remained the same as in the two previous elec-
tions ; and in a third qf the departments it rose above the
figures of 1S57. Above all, the government continued to
make progress m the west, and Its vote there went up over
what it had been in 185 a, when it had not already done so
in 1857. hlaine-et-Loire, Vendee, Vienne, Haute-
Vienne, Orne and Eure the foundations of the Bonapartism
of the third republic were being laid
Persigny therefore hailed the election as a great victory.
He might claim that there were not many more opposition
hl.P .s, for the old parliament had contained recommended
hl.P.s who had in fact formed an opposition.* However,
there was no denying the doubling of the votes cast for the
opposition ; and worst of all for him, the fact that govern-
ment mismanagement contributed considerably to the
election of many of the opposition members. The election
of opponents in great towns and traditionally hostile regions
was possibly unavoidable ; but even here it was sometimes
possible to wm by carefully choosing one’s ground. In
Bordeaux and m Yonne the old opposition candidates were
supported by the government and the radicals thus kept
out. Similar careful planning could have reduced the
number of opposition M.P.s by at least half. In fact un-
satisfactory offiaal candidates account for several opposi-
tion victories. Great names like Bertyer and Mane were
confronted by complete obscunties. Buffet w-as opposed
by a clerical whose position had been undermined by the
prefect for two years, smee it had been expected that he
would be deprived of official support-* No doubt he was
more harmless than Buffet, but had a distinguished Bona-
partist been put up, the opposition would have been
divided between Buffet and this clencal and the two would
have been defeated. Havin likewise owed his elecuon in
■ Circular, 51 t.im. F(“) 13066 f sjw.
to Nipoleon. draft. .S64 . Ptrv.sny W prcfe«». tcfrgrwii.
5 6 lS6j, AD Miuie-tt-Doye
^ DB(jo) 430* l>TiiCurfUr 20,3 tSoj
The Political System oj Napoleon III
no small measure to the government’s undermining the
position of his opponent, the official candidate, in accord-
ance with the plan to adopt Havin. The government
found a candidate to oppose Ancel only a fortnight before
the election, which was far too late. The mayors of this
constituency included many retired merchants of Havre,
clearly disposed in Ancel’s favour and several years of
preparation were obviously required to overthrow him.‘
Again, in Loiret, Persigny sought to evict Grouchy from a
constituency in which he had been sub-prefect for fifteen
years and M.P. for six ; where he consequently had one-
third of the mayors and one-half of the judges of the peace
on his side. The government was thus deprived of its
normal electoral agents but took no measures to prevent
the inevitable result.* In three constituencies the new
official candidates were unpopular choices, either as
strangers to it, or as a subject of local hates and rivalries
which deprived them at the outset of many votes.* In two
others the government was defeated largely because the
official candidates had been drugged into sleep by long
unchallenged possession and just did nothing to secure
re-election.-* Chambrun might well have been defeated
had the prefect not published at the last moment a brusque
telegram from the minister of Education saying that he
would not tolerate the hostility of the clergy. On the last
night almost every house was therefore visited by the
priests and the balance tipped in their favour.*
Those who disagreed with Persigny used the large
figures of the opposition votes to attack him. ‘The evil’,
wrote Baroche to Napoleon, ‘is in a great degree the result
of the direction given by the minister of the Interior to the
' P'ocureur general, Rouen, 25.5.1863 and 18.6.1863.
° Orleans, 8.6.1863.
4 ^ 20 , procureur general, Douai, 4.6.1863 and 17.6.1863 ; A.D.
Nord M30/10, sub-prefect. Cambrai. 9.3.1863.
■* BB(3o) 429, procureur general, Douai, 4.6.1863.
* F(go) 589, prefect of Lozfere to minister of Interior, 3.6.1863. A.D.
Lozere IV M 14, prefect, 28.5.1863.
n8
IIoiv Persigny sought to meet the challenge of the left
electoral campaign and to the violence with which some
were supported and others fought, ... The government
of the emperor is strong enough to have no need either of
such agitation or of such a great deployment of circulars
and newspaper articles, or, above all, of violence to obtain
from universal suffrage M.P s frankly devoted to the
imperial dynasty’* Even those who were not biased
against Persigny’s general policy recognised that the mam
lesson of the election was that the official candidates should
be selected with more care and that greater attention to
local details would have prevented many defeats.*
It Was this violence on the one hand, and lack of atten-
tion to detail on the other, which led to Persigny’s dismissal
Your maintenance m office', Napoleon wrote to him, ‘will
cause the agitation to continue, it vnll excite opmion and
make the venfication of the elections disastrous for the
government. What do you want people to say in support,
for example, of the candidatures of MM. Seneca and
Boitelle, discredited men who were elected only as the
result of the most culpable pressure of the administration !
Well, I say it with regret, your temporary withdrawal
can alone re-estabhsh calm m public opinion. I recog-
uise the great devotion you have shown me and lam far
from bearing you any grudge for not having succeeded
everywhere But it must also be acknowledged, your
superior and lucid mind is worthless for adnunistration
where all must be prepared long before by perpetual
regular conduct, How could you succeed, for example,
when the candidature of M. Delessert was improvised ten
days before the election
■ Draft dated 1S63, Earothe papers, 1014 f 36-41
* 427, prOcureuT general, A« 8.6. 1863 , ibid, procureur sHietal,
Armens.. 6 6 1863 . B2(3o) 429, procureur gfneral, Douai, 4 6 iSdj ;
BI1(30) 431. procurewr KoueP. rS 6.rSfrJ
5 Napoleon to Petsigtiy, r I 6 1863, Persigny papers
CHAPTER rx
Why Ollivier and Morny became advocates of a liberal
empire and how the authoritarian empire’s majority
in parliament disintegrated
There is a myth that the liberal empire represented the
abdication of Napoleon III, giving up his prerogatives in
order to keep his throne ; that it was forced on him by
t e strength of the opposition, who thus succeeded to his
power. The truth is that just as the empire was founded
m 1853 on a combination of forces created by the diffi-
cu ties of the republic, so likewise the liberal empire was
the result of a regrouping of these forces under the new
circumstances created by fifteen years of strong if erratic
government. It was not the victory of the opposition, but
0 a new party composed of both opponents and sup-
porters of the old regime. The transformation and the
conversion 0 these men is one of the most interesting
subjects of the second half of the reign. In 1857 when
e ve mem ers of the opposition arrived in parliament
ey were completely isolated. They found that seats had
them all alone on the highest
benches of the left. In the lobbies and public rooms of
srhnnl Were similarly kept at a distance. Old
^ their backs and refused to speak to
were regarded with fear and dislike as
that- the mob.' How was it, then,
min' I- ^ ostracised group became the prime
minister of the liberaj empire?
mile Ollivier wa,s the son of a red republican, who
‘ A. Darimon.l^ej Cinq sous Vempire, 71, 103-5.
120
Why Ollivier hccam an advocate of a liberal empire
was the friend of Mazzini and Ledni-Rollin. and who had
been imprisoned and expelled after the coup d’etat. He
nuelf served the republic as prefect and was dismissed
y riouis Napoleon. Such eircumstances would have filled
ordinary man with perpetual hate of the empire and an
ineradicable hostility to it. Many republicans whose careers
were thus cut short by the empire had their growth com-
pletely stunted and they spent the remainder of their period
u power vegetating on the memory of their
short spell of glory fimile Ollivier, how'ever, endowed
with a brilliant mind, ever given to self-cnticism and self-
examination in its constant search for self-improvement,
turned this apparent defeat into a positive advantage. He
devoted his enforced retirement to study and to a complete
tethinkmg of his position. ‘Nothing is permanent/ he
wrote to a friend, ‘ all is temporary in what we see. The
hand^ of God is long and we must have such confidence
m His justice that w'e must never allow ourselves to be
crushed by the weight of the present, however heavy it
might be Only profit from the rest which is given you
m the battle of life to subj’ect your mmd to a firm discipline.
Enough of poetry, of vague reading, of Michelet, etc , etc.,
take Substantial, hard, precise, arid books. Undertake
some difficult and disheartening work, which accustoms
your mind to continual effort. We ha^e collected in our
hearts enough images, sentiments, aspirations, too much
perhaps 1 We must, to make these things useful, fill our-
selves With practical facts As Joubert, a man of parts,
whose maxims I am reading, says, he who has imagination
\vithout erudition has wings and has no feet . . The
future belongs to us. If w^e have as much firmness m our
Will as warmth m our hearts we could plough a gionous
furrow, but for this we must profit from our years of
obscurity and miseiy to exalt our minds and create in-
exhaustible resources for ourselves. We shall thus become
at once more learned and better; the men of die future
121
The Political System of Napoleon III
must be saints : let us try at least to be less bad than many
others.’ '
Feeding his mind therefore not on pamphlets and news-
papers, but on the best French and European classics of
all ages, he grew tremendously in stature and in breadth
of understanding. Gone were the dreamy schoolboy’s
romanticism, the politician’s addiction to verbosity and
cliche, the pompous facade of empty thoughts. He
emerged from his studies completely transformed, imbued
with an appreciation of the past and with the wisdom of
the masters of politics and philosophy, but no less out-
standing for the originality of his ideas and the clarity of
his thought, the precision of his expression and the felicity
of his style. Above all, he was no longer the typical repub-
lican or the mere politician : he had emerged with the
makings of a statesman — with a new set of principles and
with a definite solution for the problems of his time. The
problem was how to establish liberty in France. The
method so far adopted had always been revolution, but
revolution inevitably produced reaction and France thus
moved perpetually between absolutism and anarchy.
Nothing firm could be founded on a revolution. Reforms
must be gentle and gradual if they are to succeed : they
require a basis of peace and good order and they must
seek to rally all the classes of the nation. Revolution was
essentially violent, and made half the nation opposed to its
re orms from the beginning. Ollivier’s paramount aim
was iberty and therefore, since he could not establish it by
revolution, he saw he must accept the existing regime. He
would not be wedded or glued to forms of government’ :
e ad personally preferred a republic, but if the empire
granted liberty and was willing to concede the principles,
w ich was all that mattered, there was no reason why he
s ould insist on the outward form. His opposition must
be honest : he must show that he was opposing because he
Ollivier to Guiter, 18.12 . 1S49, “td 15.6 . 1852, copies, Ollivier papers.
123
Why Ollivier became an advocate of a liberal empire
wanted the triumph of his ideals and not because he had
been expelled from office and wanted to regain his place.
He proclaimed a new policy of constitutional opposi-
tion, and announced his readiness to rally to the empire if
it became liberal, to help it m the disinterested task of
reconciling liberty and order in France. He worked out a
definite plan for the creation of a new party. ‘ In the legis-
lature’, he wrote in 1859, ‘I shall confine myself ... to
resuming my work, modest, thankless, slow, but whose
grandeur and usefulness posterity will recognise, because
from It will date, I hope, a liberal republican school,
reasonable, possible, immoveable m its convictions . , .
whose leaders . . will understand that a deserved defeat
is not mended by sitting with folded arms and declaring
oneself indignant at it,' *
His constructive policy made him break with the
various groups of the republican party in turn. By entering
parliament and taking the oath to the empire, he divorced
himself from the old men of 1848 and from those who re-
fused to have anything to do with a government tainted
with the original sin of the coup d'etat. By welcoming the
libera] measures of i860 as one of the greatest reforms a
government had ever earned out on itself, and by declaring
that if Napoleon went on to introduce liberty, he would
support him, he dissociated himself from the systematic
opposition and founded a new school of constitutional
opposition. Finally, when he co-operated with the govern-
ment m 1 864 m the reform of the law of combination and
in 1865 voted for the address to the throne to prove the
smeerity of his willingness to accept the^empire, he broke
with Jules Fa vre and the 'irreconcilables’."
He thus lost nearly all his old friends, but he had all
the time been gaining new ones, and winning an aacendancy
: M a .a„.
7,»2 1849, October » 8 s 7 , August 1S64
The Political System of Napoleon III
over the rest of the house and the loyal official candidates.
When he had first come to parliament they had been
determined not to listen to him, and to silence him with
their coldness and indifference. His very first speech,
however, won their attention and their admiration, for he
had made moderation and disinterestedness his studied
principles and he at once showed himself to be no violent
red. He was a great speaker to whom it was impossible
not to listen. He dazzled the house with his ability to
master a subject at the shortest notice ; he charmed it
with his smooth flowing oratory and by his lucid exposition
carried it with him. In 1858 Montalembert heard Ollivier
speak in parliament and noted in his diary, ‘This young
democrat will go far. ... By his moderation he puts out
even . . . Granier de Cassagnac’ (a leading ultra-right
M.P.). Montalembert asked to see Ollivier, and wrote
after the meeting, ‘ I am very struck by the distinction and
loftiness of mind of this orator in the making. He is to
all appearances a real liberal, which is perhaps rarer in the
rank's of the democrats than anywhere else.’*
Finally what enabled Ollivier to move towards the
empire was the fact that, unlike Thiers, who could rival
him in his influence on the house, he did not believe
in pure parliamentary government. He had quarrelled
violently with Thiers because he objected to the latter’s
maxim that ‘the king reigns but does not govern’. ‘Minis-
terial responsibility’, he wrote in 1861, ‘means royal in-
violability. Now this is the monarchical principle and not
the republican or democratic principle. Democratically
every act carries a responsibility with it.’ ‘Just as repre-
sentative government is great, so parliamentary govern-
ment is despicable.’ The ministers must have a place in
p&J.rliament but they must not depend for their existence
onythe votes of the house. If parliament defeats the
I Ollivier, Le rg Janvier. 175 ; M. Du Camp, Souvenirs d’utt demi-
si^cle,\i‘ 226, 237-9 : Montalembert’s diary, 18. and 33.3.1858.
124
IVhy Ollivier became an advocate of a liberal empti e
dismisses it if he thinks parliament is
nght ; but if not, he dissolves and appeals to the country,
n practice of course he would not find it in his interest to
Keep m office ministers who were unpopular. Parliament
must impose not men but principles on the executive
hat we want therefore, said Ollivier, is not parliamentary
government which absorbs the executive power or leads to
revolution, but the end of absolute power and the return
to the representative system — i.e the sjstem founded on
ree elections and an independent press Liberty alone
vvjas no use. ‘Liberty but also democracy. Without
iberty, democracy is nothing but despotism. Without
democracy, liberty is nothing but privilege.' As early as
i86i therefore, Ollivier is found preaching the self-same
doctrine which he put into practice m 1870.*
Ollivier was at the same time encouraged to hope that
Napoleon would concede more liberty by the due de
Momy, who likewise played a leading role in the creation
of the liberal empire, Momy has generally been misjudged,
for he put very little down on paper ; he has therefore re-
mained enigmatic, like Napoleon III, and been considered
a mere dilettante and speculator. Now it is true that he
was not endowed with a brilliant mmd nor with any gifts of
oratory and that he could not impose his will by the force
of any intellectual superiority. But m politics it la fre-
quently more useful to be liked than to be admired, and
Morny, as an essentially likeable man, who could make
friends at once by the charm of his manner, who could
influence them by his sound common sense free from pre-
tension, and who could keep them by his conciliatory
spirit and his intuitive appreciation of the point of view of
others, was one of the empire’s greatest assets It was all
Very well satisfying the masses and silencing the leaders of
the opposition, but government is a co-operative enter-
prise which depends for its success on keeping its
< Ollivitr’* diary, lO 4 tSSi and 27.11 iS6t.
laS
The Political System of Napoleon 111
personnel together. Morny was just the man to do this.
He had always thought,’ he told parliament in 1856, ‘and
he is more than ever convinced that the most carefully
thought out constitutions, the most far-seeing standing
orders, must, in order to function well and for long, have
the co-operation of men, their good will, their good faith
^ sense. . , Parliament and government
would be kept in agreement not simply by institutions but
also by men.'
Wth such a nature and such views, Morny was in-
valuable in managing the legislature. ‘M. de Morny’,
wrote Granier de Cassagnac, ‘had as a characteristic a
aste or creating a clientele of friends whom he strength-
ene with his influence and whose action added weight to
is own authority. He was careful besides to choose men
w 0 were not only devoted but also distinguished. It was
us t at e succeeded in dominating the legislature till
formed a group of twelve colleagues
tnere who, at a given moment, moved quietly along the
Th^ M caused his opinion to prevail among them.'*
e .s ound a protector and a counsellor in him.
en, or example, one of them was attacked by the
ministration in his constituency, Morny wrote thus to the
minister 0 the Interior, ‘If your prefects persecute my
in n expect me to preside over the house
I h the emperor and his government ?
eg you, or mercy’s sake, in the general interest, to take
it*^w‘th them without at least having discussed
Juf' ^ conducted the debates of the house with
hid 1 smoothed the path for many a measure by
tnk't ^ l‘fo owed his success not least to his
Vance action to prevent all the difficulties he
oresee rom arising. One day, for example, he said
^ 1858, I, annexe 7.
■> 'S'OJ/fC/nW, 2. rjfi-S.
y o BilJauIt, 14.7.1855, Eillault papers.
126
Why Ollivier became an advocate of a liberal empire
to a liberal IVI.P., ‘Ig it true that your friends intend to be
\ery violent on the Mexican question ?’
^ I think they want to pull it to pieces.’
My God!’ said Morny. ‘No one wants the end of
this expedition more than us. But if the opposition presses
too much, the government will certainly be forced to
persevere. Let the opposition show intelligence and
patriotism, let it help the government to get out of the
hornets nest into which it has thrust itself. Is that asking
too much J ’ >
As the opposition increased and as the government
altered, it became more and more difficult to manage the
nouse. Momy advocated liberal concessions, not from
Were weakness, but from a positive belief in their desira-
bility. ‘ A government not subject to control or to criticism
IS like a ship without ballast. The absence of contradiction
blinds a government and sometimes leads it astray, and it
does not reassure the country.’ The system of having
ministers responsible only to the emperor w'as bad, since it
freed them from the control of their colleagues and placed
the responsibility for all they did on the emperor.*
Morny was in fact veiy much like the Tory country
gentlemen who were passing reform bills on the other side
of the Channel. He was a conservative who knew how to
swallow liberal pills when it was necessary. He believed
m concession almost as m a principle. Shortly before the
revolution of 1848 he had said, 'Since my entry into this
house, I have been a very sincere partisan of parliamentary
reform and nevertheless I have remained a faithful con-
servative. Nothing is more demoralising for a country
than to see men changing but the government’s policy re-
maining the same.’ At the same time he published an
article urging social reforms. He now wanted the empire
* A Xisttutionf Tiirt P^ru sous Vempir€f iQi-C Cf Momy tc, OIL VJer.
14 Januaryt?) 1864, OlLvier papeis
' ACL 1863, 4 Z47 Momy to Napoleon, 24 iz. 18S3, copy of draft in
M. Quatrelles L'Epme’s manuscript biography of Momy
127
The Political System of Napoleon III
Had the republican opposition been returned victorious at
an election, it would have been met either with an abdica-
tion or with a coup d’etat. Napoleon could only share his
power with a dynastic majority. What happened now was
that some of the opposition accepted the dynasty and some
of the majority moved towards them and became supporters
of a liberal empire. This regrouping of the house was due
first to the rise of new issues which divided it in new ways
above all, ecclesiastical policy, free trade and the pace
of liberal reform. It was due secondly to the absence of
clear leadership from the government. The separation of
the executive from the legislative had placed the majority
in a curious position. They were not called upon to defend
the government, and were usually content merely to
register favourable votes. The few opposition members
spoke almost as much as the whole majority, at least on
important questions, and ministers and counsellors of
state answered them.' There was no real partnership
between the ministers and the members of the majority,
who were therefore more willing to follow leaders in the
house itself who could put forward definite programmes
in which they could participate.
Thiers began forming a group almost as soon as he got
irito parliament. He kept it separate both from the irrecon-
cilable left and from OHivier’s following ; but it was com-
posed mainly of clericals and of men elected against the
government, who would accept the dynasty grudgingly
only if it granted parliamentary government.^ Hence, for
all the prestige he enjoyed, he could not form the nucleus
of a majority with them. Ollivier, meanwhile, was working
in another direction. He could not go back to the left,
with whom he had completely broken, and it was useless
remaining isolated. ‘The best plan for us is to mix as
* Cf. ACL 1862, 2. 73-4.
diaw," + .?T8^3°"’ *7; Ollivier's
130
How the authoritarian empire's majority disintegrated
niijch as possible with the liberal elements in the house’,
that IS, those who wanted the crowning of the edifice At
the end of 1865 therefore, he held a dinner at the house of
janz^, an official candidate who had broken with the govern-
ment because of his excessive liberalism, for the purpose of
organising a liberal empire party. Those present included
another official candidate, and it was hoped to recruit still
more like Welles de La Valette and Jules Brame.* Momy’s
fnend Latour du Moulin, convinced likewise that it was
unwise to form a third party ‘from outside the majority’,
tvas moving in the same direction and various other
official candidates began to vote with the opposition.^
While the liberals were causing the disintegration of
the majority from one aide, Jerome David began pulling it
to pieces from the other side by organising a right-wing
party. The club of the rue de V Arcade, which had started
as a gathering for members of all parties, had elected him
president ; he began to use it to influence their politics , he
conveyed messages to them from Rouher; and gradually
secured the departure of all but the ultra members ^ Here
is an example of how he acted. ‘Yesterday’, wrote Geiger,
a loyal Bonapartist, ‘Jerome David took me aside to confide
to me that he wanted to w'rite a letter to the emperor by
which he hoped to have the bills on the press and public
meetings withdrawn, if the letter was signed by 80 or 100
members of the majority He appealed to my devotion,
which he seeks m certain simpletons only to forget it later ,
uc let me understand that the empress was in agreement
with him; m a word, it was a little intrigue to become
minister being hatched under a petticoat.’ ♦
These groups gradually became more and more united
defined, though of course they always remained with-
out any permanent organisation or discipline. The election
* A. Darimon, ie Tiers Ports sous I'empire, 330-1
* A Darimon, Let IrreLOttiilmbles sous C empire, 3°
* Ibid, 49-54, 142. 180, 188
* Geiger tq Persigny, 26 11 1867, Petsigny papers
131
The Political System of Napoleon III
of the secretaries of the house became a party struggle,
with each group trying to secure the nomination of one of
its members. Above all, the habit of voting with the govern-
ment grew weaker. When laws were rejected by the house,
it was a sign of independence rather than of party organisa-
tion. What really broke the majority up was the amend-
ments and interpellations. Groups of M.P.s went about
recruiting support for their ideas ; the signatories of
amendments acquired cohesion and began to vote together
again and again. Once a member of the majority had been
got to vote independently a few times, his independence
became a habit. He ceased to be a member of ‘ the compact
majority’, as Latour du Moulin called it, and became ‘an
occasionally dissident member of the majority’,’
The session of 1864 saw the first step in the creation of
the liberal empire group : Ollivier as reporter of the law
of combination openly co-operated with the government
and broke with the left. In the following year sixty-one
votes were cast for an amendment in favour of subjecting
the press to the control of the courts instead of to that
of the administration.- Another amendment sought to
enumerate what the opposition wanted from the law of de-
centralisation which the government had promised, instead
of merely thanking it vaguely in the address to the throne.
It obtained only twenty-five votes, but forty-two M.P-S
abstained, showing that, though they agreed with the con-
tent of the amendment, they were unwilling to appear to
dictate to the government.^
In 1866 the decisive step was taken. Ollivier drafted,
with the co-operation of Chambrun and Buffet, an amend-
ment to the address, asking the government to proceed to
the crowning of the edifice. The organisers collected signa-
tures only Ironi men whose dynastic loyalty was not suspect,
and Ollivier himself preferred not to sign it in order not
‘ .tCL j;i6s, 7. -5. 1 1S65, -• n;i-
^ ACI. 1865, ;93 and 3. 30.
132
How the authontanuTi empire’s majority disintegrated
to frighten away any members of the majority who, though
favourable, would be unwilling to co-operate in any opposi-
tion. When the amendment was discussed, a member of
the right wing said that it was ‘a defiance against the
sovereign’ — to which Buffet retorted, ‘No, no, sir’ — a
protestation of dynastic loyalty which made a great impres-
sion on the house Forty-two signatures were collected,
which included a few more recruits to the ‘dissident
majority , and more would have signed had they not
objected to dictating a programme to the emperor ’
These scruples diminished with the increased un-
certainty of government policy. The government did
indeed embark on a programme of liberal legislation, but
this Was not supported by some of the ministers : it was
opposed by the right wing ; and the left found it inadequate.
There were delays, postponements and talk of withdrawing
the bills. The army law was very unpopular with the
majority, and all the more so because it came just before
an election. The independent votes in these years rose to
sixty and seventy or more Fmally, in 1869, loi votes
Were cast m favour of allowing the discussion of an mter-
pellation on the government’s liberal policy These
included above thirty more members for the dissident
majority who were to side with the liberal empire in 1870.
Thus even before the election of 1869, the nucleus and
indeed over half of Ollivier’s party had been formed.^
Just as Napoleon had taken the initiativ^e in making
liberal concessions, so too was he to a considerable extent
responsible for the secessions from the majority. It W'as
well known that he was favourable to granting more liberty
and it Was wise to move m the direction in which the wind
was blowing. Moreover, he seemed to countenance those
who took part m this liberal agitation. The night before
the amendment of the 42 was debated, for example, some
’ ACL 1866, 3 240- z, Segris » £ OlUvier, Lf l^Janv-tr^ chapter il.
' ACL i86g, i 77.
>33
The Political System of Napoleon III
of its signatories dined at the Tuileries, and Napoleon
showed no signs of irritation.* There was, however, no
question of these members of the majority merely continu-
ing to play the game of ‘follow my leader’ though to a
different tune. They felt that the uncertainty about future
policy, which obstructed industrial and commercial plan-
ning, and thus affected many a M.P. very closely, should go
on no longer.2 Napoleon and the creators of the empire were
getting old. They must make provision for the future.
The empire based on personal government would fall to
pieces if Napoleon died without leaving an adequate heir.
The empire must be made permanent and permanence
could rest only on institutions and not on men. The
youth of the country had not known the terrors of the
republic of 1848 and therefore found no justification in
the old despotic regime. If matters were left as they were,
these young men would become republicans and the
country would be plunged once more into the vicious circle
of revolution and reaction. A liberal empire alone could
win over these men and give new youth and life to the
dynasty.^
‘ Articles in La Liberti, 3.-7.5.1869 on the session of 1863-9'
^ Montagnac’s letter in La Liberte, 1.8. 1869.
^ ACL 1870, 3, 380, Dalloz ; ACL 1869, 2. 181, Louvet.
*34
CHAPTER X
//oiT the (lection of iSdg shozced the collapse
of the old system
By the old system of managing elections was at its
ast gasp and now, \\hat was more, the will to male it work
was slight and fitful The general election held in this
>ear was far from being the last heroic fight of the dying
authoritarian regime. On the contrary, it was an election
ul] of confusion and of tergiversation : it was extra-
ordinary for the way the government, though nearly
eterywhere master of the ground, made terms, yielded,
Withdrew, and voluntanly weakened its own defences,
r or it is not less frequent for governments to commit
suicide than to be overthrown.
The circulars from the ministries sounded the first
retreat. In parliament Forcade la Roquette had insisted
that the gov ernment was entitled to use the civil service as
electoral agents, but he conceded that it had no pow er to
compel It to perform these extra functions. Now, in a
circular to the prefects he left it to them to decide whether
circumstances in their department made it desirable to ask
the mayors to distribute voting papers. In any case the
prefects were to avoid suspending mayors vvho refused to
•^-operate * The government thus began by abandoning
the use of one of its most important electoral instruments,
and by dealing a great blow at the power and influence of
the prefects. A considerable number of mayors now voted
Openly for the opposition and with impunity refused to
, ailS and ad Cotri^e, 1869 election file, circulars of s and
^ 5 i«6g
>35
The Political System of Napoleon HI
support the government which iiacl appointed them.' The
minister ot Education torbadc his inspectors to send circu-
lars to the village schoolmasters to stimulate their zeal,
again on the grounds that the opposition would misrepre-
sent them as proofs of oppression by the government.^ A
sub-prefect was forbidden to wear his uniform while
accompanying the official candidate of his constituency on
his electoral tour.^ The support which the official candi-
dates received was thus greatly reduced and the general
policy in fact was to make them depend ‘on their own
opinions and personal merits ’.•* No longer was Persigny’s
phrase diriger Vopinion'' to be used, but only 'eclairer
I opinion’.^ Candidates thus finding themselves left to
tieir own lesourccs were forced to set up their own organ-
isations, committees and newspapers.
Ihe system of official candidates was continued but in
Cl uted form and without real confidence in it. In the old
ays t re minister s files were full of applications for this
tit e . now it was impossible to find enough men to fill the
vacancies. To such an extent had the opposition’s propa-
scorned or feared to be called
0 cia candidates ; and when some young man wished to
en erpai lament, he no longer applied to the government
01 t IS title, formerly so coveted, and formerly an almost
cer ain guaiantee of success. Persigny’s trumpet title of
can 1 ate of the government of the emperor’ was aban-
‘ ^ °^tgoing M.P.s had to be content to be merely
can 1 ates of the government’. Some judged even this
e excessively strong. Several refused it as spoiling
sub-pre^fief Amiens, S.6.iS6c; ; A.D. hire 8Mi6,
toleg^n; T a N ADxJx S9U prefect, H.-Vienne, 13.5. 1869,
Ardtche file, passiw
A.D. Loiro-Inf iM r’oo^^ 1786, /trocMrair gAicraf, Aix, 13.5.1869;
= A.D H . m,. r-f° of sub-profcct, St-Nazaire.
12.5.1859. ' ronnu 2M36, minister of Education to prefects,
40 S.m,Su?r’'; 5 *" » mtofew of Inlcrte,, r(9=)
136
How xS6g showed the collapse of the old system
their chances and others made public excuses for bearing
it. They were, they said, perfectly independent, even
though they were the government's candidates and they
made it clear that this status implied no servitude on their
part They would no longer promise ‘devotion’ but only
loyal co-operation’ * One prefect thought it best that his
Candidate should avoid all such titles Another received a
letter from his sub-prefect suggesting that the title ‘candi-
date of the government’ would sound better than ‘official
candidate’ The prefect telegraphed, ‘Say Conservative
Candidate * ; and then, on second thoughts, sent another
telegram* ‘Liberal Conservative Candidate’ would be
better still * The wider the appeal, the better no doubt
Would their chances be
A great number of government candidates did, in fact,
follow this policy Just as m the old days it had been
essential for them to mention the name of the emperor, so
now It was almost the rule that they should mention the
name of liberty There were, of course, many traditional
professions of faith which spoke only of devotion and glory
There was one, particularly distinguished by its simplicity,
issued by an old faithful, M.P. since 1852, who w'as, in
fact, now defeated. It consisted of a portrait of the
emperor, with a short statement that the candidate was
devoted to him. ‘If you re-elect me’, it said, ‘I shall, as
before, support the empire and w'e will repeat together,
“long live the emperor U ^ How^ever, an ancient love
of liberty was now claimed by candidates no less frequently
than ‘an ancestral devotion to the Napoleonic cause*, 'f
have not for one instant’, declared the due d'Albufera,
typical of many others, ‘ceased to consider liberty as tfie
* A D Cortege 63M, LafonU de St-Mur's circular , A D Mauie-et-
Lciire 8M6 j, Ljs Cates’s circular , BB(i8) 1786, procureur getia'ai, Angers,
25 5.rS$<>; BB{i8>J788 procurrvr getteraS, Di]on, 31 5 iSds; AD Tsere
8 M 16 , sub-prefect, Latour-du-:^n. 31 5 >8;69
* F(qo 1 svi. Fyr-Of . B 5 ^^ 9 , A D Nord 30M27, stib-
prefeer. Doiwi, 29 ♦ 1869, md prefect to sub-prefect, Douai, 30 4 1869
) Tra-vot. in C 13^6. Gircndts
^37
The Political System of Napoleon III
indispensable right of all civilised countries ... I want
the empire and liberty.' ^ It would certainly be a different
parliament which would emerge from such an election,
even if all the old members were returned.
But not a few of them were not really willing to fight
to the end, and in places the government would not fight
at all. None of the nine seats of Paris was contested by
t e government and the dynastic candidates whom it
avoured were careful to avoid all public connection with
Lyons and St-£tienne likewise went undefended.
Ferdinand de Lesseps, supported by the government at
Marseilles, was careful to conceal the fact. In Var, a
meeting of the notables from nearly all the communes
0 t e firet constituency unanimously adopted the candida-
Emile Ollivier; and before this mass defection,
the official candidate withdrew.^ Three members of the
t ir party were unopposed in Nord, either because the
government felt itself too weak, or because it preferred
might get in if the conservatives were
ivi e i Flence the extraordinary fact that, in all, twenty-
seven members of the opposition, and most of them
^a ers at that, were elected unopposed by the govern-
, the election, at least one M.P. was
reatened with being dropped, because the government
1 not wish to back a loser. The minister of the Interior
0 t e time, Pinard, urged the prefect of Aveyron to be
rescr\e m his attitude towards Auguste Chevalier, the
economists brother. ‘This e.xpectant attitude was aimed
Cornudei'fn ' A'lathieu ; BB(i8) 1788,
•intl Andri! in Card BB(i8) 1790, Dum:>3
prcfccVof’vfr/i3‘’.7.^[869^ 8.5.1869; I'(90) 408, ministw to
' * letters, 25.2. 18O9 and 1.^.5.1869.
I’olletan. IdK„ ’ / nT.- Carnier-PaKts, Ferry, Favre, Simon,
Vaidroni'e 'om'-' Buftet, Bramc, Kolb Bernard, Chevandier de
I troche Tiilancourt, Malezicux, Martel, Esiourmel,
l-.iroche.Joubert. Planat. M.agnin, Marion. Tachard, Gr6vy.
i38
IIoTv iS6^ showed the collapse of the old system
at giving you time to study with complete moi-al freedom
tne real inclinations of public opinion. It was aimed in
addition at allowing the government to clear itself of re^
sensibility by withdrawing from the fight if the re-election
ot the sitting member was found to be too seriously en-
angered . . and to avoid exposing the government to
a Serious political setback W'hich might occur if it rashly
gave him its patronage ’ >
This fear of being beaten caused the government to
a opt as Its own a handful of candidates who were more
I eral than dynastic. In Bordeaux the trick of 1863 was
repeated and a liberal was successfully chosen to prevent a
radical being elected.^ In five other constituencies the
official candidates were not elected at the first ballot, and
another ballot W'asnecessaiy ; but such was their discourage'
naent that they withdrew and the opposition was victorious,
A sixth man w'as prevented from followmg them only vvitli
difficulty.! In three cases where a second ballot was neces'
sary, the government declared its support for one of the
independent candidates, m order to avoid a radical ^ Thus,
almost exactly half of the opposition or independent candi-
dates entered parliament with, as it W'cre, the co-operation
of the government
In the majority of cases the government did not of
course yield but it had nevertheless given die opposition
the weapons with which to fight. Liberty of the press and
of meeting benefited the opposition alone, and produced a
campaign conducted with a violence unprecedented since
the second republic. In Pans 20,000 men on an average
attended electoral meetings every night, m an atmosphere
of great excitement which culminated m a riot and in
barncades Crowds marched through the streets, looting
* A D Aveyron, iSSp election file, nunuiet to prefect z? j iS6S and
20 6 iSo3
* Hou^ssrd, Johnston, Carrd-Kezisouet, Genton, Rouxia
> Gf os, Pouyer-Quertier, Clary, Ayme, Fancu , and Pagfey
s Baboin, Grouchy, Delahyn
139
The Political System of Napoleon III
and throwing stones, crying, ‘To the Tuileries’. They
sang the Marseillaise, and at the line,
^ Aux armes, citoyens’,
brandished the sticks they carried. Similar violence seized
the large towns.' The radical press reached the limits
of vituperation and abuse. Revolution seemed at hand.
There are historians who assert that all this produced a
reaction in the government’s favour, which resulted in all
conservatives rallying to the government’s support to
defeat the reds : the election, they assert, was therefore
one of conservatism against radicalism. This is not the
case. The challenge of the reds was far less marked in the
provinces and certainly the parties did not call a truce in
the government’s favour. The clergy did not support the
government with any concerted plan. They based their
choice, as always, largely on the personal merits of each
candidate. Though the bishops frequently pledged their
support to the government, the clergy more frequently
aided the clericals and legitimists. Where there were
second ballots, they usually transferred their votes to the
government. But the spirit of conservatism could hardly
have been dominant among them if the Univers did not
hesitate to say, ‘ Since nothing can be e.xpected from him,
it does not matter defeating M. Pons Peyruc [the official
candidate in Var], even if it benefits a radical
Never before had there been so many candidates.
1 here were 333 for the nine seats of Paris alone.' A bare
10 per cent of the seats were not contested. If the opposi-
tion candidates who got a decent number of votes and can
be taken seriously arc counted, the totals are as follows
in round numbers and omitting those who cannot be
classified.
‘ ttpuris uf prefect cjf police. Ft'jo) S<)' • prefect of
iJouciico-iiu-Ui'.Sne. ;o. 5 . tSfx;.
f •''fyer.ii:!. f.j; i'o/jroprr ectlciiasliiue Jit aconJ cwp.’/e, 'joS .Old Oit>'
l t.iv) i'JCO, note. iiiiiiUtr>- of UcIij;ion>. ‘ C.t j7r-
140
Haw xS6^ showed the collapse of the old systeiH
Republicans 140 I Catholics 20
Legitimists 45 Liberals 40
Orieanists 30 I Dynastic 25
The results of the election gate the government a
nominal victory, though it is the great increase in the
strength of the opposition which was more striking. Since
the system of official candidates tvas not rigorously applied ;
since very independent candidates were given official
patronage; and since two dozen constituencies had no
official candidate, it is difficult to compare this election with
previous ones If the votes are divided between those
whom the government definitely opposed, and the rest, the
figures are :
Not opposed 5,105,461
Opposed 2,903,496
The government's vote here is almost the same as that in
the three previous elections and it could therefore claim to
have held its ground. In fact its votes must be reduced in
this way ■
Official candidates 4,356,510
Neutral 404,683
Benevolent Neutral 184,076
Hostile Neutral 1 60, 1 92
This still leaves some independents being counted as
official candidates. Nevertheless it shows that the govern-
ment obtained a majority of 1-4 million over the opposition
Once again the distnbution of the votes is very unequal.
In thirty-three departments (and in 113 constituencies)
more than half the total electorate voted for the government.
The strength of the opposiuon is tremendous, but its divi-
sion IS such that the government easdy won a majority in
the house itself. Again it is difficult to classify members,
since the election was not contested by clearly defined
parties However, the new house contained about eighty-
eight independents, that is, roughly one-third of its total.
I4»
The Political System of Napoleon III
The real importance of this election is threefold. First
it was a great defeat for the old Orleanist and legitimist
leaders. Remusat, Casimir-Pdrier, Broglie, Audiffret-Pas-
quiet, Bocher, Cornelis de Witt (Guizot’s son-in-law),
Pr^vost-Paradol, Duchatel, Decazes, Leon Say, Passy,
Falloux, Larcy, Vogud, Crussol, Pozzo di Borgo, Carn^,
were all defeated. The people did not elect these men
whose very names were irreconcilable with the regime.
he majority of the independents were not hostile to the
dynasty, except for one group, whose rise is the second
main feature of the election. They are the reds, the repub-
licans of the left of whom there were now about thirty in
parliament. The old opposition was clearly split between
these men and the moderates who were willing to co-
operate with the empire if it became liberal. They had
ought each other as well as the government at the elections,
'vu^ co-operators had returned more numerous,
irdly, not only was one-third of the new house in
favour of a liberal regime, but a large number of the
government’s own candidates had in the course of the
election declared their support of it too. The official
can 1 ates were thus in their turn divided between liberals
an aut oritarians. The old distinctions had disappeared,
t^ e orces had regrouped and an entirely new political
situation had arisen. This is a fundamental point in the
IS ory 0 the second empire. The opposition did not
e eat t e government, nor win a majority to carry out its
programme. It succeeded only because a large number of
e government s supporters seceded and united with them,
ina y, t le lesults of this election were irrevocable because
ey s rowed that the old system of managing the country
a co apsed and there was therefore no going back. The
0 regime was finished and the only possible solution was
o create a new majority around a new regime. This was
e wor* and the meaning of the liberal empire.
142
CHAPTER XI
Who supported the liberal empire and what its theory
of representative government was
The elections showed that the old system could not be
continued, and this is why the theoretical alternative to the
liberal empire, a coup d'etat^ was impossible But the
elections did not give birth to a clear majority able to take
office, and it took six months of negotiation before a
ministry was at length formed. The famous ii6 repre-
sented the culmination of the movement which had begun
in 1866; they were 116 men who signed an interpellation
asking that the country be associated in a more efficacious
manner in the conduct of its affairs by the formation of a
responsible ministry. It was as before a coalition of the
third party and of the majority and it included only four
members of the left. The high figure was reached b}
further secessions from the majority, but there were still
other M.P s who, though favourable, would not associate
themselves wTth an interpellation which sought to dictate
to the sovereign.* In co-operation with the left the 1 16
might secure a bare majority to cany the interpellation,
but no government could be based on the support of the
anti-dynastic left. The 1 1 6 are therefore w rongly assumed
to be the foundation of Olliueris mmistiy. They pre-
cipitated the concessions of the liberal empire, but the
largest single group was still that of the old loyal official
candidates and Ollnier had still to create a majority to
support him.
This he did in the autumn, when he appealed (or
• ACL * 870 , » 354. PinaiJ,
*43
The Political System of Napoleon III
recruits from the official candidates. Napoleon had till
then given the legislature no clear lead ; the initiative had
therefore been taken by M.P.s and that is why the liberal
empire has the appearance of a transformation imposed on
the sovereign by parliament. However, as soon as Napo-
leon came out of his silence and .announced the liberal
institution, the official candidates became free to answer
ivier s call, and enabled him to form a majority. The
[ swamped and seceded to form the centre
® h ivier thus found himself with a majority composed
almost entirely of former official candidates, which now
became known as the centre right.
Now Ollivier intended to form a ministry based on the
centre rig t and on 31 December 1869 such a ministry was
m act ormed. It included four ministers of the author-
1 arian empire and the continuity between the new and
e 0 was thus preserved in the ministry as well as in the
majority. I ivier had no wish to include the leaders of the
‘ of M. Buffet,’ wrote one of his friends,
insisted on him
at e would be obliged to make overtures to M. Buffet
0 ^^spect for his party, but with the hope of obtaining
• ^ of these leaders of the centre left
SIS e on coming into office only together with his friends,
sorry at this obstinacy and formed his
ivr-in^ D wit out them. Then, however, all was spoilt by
in the centre left should be brought
was* lost homogeneity of the cabinet
centre parties might be allied in opposition
cnnirp ^ ^ould not worlc together for long. The
mrl'-i clieved in a liberal empire, the centre left in a
■ '* ’^l^.^tary empire : the former were more essentially
ena ists and laid much stress on social reform, whereas
a5.to.1S6Q, Chasscloup papers,
livier, L’Empire liberal, vo], 13, ch. 1-7,
144
Who supported the liberal empiie
the iatter were absorbed by pure politics and tended to
be protectionists and clericals.* The difference between
the two groups can best be seen by examining their
leaders.
The father of Louis Buffet, the minister of Fmance,
had been a Bonapartist. He came from a bourgeois family,
which included notaries, merchants and landowmers, and
he was himself a business man, mayor of his commune,
member of the general council He had served in the
Napoleonic armies and kept his affection for the empire
ever after. However, the most that Louis Buffet inherited
from his father was an absence of hostility to the Bona-
partes. He was born ip early enough to draw his
ideas from the liberal doctrinaires but too late to serve
Louis Philippe. Hence m 1848 he was a pure liberal, a
strong believer in the necessity of a ‘regime of order, o
liberty, of right and not of despotism and arbitrary
... In a free country the majority makes the law and the
minority must obey this law , otherwise there wou e
anarchy. But it is also necessary that majority and minority,
that all should be able to mmifesl
opioions, their bchefs, openly and fiankly. t a a ®
be able to work by apeech, press and all the ntstnnnents of
fair propaganda to spread these
beliefs, to win ^ JrL as 1851 he had
consoieuc^ m ZZZtion b«»ecn parbaoiktary and
tejeeted Napoleon sdnMcn™ ^
represwtanve pt® , ' ,uce a parliament with limited
one. Hethongh.2^”Zr» mZase them, so that It
powers would inevoublysee^^l ^
had to be either v ^ P . compatnot Boulay de La
ability, his relationship witti ms c /
, a ^ 3.i8to.reportoficonvrr5atio(Jvri[hDini.
* Moaulembe^* ^
* 1848, his profes^oo of by Courcel, ‘Nonce lar .
f Buffet to hn drt Sttnues UtoroUt tt BWjUjwe, Imltlul tit
Buffet',
Fraitct, Januaty t9®^r
The Political System of Napoleon III
Meurthe (vice-president of the republic), the fact that he
was a new man, resulted in his being made minister in
1851, and in his learning to know and to admire Napoleon.
He was, however, a parliamentarian and nothing could
make him a Bonapartist ; and so the coup d’etat and the
authoritarian system sent him into the wilderness. This is
how he explained his conduct. ‘When the coup d’etat took
place, my duty as a member of the [National] Assembly
was perfectly clear’, viz. to protest. The coup, however,
was ‘purified by the assent of the country’ ; and had the
government then gone on to combine liberty with authority,
‘I would have forgotten the past’ and agreed to serve in
parliament. ‘I certainly did not have any personal pre-
judices against Prince Louis Napoleon. The kindnesses
he had done me, the confidence and attachment which he
had been good enough to show me on more than one
occasion had found me neither insensible nor ungrateful ;
I would even go so far as to say that few people have had a
greater affection for him, and much of this feeling still
remains in my heart for him as a private individual. He
will learn it if he one day falls into misfortune or out of
power. It is therefore not as a result of any personal
dislike, it is therefore no more because I wish to oppose for
ever the act of 2 December that I keep out and shall con-
tinue to keep out of politics. No, the motive behind my
conduct is to be found above all in the policy pursued since
this date : the banishment of men who could be reproached
with nothing except perfectly legal opposition ; the decrees
of 23 January [confiscating the property of the Orleans
family] which are in my view a deplorable monument of
iniquity, and the acts no less regrettable, which resulted in
the dismissal of counsellors of state guilty of having judged
according to their consciences ; and finally a constitution
which deprives the country of all serious participation in
the conduct of its own affairs ; these are the reasons which
compel me to keep out of politics. As long as they continue
146
Who supported the liberal empire
I shall not change my attitude. The day they disappear,
I shall be completely rallied ’ ’
He was true to his word He rejoiced at the decrees of
November i860 and returned to parhament at the following
elections. He at once assumed a leading role in the organ-
isation of the third party. During his exile from politics,
he had allied with Broglie and Montalembert m founding
the clerical review, Le Correspondant, but he had taken care
not to compromise himself by any contact with the Orleans
family It was, however, ineMtably towards the Orleanists
that he moved after the fall of the empire, for he was par
excellence a parliamentarian, the last of the restoration
doctrinaires, believing that only men with independent
incomes should become M.P s. He died a member of the
Orleamst pretender’s household, and his career is thus
curious in that it shows a man of Bonapartist ongms
becoming an Orleamst,*
It was the same with Dam, the foreign minister, Buffet’s
greatest friend Son of a minister of the first empire,
godson of Napoleon and Josephine, son-in-law of Lebrun
the consul’s son, he had sat by hereditary right in the house
of peers under Louis Philippe, imbibed the doctrines of
that regime, added to it a liberal Catholicism, cast off his
Bonapartism and married his daughter to the legitimist
Benojst d’Azy i He would enter the ministry only on
condition that Napoleon told him that he did not believe
that he, Dam, was an Orleamst « His presence m the
mmistiy was symbol of the gcneml return of the men who
had disappeared after the coup d’etat. He had played an
active role m the second republic, been wce-president of
the National Assembly, refused ministries and it was at
his house that the M.P.S met to protest on 2 December.
, ..j RMirlie in Lt Conrshondatn l8<>9i
' Letter quoted JjT Rosier 0°. m Poulet-.Mtluri*.
* CourccI, la<mJ tmfr-ft (tSSol, So . Prtil Pharr of
pjptrrr tecrtlt ft rorrtspOMja ^ ^ gglj-et, Lt ComU Dant (P*m, iSgjJ
"“'e' W-
The Political System of Napoleon Ilf
He returned to parliament only in 1869 as opposition candi-
date. He represented, therefore, the half-hostile clement
of the centre left.
The marquis de 'Palhouet-Roy, minister of Public
Works, occupied an intermediate position between the
two centres. He was the f^raiid scii^oietir of the ministry, an
aristocrat to the core, elegant, polite, with a good word for
everybody, and a passion for pleasing ; and wliat was more,
he was immensely rich, as the heir through his mother of
comte Roy, the restoration minister of Finance. He was
the owner of the magnificent chateau of Lude, where he
ruled as a patriarch, establishing model farms, draining
land, cross-breeding cows and plotting railways. Plis
sympathies and his connections were royalist : he was a
director of the Anzin mines, as was Thiers, and his sister
was duchesse d’Uzes. Another sister, however, was
duchesse de Padoue (wife of the Bonapartist prefect and
senator) and this was his link with the empire. Like
Buffet and Daru, he had protested against the coup d’dtat,
but, thanks to his connection with Padoue, he had been
made official candidate in 1852, on the understanding that
he would not be hostile to the government, though he
reserved his independence and his right to criticise it. ‘ My
devoted co-operation will be given to all that I shall think
useful and glorious for France. I know that my country
has need of rest. I shall not contribute to troubling it.
As soon as this need for rest became less obvious, he was
of course one of the first to demand liberal concessions.'
The minister of Education was Segris, who owed his
office to the influence he had won over the house and the
important part he had played in the formation of the new
majority. He was the son of a merchant of mediocre
fortune, and he had married the daughter of a merchant,
too. He had become the leading barrister of Angers and
J *'1 'he possession of the present marquis ; £. Ollivier,
L litnpirc Itberal, iz. 237,
148
Who svpported the liberal etnptre
its deputy major when he was chosen to represent it in
1859. He distinguished luraself at once by his ability ; he
served regularly on important commissions and especially
on that of the budget which ga\e him a good preparation
for office. He was a remarkable man of great warmth and
sincerity. He gave the impression of arguing to convince
himself as much as to convince his audience, and the con-
sequent earnestness and transparent honesty of his conclu-
sions gave them great weight and mfluence. ‘Mr, Segns
is one of the few orators who know how to gam over the
house and to modify its votes.' ‘ Mr. Segris has no tran-
scendent talent ; he is not an original orator, but his speech
has a warmth so communicative and bears the mark of a
conviction so sincere, that a few words from him suffice to
disarm his opponents and reduce them to silence.' ‘He
was pathetic, He used admirable gestures . . he walked
up and down the tribune . . . his eyes wet wnth the tears
which the unfeigned passion he displayed drew from him.
The whole assembly hung on his lips . . He early
showed a leaning towards liberalism ; he had been elected,
he said, to support the empire and to co-operate In the
development of political liberties. He was a new man free
from ties to any former regime, his honesty could not be
doubted, and he advocated this development with the
greatest moderation. He was no theorist or doctrinaire :
all he wanted was more participation by the country in the
conduct of government.
Louvet, the minister of Agnculture and Commerce, was
another member of the centre right who had been an
official candidate Like Segris, he came of a merchant
family He had founded a bank m his native Saumur,
became its mayor m 1845, and had been its M.P. smee
1S48. He won his ascendancy in the house by his fmanciaf
> a.l«4; Lt Fra^fau. it, 8 1868, U
r TsAfi- DB/WU 39*. »uU.bio(rraphiMlnot«Se8nJ in paptri,
Ar? 3*3. ACL .866.3 ACL. 868.4 ^43-6. ACL . 863 ,
J ,49 . i* Oiuticr. >34
»49
The Political System of Napoleon III
knowledge, which also made him repeatedly demand more
control of the budget by the legislature. ‘ I am one of those
who think’, he said in 1869, ‘that no great affair which
concerns the country should be decided without the par-
ticipation of the nation’s representatives sitting in this
house. But I am one of those who think also that the best
way of obtaining this parliamentary liberty, which is needed
and wanted by everybody today, is to start by using the
rights which we already have and so to make this liberty
arrive without shock, through practice, by the force of
things, and by always placing these rights under the safe-
guard of a close union of the sovereign and the representa-
tives of the country.’ He did not want parliamentary
government, but what may be called, in the terminology
of the British colonies, representative rather than respon-
sible government. ‘ Without placing the government in the
house, where it ought not to be, let us everywhere widen
and fortify the control and the co-operation of all the
elected powers’, local and central. ‘Let us accustom
the country to governing itself.’ He did not believe that
the country could achieve self government by the mere
proclamation of a constitution, but saw that it must be the
work of time.' He was no mere banker but a man of
culture and outstanding good sense, solid and moderate.
He was, however, not a Bonapartist of race or religion : he
moved among Orleanist friends and married his daughters
to blue-blooded legitimists.^
Ollivier brought two friends of his into the ministry.
Chevandier de Valdrome, minister of the Interior, was a
son of a peer of Louis Philippe and was a manufacturer of
ice who had acquired a considerable reputation as a scientist.
He was elected M.P. in 1859, unopposed by the govern-
ment ; he had sat in the majority but had gradually moved
* ACL 1869, 2. 180-1.
^^uie-et-Loire 8M54, letter to prefect 25.5*1863; letter to
Ollivier, iS*7't^2, Ollivier papers; Segris to Ollivier, lo.is.iSySj
Olhvier papers ; E. Ollivier, UEmpire liberal, 12. 236.
150
Who supported the liberal empire
left. Aldiincc Ricli^rdt lutnister of iHnc ArtSi the rich son.
of 3 stockbroker, enriched still further by marriage, lived
as a country gentleman in the chateau of Millemont which
he had bought from the prince de Pohgnac He entered
parliament as opposition candidate in 1863, but his opposi-
tion was moderate and his good nature made him popular
with the majonty. In the cabinet he was essentially
OlJivier’s man.*
The man who represented tlie liberal empire best was
without doubt Olhvier himself The remarkable fact is
that the men of Bonapartist blood were least at home in it,
and that its staunchest supporter was a convert from re-
publicanism. It IS a paradox explained perhaps by the
difficulty of keeping an aristocracy loyal to Bonapartism.
Once an emperor has turned them into aristocrats, they
forget their maker and assume all the ideas and the para-
phernalia of their new class Moreover, the liberal empire
was based on principle and not on sentiment, and the old
Bonapartists, therefore, for whom the empire was a religion,
might join the ranks of its supporters but hardly assume
Its leadership.
Now the crucial element in the theory of the liberal
empire was the question of responsibility. The emperor
and the ministei^ were both declared ‘responsible’ but the
problem was how the ministers could be responsible to
parliament if they W'ere also responsible to the emperor,
and how the emperor could also be responsible at the same
tune It was easy to ridicule this as the product of muddle-
headedness, and as a contradiction which could not but end
in failure The point was that it did not intend to establish
parliamentary government and that the correct analogy
for comparison is not the English constitution of the nine-
teenth century, but that of the late seventeenth ; when the
t £ Ollivjer, L’Empire Itbiral, iz 238 ; Robert et Cougny, X}icttO«itatye
dts parlementatret Jtattfais
^ 5 *
L
The Political System of Napoleon III
king ruled as well as reigned and when ministers had to
please both king and parliament. Parliament could not
force any minister upon the king, but it was difficult for the
king to have a minister who did not enjoy its confidence.
The government was the king’s government : and parlia-
ment was merely associated with him. It was no more all
powerful than was the king, but the advantage was with
the king, who could always dissolve parliament and appeal
to the country. This is of course a much less clearly de-
fined system, much more delicate and difficult to work
than parliamentary government, since it cannot function
without much tact, compromise and mutual respect. Yet
since so many people believed that France was not ripe
for the institutions of nineteenth-century England, it was
perhaps not as silly as it might appear to start with those of
seventeenth-century England.
The dual responsibility was certainly not proclaimed
by accident, and was certainly not intended as a false con-
cession of ministerial responsibility tempered by the pre-
servation of imperial responsibility to render it worthless.
Chasseloup-Laubat, who drafted the new constitution,
shows quite clearly that it represents a definite theory of
government. It was a theory which repudiated the prin-
ciple that a king must reign but not rule. The ministers
had, under the authoritarian regime, been merely grand
civil servants. Now, in order to cement the alliance with
parliament, the emperor would choose his ministers from
parliament, from its leaders enjoying its confidence, but he
would not hand over all the reins of power to them. He
would continue to rule, and he proclaimed the fact by
keeping the presidency of the council of ministers for him-
self. The ministers were his ministers for the conduct of
his policy, though he would obviously find it wise to accept
as his policy whatever was adopted by the majority of
parliament. Ministers must therefore combine the con-
fidence of the emperor and of parliament. Formerly the
152
Who supported the liberal empire
ministers, as civil servants, were individually responsible
to the emperor ; now, as the representatives of the majonty
of the parliament, their responsibility was collective.
Napoleon’s responsibility was placed above all this. He
remained the elect of the people and responsible to them.
This responsibility, it is true, was rather nebulous, but it
was less so than the similar responsibility which the Stuarts
said they had to God. On fundamental issues the emperor
could appeal by plebiscite to the people. Had he abandoned
this responsibility, he would have, in fact, become emperor
by the will of parliament to be changed only a little less
frequently than ministries ; he would have become a mere
constitutional hing, depending for his throne on the ab-
sence of Qver-excitement among the M P.s. It was a basic
belief of Bonapartism that it was absurd to leave the door
thus open to perpetual revolutions and changes of djuasty
The new constitution therefore placed the question of
dynasty outside the powers of parliament, and made it a
matter between the people and the sovereign In this w-ay,
it was hoped to have liberty without revolufaon. In this
way did the liberal empire offer a construcuve solution to
the main problem of politics in France.*
' Chasseloup'* notes on the consntution, JuTy-December m fiis
papers, Napoleon to Chasselciup, r 8 1869, Chasselovip papers.
CHAPTER XII
What the three parties zohich opposed the empire re-
presented, what Bonapartism stood for, and how it
conquered a following
When Napoleon came to power there was no Bonapartist
party of any importance, but he left one behind him which
survived for twenty years. The masses who supported it
could not be accused under the third republic, as they
might be under the second empire, of merely pandering to
the holders of office and the bestowers of its favours. Is
the explanation simply that the solution he offered to the
political problems of France became appreciated and re-
gretted only after his overthrow and after the terrors of the
Commune ? This accounted for much, no doubt, but it
is no less likely that he actually conquered the allegiance
of a great number of people who remained loyal to him.
The support the Bonapartists received was confined to
certain parts of the country. In 1877 not a single M.P. of
their party was elected in the east of France, but they had
almost complete control of the south-west and considerable
strength in certain parts of the west and north. A com-
parison of the elections of the empire likewise shows that
at the beginning the opposition was strong in the west and
the south ; most of the south remained hostile, but the
government vote in the west increased greatly. Finally,
the plebiscites of 1851 and 1870 indicate the same change ;
the west opposed in 1851 but supported in 1870. The
second empire was thus no gap in the political history of
France : it effected important changes in public opinion,
which it is necessary to explain.
154
The Political System of Napoleon III
monarchy who had throughout that reign indefatlgably
devoted themselves to obtaining roads, grants, favours, and
jobs for their constituents. ‘Men of such importance
necessarily have a clientele’,' and this consisted largely of
the electors of the July monarchy. Their essential char-
acteristic, to their opponents at any rate, was not that they
were of the middle class nor that they believed in parlia-
mentary government, but that they were a clique fallen
from power, formerly the dispensers and receivers of the
favours of the government. In practice of course they were
an intellectual and financial elite, and in the changed cir-
cumstances of universal suffrage, they still retained their
importance. They were an army of officers and no soldiers,
and could exert very little influence on the masses ; but
the empire could not create officers for its regime from
entirely new material, and it was consequently often im-
possible to dispense with their services. The more violent
Bonapartists claimed that the Orleanists themselves had
created the myth that they were indispensable ; that they
owed their authority to their government and that the
new government could as easily create its own aristocraey.
However, they frequently continued to occupy the jobs
and it was in this way that they presented a challenge to the
new regime.
Republicanism, on the other hand, was essentially a
popular movement. Its partisans were men who had not
attained to the privilege of the Orleanists ; they met not
in salons but in secret societies, in clubs, factories and
cabarets. Their link with Paris was not the M.P.s but the
opposition press ; and their leaders were generally men
risen from the people. Again, devotion to the republican
form of government was not universal among them. They
were frequently merely radicals, liberals or opponents of the
particular clique in power in their own communes, who
assumed the label of ‘red’ because their opponents called
' F(ic) II 98, Ain, prefect, 30.1 .1852.
Hfm Bonaparttmt conquered a following
themselves ‘white’. ‘The reds in the countryside are not
always reds by conviction’, wrote a sub-prefect, ‘or from a
desire for pillage, nor fanatics of the streets. They are more
often the party opposed to the mayor, the sub-prefect, the
prefect, that is, to authority.’ * Like all parties, they had
members who were made so by persecution. In the south,
for example, the partisans of Napoleon I had been persecuted
by the legitimists in 1815, and had therefore supported the
government of July simply because it meant the overthrow
of the ‘whites’. When that government fell in 184S, the
legitimists returned to power and, setting themselves up as
the defenders of order, turned the repression of the coup
d'itat into a repetition of the white terror of 1815. ‘Many
of those who had been prosecuted at the fall of the empire
were prosecuted a second time at its re-estabhshment,’ *
Such is the odd origin of some republicans. The protest-
ants of tbe south were also frequently of the left simply by
reason of their traditional radicalism ^
The legitimists combined the advantages of the Orlean-
ists and the republicans. Their leaders were aristocrats
but they had in addition a popular following and great
influence on the masses. Their power as landlords and
the ascendancy which the clergy had over their flocks is
well known. They had an organisation to start wath, in
their farms and parishes ; but what is less wtcII knomi is
the great variety of means they used to supplement the
influence which they naturally possessed. Charitable
organisations, religious societies and social clubs nere used
for political purposes. ‘People are not generally aware’,
WTote the prefect of Vauclusc, ‘that the high Jegitimist
part}% in other words the ^Vhite Mountain, is organised
• Sub-prefftt, Trevoux, t6.tl.1852 uid tub-pnf^ct, Ce*. I-i* >* 5 '’
inTtiO in. Ain6
• f(ic) JJI, JUr»u)t9,»ul>-f't*fect,lWrixn,
prefect, 7.9 iSs3 ; note in F(ic) It 99, ll^nult.
t Stu»rt R Schiwn. /Yttetfairtum atuf Poiititf ,ji
Ftie) III, Ard^:h< 5. pr*fc«. 5 8.1852.
*57
The Political Sysfe}ii of Napoieou III
here in dccuries and centuries, with passwords and signs
in the same way as the secret societies. Common people,
workers and paupers form the mass of this association :
here the Decurion is usually a foreman of a factory, [while]
the Centurion belongs to the aristocracy.’ * It appears that
at least under Louis Pliilippc the legitimists of France were
organised in regional ‘priories’, consisting of several depart-
ments, with minor priories for each department, and com-
mittees for the communes. Again, all these had a working-
class basis, which benefited from the provident fund to
which part of the subscriptions were devoted.- One gets
the impression that whereas the legitimists of the west were
dependent more on their position as landowners and on the
support of the church, those of the south had more of an
Italian character and used secret societies to a greater
degree.
In the face of these parties what did the prefects do
when, in the first days of the empire they were sent out to
their departments ? Their minister might want them to
create a ‘government party’ and to send him lists of the
supporters of the emperor,^ but it all depended on the pre-
cct. For those who were energetic and enthusiastic, the
po icy to follow was clear. Politics in the departments was,
a ove all, a struggle for influence. These prefects saw the
Ju y monarchy as the nadir of the influence of the govern-
ment and the zenith of the power of the cliques. Favours
were granted through the M.P.s and the prefects were tools
in t eir hands.^ A prefect reported in 1852 that his depart-
ment was entirely dominated by the legitimists and the
c ergy and that there was absolutely no government party,
n t e course of many years, people in this part of the
^ prefect, 6.3.185Z.
la mnnarrhfn politiques dans la Haute-Garonne <3 la fin de
, , " " Pf T^T ■" Godechot, ha RMutlon de ,848 d Toulouse (1948),
“‘■"■‘=‘- 9 »ronne 30M i & 2 ; J. Dagnan, he Gets sous la
seconderepubhque, vol. 2 (he Coup d’6tat . . .) 386-9.
Cf. Bouvet’s note m F(ic) IH, Ain 8.
158
Iloto Bonapartism conquered a foUomng
country have been accustomed to a complete absence of
gfovemmental direction on the part of the prefects.’ i
Now, however, the prefects came out clothed with all
the prestige which their status as agents of an all-powerful
emperor gave them, and with increased powers which the
decree of 25 March 1852 delegated to them They set
about re-estabhshing the authority of their office, 'proving
to the people that in France it is the government, and in the
country It is the administration tvhich alone govern and
direct’, seeding to ‘restore to the government its credit, its
dignity and the respect which is due to it Reflecting the
conduct of the central government, the prefects sought to
make all the favours of the government come to the people
through them, and so destroy the power of the former
ruling class by depriving it of all patronage. Yet, since
they had to deal with the whole of France and not just with
a small group of electors, they could not confine themselves
to distributing jobs among friends. The people could be
won only by material benefits, by ‘perpetually carrying out
useful, practical improvements’.* ‘To excite enthusiasm
here wrote the sub-prefect of Ancenis, ‘is impossible ; we
must give up any idea of doing so. Fasstons died jn
Brittany with the last chouan, but personal interests are
very much ahve. We shall increase the number of our
partisans, and we shall keep those we have won, by obtain-
ing extensive satisfaction for material interests. The dis-
trict is exclusively agricultural ; agriculture js m distress,
usury dcv'ours the countryside; we must improve its posi-
tion by establishing banks for agricultural credit, funds for
mutual benefit, by popularising better agricultural methods,
by opening new markets, new means of commumca-
tion. . . The masses, they believed, were profoundly
indifferent to politics; the people wanted plenty of
' FCic) III, Lftire-Inf S, prefect, lo g iSja
■* FftcJ lUyAtn 6, swb-prefoct, Gex, i
» F{icV III, Gironde 6 sub-prefect, Rf ole, 4 s 1853,
+ F(ic) III, Loire-Inf 5 , 7 *it-* 8 sa
159
The Political System of Napoleon III
‘administration’ in the form of such things as public
works. Politics was for them ‘the question of salary,
work and easy living’.’ This devotion to the material
welfare of the masses was well rewarded. The empire was
remembered above all as a period of prosperity, for which
it got the credit, whether it was responsible or not ; and
the Bonapartist party of the third republic probably drew a
great deal of strength from it.
The government, wrote a prefect, ought to have two
aims : ‘ The gradual amelioration of the lot of the poor
classes, who are our surest support, and the formation in
the other classes of a governmental party, a Napoleonic
party. In order to keep the affection and gratitude of the
former, and in order to be able to work usefully for their
well-being, it suffices not to abandon them to themselves,
to lead them, to take up their interests. Prompt solutions
must be given to the business of individuals and of com-
munes’, mayors must be chosen from elected councillors,
M.P.s from among local men familiar with local problems.
The second task of creating a party was more difficult.^ It
was a slow and silent process, during which the government
won men over one by one. It sought to make the civil
service, purged of the hostile relics of former regimes, into
the compact nucleus of a solid party.^ It adopted the
methods of its opponents, too, and tried to capture whole
classes of men. It organised its own charity against that
of the rich, openly seeking political influence by it,”* To
the same end it established mutual benefit societies with
presidents appointed by the emperor. ^ It found in the
Sapeurs-Pompiers, the village firemen, what the Orleans
monarchy had found in the National Guard — a disciplined
‘ F(ic) in, Ain 6, prefect, 2.12.1852; F(ic) III, Maine-ct-Loire 8,
prefect, 15.10.1856. o . \ t
^ 8, prefect, 21.7.1854.
Cf. Persigny, Memoires, 301-21.
p F(ic) III, Loire-Inf. 8, sub-prefect, Ancenis, 1.7.1853, 28.2.1853,
and 31. 12. 1855.
5 F(ic) III, H< 5 rault 9, sub-prefect, St-Pons, 22.9.1858.
160
H<m Bonapartiwi cmiquered a follo'xing
force instilled with loyalty to its cause.* As far as possible
It filled the local councils with nesv men and so gave to
loyal supporters the influence which went with seats on
these bodies.
Loyal dynasties were in this way helped to found them-
selves in the provinces. In Loire-Infeneure. for example,
the family of Thoinnet de La Turmeli^re, M,P,, held a seat
on the general council from 1845 to i9tg j that of Gandin,
of the Foreign Office, from 1858 to 1883 ; that of Gmoux
Deferinon, count of the empire, from 1S53 to 1932 and
again after 1945 ^ These were, however, men of svealth,
for the nonentities who were often packed into these
councils disappeared quickly enough. The problem was,
therefore, how to win men of wealth over to the Napoleonic
cause. Many prefects devoted themselves to this problem
They opened their salons to society of all parties, and with
conciliation as their catchword they hoped to convert the
more moderate of their opponents Being legitimist, Or-
leanist or Bonapartist did very often mean simply belonging
to a ’set’ and an active and sociable prefect could make his
set as smart as any other and far more useful to its members.
The second empire is remembered as a period in which the
prefects were the centres of social activity in the provinces
in the same gay and energetic manner as the court of
Eugenie was in Pans ; but the purpose of it all was not
purely pleasure. Balls and dinners attracted the aristocracy,
impressed the populace and enabled a prefect to pose, if he
had a mind to, as the greatest seigneur of his department
‘The government must now prove that it is running the
country,’ wrote a prefect. 'I have certainly been happy to
have been able to increase its prestige by giving numerous
dinners and frequent dances in the evening . .
* F(ib) I 164 (1), J»nvie»de La MoWe’s file
* L Miitite, aiiiftmutratite du d/parlevte^ Jf la Lotre-Iji/inturt
(Nantes, iMSy . _ ,
J F(ic) II 100, Lot, prefect, ao.a iSsz, tf s manuscript pimplJet ui
F(ib> 1 166 (33). ^ tfb Hirauft 9, piefect, 5.3 .rSs-l
t6t
The Political System of Napoleon III
This method of winning converts was, however, not
practised by all prefects. When it was used in districts
where the aristocracy was powerful, there was the danger
that it merely produced the swamping of government
society by legitimists, A prefect would say he was con-
ciliating them : his critic would answer that he was abandon-
ing all influence to them. One M.P. in the west, wrote a
prefect, ‘belongs to the class of the bourgeoisie and thinks
that, particularly in Brittany, the imperial government must
necessarily base itself on the bourgeoisie or the liberal
party. He regrets that the emperor’s government has
given the diocesan authority an influence which it did not
have under the government of 1830. He does not believe
that the Bishop of Rennes possesses the influence which
the government assumes he has, and which he keeps only
tlyough the government’s perhaps excessive good will to
him.^ I said . . . that Mgr of Rennes was devoted to the
empire and he answered that no one at Rennes seriously
believed that the bishop was disinterestedly devoted. He
also declared that for a very long time favours have been
given only to the legitimist party, and it is because of this
that a considerable part of the bourgeoisie had gone over
to this party. He is convinced, moreover, that the liberal
paity, if it is encouraged, will give the empire in this part
o the country guarantees far less uncertain than the devo-
tion of the diocesan authority and the limited co-operation
0 rallied legitimists. I share [added the prefect] most of
t ese opiiiions, except that Mr. de La Guisti^re seems to
rec mn a little too much on the bourgeoisie and not enough
on the people . . .’"
The famous Janvier de La Motte, prefect of Eure from
^ ^ ^ supporter of this latter method and
asc ^ imself on the people, rousing the ‘ cottage against
t e chateau . When he came to this department, it was
r camst, the fief of the Passys and the Broglies ; the
r(ib) I 161 (25), GuistiJire's file, information from prefect, 5.1 .i8sc)-
162
Bonapartism conquered a foih^n^
OrJ^ans family had extensive properties in it, which it had
often, visited and where it had made many fnends. Now
Janvier wag a ribald, plam-spealing man who led a fast life
displeasing to the pnm virtue of the Ofleanists, and he
enjoyed vast public meetings far more than the exclusive
parties of the salons. He gave huge banquets to the fire-
men who formed his popular clientele. 'He drank noisy
toasts with them to the emperor and to the prefect, and they
cheered him when he said, ‘ The emperor is the father of
firemen, of all firemen'. He was prodigal of grants and
favours. ‘Never have I refused anything’, he declared.
He spent the fortunes of two wives and ran his prefecture
into a large deficit to maintain his reputation. His energy
was served by great tact and a marvellous memory for
names, and he acquired such an ascendancy over hrs depart-
ment that he claimed, ‘the people obeyed him blindly*.
When the empire fell he became the department’s M.P.
In such various waj-s did the prefects win recruits for the
empire.^
The basis of all these methods, however, was that all
good things should appear to come from the prefect. The
prefects urged that the M.P.s were simply official candi-
dates selected by themselves, and they were very jealous of
any influence which these IVI P s might gain independently
of them The influence of hi P s, they said, could fiounsh
under parliamentary governments , but centralised auto-
cracy required the supremacy of that of the prefects.*
Certain partisans of the liberal empire deplored this system
and all the more so when even the prefects themselves began
to complain that they could no longer manage the people
as they had formerly done, and when the government itself
began limiting their power ‘The prefect is no longer the
dazzling star who alone spreads his light on the department ;
* F{»c) III. ChaWrtte-Itif g, p
and Robert Coujny, Jei
refect, 4 + tSsT
i6j
The Political System of Napoleon III
he can no longer distribute favours to his friends uncon-
trolled ; he is obliged to produce receipts to support all the
parts of the budget which contain no allocations of a politi-
cal character ; and he cannot refuse the general council
complete justifications of expenditure. . . . ’ ' The effect
of the prefectoral system had been, they claimed, that the
government had packed the administration with its creatures
and substituted them for the ‘legitimate influences’ of
wealth. ‘Now you discover that the people to whom pass-
ive obedience to the orders of the administration had been
preached, on the one hand do not want to obey the adminis-
tration any longer, and on the other hand they have lost the
habit of taking the advice of men whom the government
had fought, and so they now often accept the most regret-
table leadership.’ ^ They claimed that though the govern-
ment was right to base itself on the masses, ‘it had neglected
excessively certain intermediaries necessary to winning the
masses and to remaining in constant relations with them .
For example, the chambers of commerce might have been
consulted when free trade was introduced. The inter-
mediaries’ were hurt, too, when the government chose be-
tween candidates for official investiture. This repulsed
men who were ready to rally — who were legitimist or
Orleanist only by tradition, which they would have for-
gotten on entering political life — and men who would have
been glad to serve democracy outside the ranks of the
republican party.^
In practice, however, the second empire did not differ
so radically from preceding regimes. The destruction of
‘ legitimate influences ’ did not mean that it was levelling the
people down and so making way for the rule of committees
instead of notables, which became prevalent under the
republic. For it was really seeking to replace old influences
' Pamphlet, Un Pre/el devant Ic Conscil General, by Boucher d Argis,
iS68, in F(ic) III, Loirc-Inf. 8. , ,
- Chasscloup’s note on ‘La Situation. MM. Rouher ct Lavalette , 1809,
Chasscloup papers. ’ ACL 1S70, 2. 3 S 5 - 8 > P'natd.
164
}Jo7p Bojjapartism conquered a following
by new ones. The men of the empire who came m as 'new
men* immediately set about entrenching themselves and
establishing dynasties just as their predecessors had done.
‘We are witnessing’, said an M P., ‘the creation of a new
aristocracy, territorial or financial ; ^ye are witnessing the
creation of a patriciate and a clientage.’* For, hoivever
much men might seek to ivork anonymously for the govern-
ment, energetic individuals inevitably conquered personal
influence. It was perhaps just as well for the subsequent
strength of Bonapartism that the M.P s did not all shelter
behind the prefects. The able and active ones among
them became M P.s in their own right and in no need of
government support, Eschasseriaux ' was the real kmg of
the Charentes . . I have never seen anybody know Jus
electors and work for them like him He kept an up-to-
date electoral register of his department, I was told, on
which he entered all the information he received about the
hfe and the needs of each one ’ * After the fall of the empire
he kept his seat for ten years and was succeeded by hts son.
In Gers, likewise, Granier de Cassagnac dominated the
prefects and the civil servants, and by the force of his per-
sonality and vast energy conquered an a'^cendancy also
bequeathed to his sons * They founded papers of their
own with which to influence the masses and the services
they rendered won them a host of loyal devotees. They
allowed the electors to suppose, complained a prefect m
1S65, that ‘their position as controllers of the acts of the
government gives them a right of surveillance and almost or
tutelage over the administration. They are already seeking
to anticipate the time when their re-election wdl he
achieved with their personal strength ; and to this end
they will do all they can to seize on the various questions
‘ Jim iSSj a - 113-6 Cf Kiffaud's file BE(6) II 366
. Jufe ^ ripublm. (znd ed.non. ,883),
Cf J Dagnan, Gert tous It ttemd tmptrt,
de 1S4S, lola 29 aijj JO. ^ art/eles
at htt RHedutso^
The Political System of Napoleon III
which will embarrass the departmental administration and
will try to prove that everything has to be done through
their influence. Not a job will be given without their in-
sinuating the idea that they had almost been responsible
for the appointment themselves.’ Here someone in Ae
ministry noted in the margin, ‘This is a tendency which
increases more and more on all the benches of the house .
It is clear, therefore, that the Bonapartism of the third
republic was not based simply on deluded memories of the
good old days of the empire, but on definite and tangible
achievements. Now from what parties were its supporters
recruited ? Only a small proportion could have been
Bonapartists of the first empire. Under Napoleon I the
east was Bonapartist and Normandy royalist, whereas
under the third republic the east was republican and
Normandy Bonapartist. Tarn-et-Garonne, it is said, was
one of the most anti-Bonapartist areas of France under the
Hundred Days, but it was Bonapartist under the third
republic.^ There may be some continuity in the Bona-
partism of Charente-Inf^rieure, but Dordogne, its neigh-
bour, which, in 1877, elected six Bonapartists and only one
royalist, had no Bonapartist past. There is the additional
circumstance that, apart from the Charentes and Corsica,
the departments which acclaimed Napoleon most unani-
mously in 1851, no longer supported him with anything
like the same enthusiasm in or after 1870.
It may be that the transformation effected by the
second empire proceeded on some such lines as these. The
Bonapartists probably gained at the expense of the legiti-
mists, whose influence was diminished by the disintegra-
tion of their great properties and by their abstention from
office. 3 The peasant, too, was emancipating himself from
his lord. ‘The peasant who sixty years ago owned nothing,
* F(ic) III, Charente-Inf. 13, prefect, 1.5.1865.
^ Le Gallo, Lcs Cent yours, 368 ; J. Vidalenc, Le Dipartement de I'Eure
sous la monarchic constitutionnellc.
^ Cf. F(ic) III, Maine-et-Loire 8, sub-prefect, Segr 6 , 6.7.1858.
166
How Bonapartnfn coniju^ed a foUomitg
is today everyivhere a landowner. Henceforth his interest
prevails over old traditions. When the ^vastelands were
divided, as was generally done in Loire-Inf^rieure, he nearly
always found the local aristocracy as his antagonist, either
because it renewed old claims or because it eijiuined old
title deeds, or because it used the fact of its possessing exten-
sive properties to claim a proportionately larger share. The
peasants have preserved the memory and the grudge. They
are happy to reach municipal office, which gives them some
authority over the descendants of their own lords The
influence of the nobility in the countrj'Side received a first
blow in this way. Every electoral defeat since has reduced
it further. Forced to live on his own capital, obtaining
no part of the profits of commerce or jndustiy, or from the
salaries of administrative offices, it has gradually fallen into
debt. — the registiy of mortgages tell to what a degree.
Finally, by refusing the oath and abdicating all participa-
tion in the deliberations of our councils and our assemblies,
it has given itself the final blow AH these circumstJtwe^
do not escape the perpetual attention of the peasant. Fof
him, words are not enough, he needs deeds. Placed be-
tween the promises which have for over twenty jears
announced an ever postponed restoration, and the acts o
the empire, at once energetic and benevolent — he is almost
converted to new ideas which daily effect new progress an
new benefits for him under his oun ejes, '
WTien the legitimists were not supported by a po«e u
clergy, the Bonapartlsts were frei^ucntly able to gam
ground, and it is precisely in the non-clcncal
peasant proprietors that they struck root under the t ir
republic.^ They probably also obtained their share of me
liberals of the constitutional monarchy in areas ^
legitimists were even more reactionary than the na
panists, and where, therefore, the liberals would suppo
' FT(IC) irt.Loirt-Inf
* cr A. s»»srn<d, u ^ ^ ^
The. Political System of Napoleon III
them as standard bearers of the tricolour against their
ancient white enemies. More liberals, however, probably
went over to republicanism because of the way the empire
was founded. A map showing the arrests which followed
the coup d’etat coincides largely with what was later a
republican area. Bonapartism was not liberal but demo-
cratic : it appealed more to those who wanted to bring the
aristocrats down than to the professional men of the liberal
party who wanted to climb to social distinction.
However, these generalisations about the Bonapartism
of the third republic may be similar to those which men
make about that of the second empire before they under-
take its study. The Bonapartism of the third republic
must be left for another time. It is enough if this book
has shown the interest of its parent, and given some insight
into the meaning of politics before the great watershed of
1870.
168
MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE DEVELOPMENT
OF BONAPARTISM
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1848
— :TIOftD^
^
SOMME;
-•'"i AisriE t^lBn^ v-.-.
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ORHE •-•" l.OlSt / CT ^ ITMOtUU.^^
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c.cr <r’^v^ Avty RCH
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ALPE5
I
0?pg/‘f/nf.7fr /fj Y^hich Cavaignac got Q majonty ot
the vote: cast.
^^^^Oepartmentz in which Ccvaignac got over SS% of
the vote: cost
cr results p’-jUnh^ in *Proc!amation de Lcui: fiapofeon flonaparte * tBAB,
B.tf. Lb(ss)/7
\ he opposition to Nnpolcon in 1 84S is in the west and south ; the out-
l>in;: departments on the periphery' of the countrs* seem to be standinjr
nut ai:ainsi Napoleonic centralUation
170
the plebiscite of 1851
J P,^S %'S
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f£e«!i
t7i
THE ELECTION OF 1852
ipAsa..— '"'.
gPCCAUIS^ '—-I
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ii^'PVR.IoniENIAlES
The shaded areas represent the departments
in which the goyernment candidates obtained
the votes of less than half of the electorate.
Rased on results in A.N., f(lc) Use and C. / 336-/333
172
The areas oi ojtposition have now shifted from the west to the *a>^
though the south lemsm* hostile fhc map woultj be even mcu^
stnhitg did not the repuMitan'ini of the tow/i of Boftfeatii and (he
independence of Laroche-foubert ^a ftonspattiit of the 3rd ttpuhlic)
»t A,njpjiil4me make the whole of Cironde «od Charente ipp— ' ’*
THE PLEBISCITE OF 1870
jOECAlAlS-;
L'N.-;.- S NOAd'>
^ ^ \ SOMME i f U
► ^ H DU noRO
^ } lAu Munu I 1 • rt J V **.,
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''..uaine' i ET
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=~ , SAVOIE
^^^ponooGNEV’v,^...;’ cant al i
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'^•^•\.TVfrfft^miORI ENTAUS
^e/Jart/7?e/7Cs //7 >vA/cA /Mi-f/ja/j 50% ortAe ^ (
e/cctoraCc voccrf /n favour of tJtc empire.
^■- Dc/)artme/7ts />7 k'/^/c/; jo -6o% of t//e electorate
voted in favour of tfte empire.
Based on - Bullttin rfw fg,v . layo.p.C/s-e.no. ibi 3 , voI. 35 , semestre.
^ great transformation is here clearly shown : the west, which was
a principal area of opposition in the plebiscite of 1851, is almost won
®'*'*’*_ ^ endiic votes with the same unanimity as Corsica — over 80 per
cent in favour
174
THE BONAPARTISTS JN 1877
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Manuscript Sources
H Printed Sources
(fl) Pubiw; documents
(i) Private papers * (0 m public libtanel
(it) in private hands
I, MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
(a) Public Documents
Tn the National Archives, Paris
C 1336*1378 Resultsoftheelecttonstothelegislature, 1832^0, giving
full details of the votes, by commune, canton and con*
stituency These boxes contam also birth certificates of
some M P s , and protests against the validation of
elections, which are often of considerable interest
C. 2708-2713 Correspondence of the president of the legislature,
mainly fotmal
F(ia*) 2118 and 21 ig | Election circulars of the ministry of the
F(ta) 2100 and 2122 (D) I Interior.
P(ib) I 261-286 Personal files of individual members of the pre-
fectoral corps Full of valuable biographical informa-
tion The following files were particularly examined
Baragnon 136 (3); Barante 156 (3), Banal 156 (s) ,
Belhard 156 (14), Berger 136 (17). Bigrel 156 (23),
Blosseville 136 (27), Caffarelli 157 (0. Chadenet 157
(13); Chambrun 157 (14); Chapuys-Montliville 157
(17); Omeille 157(32); Corta 1S7 (3*); Creuzet 157
(36)1 Dabeaux 138(1); Detamarre 138 (g) ; Dugui dc
La Fauconnerie 158 (33). Fortoul i6o(ii); Frcmy
160 [14I, Grouchy 161 (20) , Gmstiireifii (23):
162 (i), Hibert 162 (3>; Houdetot 162 (7): I*";""
164 {2) , Ladoucette 166 ( 3 ), Lafon dc Caj'x 166 fi),
Lafond de St-Mur 166 (S) ; Ugrand 166 (22) ; Lc-
quien 166 (27); Leret d’Aubtgny 166 (23), Leroy-
Beaulieu 166 (29); Le Sergeant de Monnceove 167
(26): U^geard 166 (33): Manam 166 (7): Merrier 167
(ig)t Ollivier 169 (i); Onwno i6g (3); Fartou^xict
170 (3); Petras 170 (lo); PUncy 170 ('7)1
bouTgt 172 (a); Remade 17^ (5)* Rcriouard I7* \ **
*77
The Political System of Napoleon III
Roulleaux-Dugage 172 (18); Ste-Croix 173 (2); Ste-
Herrnine 173 (4) ; Thieullen 174 (6) ; Thoinnet 174 (7) ;
Toulongeon 174 (10) ; Vilcocq 176 (12) ; West 177 (2).
F(ib) II. Maine-et-Loire S. Information on the personnel of the
prefecture of this department.
F(ic) I 130. Plebiscite of 1870. Results of the vote by cantons and
arrondissement.
F(ic) II 56 and 57. 1848 election correspondence.
58. 1849-53 elections : contains some useful statistics.
59-96 (one box). 1859-80 elections, nothing much.
97. 1848-55 elections, little for the second empire.
98-103. 1852 election. A source of the greatest importance.
This appears to be the only really full set of election
correspondence in the nineteenth century. Letters of
prefects and their subordinates, instructions of minister
of the Interior and notes by his staff and others. This
source has long been known but historians have never
used it fully because they did not know much about the
M.P.s about whom all the letters are. All this is in six
boxes, arranged more or less by alphabetical order of
departments. Not all the departments, however, have
files in this series. Most of the missing ones can be
found in the departmental series of F(ic) III.
F(ic) III. The remaining 1852 election files are in Ari^ge 4;
Calvados 6 ; Charente-Inf. 7 ; Cher 4 ; Corrfeze 7 ;
Corse 5 ; Dordogne 5 ; Doubs 5 ; Dr6me 5 ; Card 5 ;
Gironde 4 ; Mayenne 4; Meurthe 6 ; Morbihan 5 ; Nord
6 ; Puy-de-D6me 4 ; Sarthe 4 (1854 by-election only).
The main interest of this series, however, is the large
collection of reports to the minister of the Interior by
the prefects and sub-prefects, part of them periodical
and part of them miscellaneous and classed as 'corres-
pondence et divers'. The following boxes were studied :
F(ic) III. Ain 3, 6, 8 and 9.
Ard^che 4, 5 and 8.
Charente-Inf. 7, 9, 13.
Gironde 6 and 9.
Hdrault 4, 9, 14 and 15.
Loire-Inf. 4, 8, ii and 12.
Maine-et-Loire 4, 8, 11 and 12.
Seine-et-Marne 6.
F(ic) V. Departmental series on Conseils Gdndratix ; little of
political importance. Loire-Inf. 5 and Maine-et-Loire 4
were examined.
F(4) 2697. Allocations sur fonds sp6ciaux. What the minister of
the Interior did with secret service funds.
178
F(t4).
saS
307,
394
F(t9) 5601
51504
$605.
^(90).
5606,
HibJto^raphy
Jcftona) fijcs of M P * members of the Pamirt Cf,ausf/a
nj-icoumoot 3,77/1): Grouchy 3335 fa); Guy^St
Lij fa); Le/omdre
of ^Jepartmental press 1S83
Par^hiCTie on ‘he departmemat press, i860.
^epanmemar press, 1863 and 1S66
Wj- •
Oitto for Second Repubhe.
Di«o for Second Emptre, partictdarfy interesting for the
election of ,863,
Ditto for 1869 election
Copies of telegrams kept by the Telegraph Service
J47. 588 and 94 o(Q) contain those sent diinne the
election of 1857 ,
37 S and 589 for r86j election ,
^8 and 591 for 1869 clecpon
l^cse are almost entirely telegrams between the minister
01 the Interior and the prefectSt but contain others of
more subordinate officials too. In the absence of wntten
BR/6 «i *^°rrespondtnce they are of course \ery s-aluable,
/ 525*538 On the personnel of the magtstreej before 1848, has
little detailed information apart from dates of service,
and hardly repays the considerable trouble involved jn
tracking men derwti m it,
(6) ir. 1.434 has the personal files of magistrates after 184S and
these are much more valuable and more akin to the pre.
fects’ bits The following hU s were looked op,
Aym6 tj, BqnoiC-CAamp> 29, Deiiat izt, Duboys 134,
Fahre 15a, Huet 310, Laffitte 33r, Lasnoruer 241, Afoge
391, Pipard 3j9, Rigaud 366, Segris 391.
OBfrS) 1567, Reports of the prscareun g^iroiix on the election of
i 8S7
,786-1793 Reportsof the procureur! gAt^aux for the eiection
of tS^q
BB(3o) 436.451 Reports of the fracurenrt gAtdraiiX for the election of
1863
73S-744 The personal files of members of the council of
State The bulk of the records of this dcpartmetit were
of course burnt in 1S70 These files are, hovrever,
mther disappointing Those of the following M F 9
were looVed up Marey-Monge, hTaupas, Charlier,
Da^id, L*pel)e»ier, Pofee and Ifallez.
ABXIX ,75. Maopas' report on the press, 1853
The Political System of Napoleon III
Departmental Archives of the prefectures
These were used to fill in the gaps which the central archives have.
In theory there is a draft of all letters sent to Paris in the prefects’
archives, as well as the letters of the ministers, the drafts of which
ought to have been kept in Paris. In fact, of course, much was de-
stroyed or lost. Nevertheless the departmental archives proved of the
_ greatest importance. The following files were examined. They deal
mainly with the elections, and contain tlie usual type of correspondence
to be found in F(ic) II and III but also letters of minor men like J.P.s
and mayors.
Ardeche.
Aveyron.
Bouches-du-Rh6ne.
Charente.
Correze.
Cote-d’Or.
C6tcs-du-Nord.
Haute-Garonne.
Is6re.
Jura.
Loire-Inferieure.
Loz6re.
Maine-et-Loire.
Marne.
Morbihan.
Nord.
Puy-dc-D6mc.
Sarthc.
Scinc-ct-Oise.
Tam-et-Garonnc.
Vendee.
6 M i6 and 17 (1848 and 1849).
1857, 1863 3ttd 1869 election files.
M (2) III 26-32 ; extracts of election correspond-
ence of my period ; of little interest.
M 187-192.
62 M for 1863 ; and an unnumbered file for 1869.
3 M 72-77 for 1857 to 1869.
3 M 30 for 1857, and a file for 1869.
2 M 33-37 (1857-69).
8 M 12-16 (1857-69).
Unnumbered files on elections, especially on
1868.
1 M 100/1-3 (1857-69),
IV M 13-16 (1857-69).
Archives municipalcs of Mende, K 115.
8 M 49-62 (1857-69).
7 M 39 (1862 by-election).
Cabinet du prdfet, Serie M, Elections legislatives,
1852-63.
30 M 8-1 1 (1857-63) and 25-27 (1869).
M O 1781 (1857); 1770 (1861-9).
M 61/16 and M 61/16 bis for 1857.
II M ri(6) and. (7) (1849-63).
30 M 1 .and 2. ‘Statistique politique’ of the
department, listing all electors under their politi-
cal party.
2 M 38-40 (1857-70).
(i>) Private Papers
In the Diblioth'eque Natioualc
Nouvelles acquisitions franfaiscs.
24107-24126. Papers of Jules Favre, little of interest.
-o 17 _o _o. I'our volumes of correspondence belonging to Thiers,
mainly letters received, but also some by him.
180
ajSAj.
Ilihlii^Tophy
M,t'„ mawly iifTtml Joftjwni*. (nwrcjfinf ior
fr^^’fitirurtirsg Ittt carter
{f imivtra'i kitcrt to hw ai « ttuJcnl, for light on
Ihc youncrr
^43 ^1^370* Lmctt Ttfird** p^ptn, ktim *(Vit and Tfctt\rd
ta Vrtrfny^
V, }xTf<rtr ifTt/ copirtj from /^crtigtiy to tfie cmptrorp
1S57-*,
in (Kt Satuiyuti .•tfffutff
A*t Kouhcr * pjtpcn flot 1 coniitrn [lolittcal notM by him, in-
cluJjng drjfit t,f Ititm 10 iho crtipcrof , bot 2 has correspond-
cftce with the ompcror »nd with jicuhrr’* Iwroly ; bo» j Jrtirr*
rrm»rJ m eJcoj^jnt tnd other lub/cctr ; i>oi < police reports for
tSif/f eJecTiofi, etc.
A.{\ I'ipcrt of Duffu, mtniticr of the Mipne, j bottes, very
miKctlincous. hui include* wme interesting letter* by him *nd
*1*0 some from HsussmAno tnd Si*Arnaod
in tht nQ>tiolhlq}tt T^iVrt
Ditcr* pjpen. Fond* Thier*. i*** »fne. No 34, letter* from Thier*,
1S34-77, No. letter* tent to him 3* tine So 570, 1848
elecTMfi correspofidenee A Brest deal of Mlusble in/brmatiofT
Rsroche paper* 9^>o-i345 The foUowinR file* are particularly
interesting *>79-^80, Utter* from Foutd , <)S 1-983, from Rouher ,
1000, from Momy, 1 00 r, from Napoleon , 1014, drafts of letters
by f/amcfie; rorj. fragment of aurobiograpby; 1030. mistef-
larteotrt politreal document* , rojr-1040, change* tn the ctwishru-
t«on , I tjt, election* , laiS. liberal empire.
Pntate Pafert tn the hands 0/ (fereew/aiifr
IhJUult paper*. 7710 tn«if» »ene* »» arranged chronologically with a
file for each jear , it contains torrespemdertee and documents of
every description \chich happxMV to have survived ; of very varied
importance. The lecond senes is of letters recen ed, most of them
of no importance Since the really interesting ones are in the first
tenet The most valuable item in these papers is the correspond-
ence eirchanged beKteen SJlauIt and Napoleon.
Drame papers. Interesting correspondence with the empress ; bio-
graphy of him , his worlcs.
Bufiet papers i. Letters received, alphabetically
1 Flection correspondence, 1848-57.
y. Obituary noticES and press cuttings.
4 MiscalJaneous,
iSi
The Political System of Napoleon III
Chasseloup-Laubat papers. The documents used in this book come
from the file dealing with his ministry of 1869, which has notes
on the drawing-up of the constitution. I am preparing a bio-
graphy of him which will use tlie rest of his papers.
Forcade la Roquette papers. About 70 letters of Forcade to his
daughter, 1864-74 ; genealogies of the Forcade family ; a book of
interesting press cuttings.
Montalembert papers. Diary of great interest, one volume a year, and
an entry for almost every day ; I examined the volumes for
1848-70.
Large collection of correspondence, particularly with Falloux,
Daru and Michel the newspaper editor.
Ollivier papers. Diary of great interest, which I shall shortly be
publishing in collaboration with his grand-daughter. Written
irregularly but always soon after the event and with dates given,
1846-70.
Letters received, arranged by year.
Copies of some letters written by Ollivier.
Persigny papers. Letters received by Persigny from Frenchmen and
from foreigners, arranged separately.
Persigny to his wife.
Drafts and copies of letters to Napoleon.
Letters from Napoleon to Persigny.
St-Arnaud papers. About goo letters from St-Arnaud mainly to his
wife and brother. Many deal with his African campaigns but
not a few arc of political interest.
A dozen letters from Napoleon.
Schneider papers. Letters sent by Schneider from England after
1870; bundles of miscellaneous letters received ; and an interest-
ing correspondence with his prefect.
Also a valuable manuscript life of Schneider by M. Engine
Boyer.
Segris papers. Letters received, 1869-70.
Notes for an autobiography.
Press cuttings.
Miscellaneous papers on his work as minister.
Talhouct papers. A letter from Napoleon, one from Ollivier, and a
valuable privately printed biography of Talhouet.
II. PRINTED SOURCES
The most important printed source is the debates of the legislature
and of the various parliaments of the period before the second empire.
Comptc-Rcmlu dcs si’auccs du Corps Lfgislatif gives the summary of
debates, usually one volume a year,
iSz
Bibliography
dif Ccrps Ldstslaitf gi%es also the te\t of
mr«.nr,6 ‘he legislature and the reports of the com-
to rtamjne then — an additional source for
'fig the opinions of the house This senes consists of 5
‘he preceding senes are
u by the' legislature After 1S61 when the
A/itiyri to be published m full the best senes to use is —
JiL , ^ ""I Ugtdanf. published annually by the
ont eur and cntahi^jj'.^ ffi'i? S-atTrvrser^^
Lf before the second empire I used—
■h'S J^wtwol opictel, to loofc up the speeches
° fl ^ ^'^tered parljanjent £ 5 rJier J went far hack
as I 27 This newspaper gfves in addipon a vast amount of
in ormatioti about Politics, laws, appointments, etc , and its
editor ids and the way ,t presents the news are often very interest-
tng. However, its news is strictly limited and it is therefore
necessary to use other papers I looked at the following for
vanous points which interested me •
t,tbeftd Goirette de France
L,e Tempt Xhe Timer
Uws and decrees were looted op in the BuUetm des lots
Bookt and articles (pu£)I«h«,i jo pan? unless otherwise stated) .
Comte Alexandre d'Adhemar, Du pant Ugitimiste tn France et de sa
ertse actuelle, iSjfj
r^on, jIux vidnes da l'etnper*ur, la patrt'e reconnatssartU, 1S40, fi N Lb
Cfii) 3137
Hiographte ttatistique par Ordre alphabBigue de d^pcfternents de MM.
let membres de la GAsiwAv detD^pM^s, jB4i~6 i S+ 5 , B N, Ln f 61
49.
R Apponyt, Journal, vol 4> igah.
A, Autrand, Stahstique des Elections parlementairts et det partis pofi-
ttgues en Vauclase de iS^tS d ipaS, Vsison-la»Romaine, 1932,
H Avenel, Cowimenf la France vole, 1894
Hifftnre de la presie/ranfotje, 1900.
Baiante, Scruventrs dv Baron de Barante de I'Academte Franfatte X7St-
idSlS puhlids par ton pettt-~fiJi Claude de Barante^ 7 vols , iSgo..09,
Mgr Eaunard, Kolb^Bemard,
A, Billault, CFirt'rrr, a vols , 1863.
IVI Boulenger, Ze Due de Aferny*, 1925-
J, B. M, Braun. Noatdle Btogr/rphte det d/putdt . . zSi^-iSip, 1830,
Due de Broglie, ■'Louis Btcffet* m Le Carreipapdaut for May and June
1899, pp, 613*41 •f'tl "59
L. Buffet, Le Comte Verm, 1S93
G Buisson, La Chambre det VdpuUt. 1924-
N 183
The Political System of Napoleon III
A. Chiiboseau, Lcs Constituants de 1848 in La Rdvolution de 1848, vols.
7 and 8, 1911.
J. D. A. P. de Chambrun, Book of engravings, B.N. Ln(27)
S. Charlety, La Rcstauration, 1911, in Lavissc’s Histoire de la France
contemporaine.
La Mofiarcliie de jttillct, i^zj, in tho same series. ■ r' A
C. Chavanon, V Administration dans la socidld franpaise in A. Siegfried
and others, Aspects de la socidtd franpaisc, igSA-
R. Chtistophe, Le Due de Momy, igsi.
A. Claveau, Souvenirs polidques et parlcmcntaires d'un tdmoin. Vol. i •
1865-1870, 1913.
P. Corticebiato, Les Corses et le parti honapartiste h Marseille ett 1870
et pendant les premieres anndes de la rdpuhlique, Marseille, jgzi.
Baron de Courccl, ‘Notice sur . . . Buffet’, Sdances de I’Acaddmie dcs
Sciences Morales et Politiques, January 1 902, pp- S09-44 ^nd 633-75-
P. Cousteix, ‘ Lcs Financiers sous Ic second empire’ in 1848, Revue des
rdvoluiions contemporaincs, vol. 43, July 1950, pp. 107-35*
R. Cuzacq, Lcs Flections Idgislatives it Bayonne, 1848-70, Bayonne,
1948.
J. Dagnan, Lc Gers sous la scconde rdpuhlique, Auch, 1928.
Le Coup d'dtat et la repression dans le Gers, Auch, I929> ®
the preceding work.
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184
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^srvrrt, 4 «d* .
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t* 19 JitetMT, iS^
1S5
The Political System of Napoleon III
V. F. de Persigny, M^oires du due de Perdgny, 1896.
A. Piette, La Famille Piette, Vervins, 1861.
R. Pimienta, La Propagande bonapartiste en i84g, igri.
P. Poirson, Walewski, 1943.
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186
Bibliography
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A Robert, Bourloton *nd Cougny, DtctMntmre det paflntmtafret
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most useful being those of 1865, 1S70 and iSSo
*5;
INDEX
Abbatucci, Paul Siverm, 28
Abstentton m the electiqn of iBjJ.
AlWfU. L N Suchet, Due d*.
Andela^!” F Jacquot-Rouhier,
Marquis d’, 33
Andr6, C E , 52
Arago family induence, 34 ,,
Arc?; A A M . Comte de Gouy d ,
Argrnt de Deux Fontames, C M ,
Aa.™i “i
lo-ii; Bonapartist attempts to
convert the. 161. formation of a
new, i6s „ ji
ArjU2on,F.J F T.Com«;f-«
Amy, as a preparation for pohucs,
AwJiffrrt-Pasquier, Due d’, *4*
Aumale, Due d', son of Louis Phi-
lippe, 108
Aytni, J G , 3®
aSS'pSLAJ.R.c*””'*'’
B^che, Pierre
minister, *us ‘nfl btother-m-
sailles, 22, 52 p jj,, ero-
Uw. 26 . compUints to
perot (1863), politics,
Barrot, Odilon. n6
Bavoux. Marquis de. 35
Beausset-R^uefon. ^
Beauvau, p Barnn
BeamergerjA b •
Belliard, Jean, «,,_,87g),Bona*
Belinontel,L<"“*(y^^,^„eian. 29.
En.®Kr.»'"“'™“''"
ner,t,30. hae.iea.fc. N.pe-
Icon’s letter to him, 60
Berryer.P A , legi'‘«us*
i:l:?Adolph "Hep-el^-
date’, 89
Bidault, J J 1 33
i£S.’'Ad’lpI.e (iSPlflXS-
tnimster without
f lit .860-3). minister of
otaic V* * career, w ,
’ le ,S« -Tt ■ policy con-
election of toS7i 75 . ^ men-
ceming the mayors. 9*.
tioned, 33* 5*
Bocher, H E >, ***— E j, 52
B 0.3 T Cotu«'
Boissy d’Anglas, J G » - ^
33 i 5 J Jtfficulty of keepiTiB
Bonapartjsm
aristocrats of t^^*^ resolutions,
to, 151 . »“ !i 7 rttrength during
aecond made-
esplanation of ts (p,
quate, 155 • u 138-63 ;
Seated by of the
how It gamed St the eap""
pubhc, 7. 5 > 1,.,^; mem*
■P'rt’T?, - np-ippr- ‘‘-S' ‘
ij8-7S
of ultrs^P^**”’
1S9
The Political System of Napoleon III
26 ; different types of, 28-30 ;
conservative, 46-8 ; ‘democratic’,
49 ; of the first empire, 166 ; of
the liberal empire, 142-51
Bordeaux, 41, 139
Boucaumont, M. L. A. (known as
Gustave), 55
Bouches-du-Rhone, legitimists in,
14. 37
Bouchetal-Laroche, P. C. R., 18, 29
Bourcier de Villers, C. J. B., Comte
de, 33
Bourgeoisie, Bonapartist efforts to
convert, 162
Bourlon, P. H. D., 28
Brame, Jules (1818-78), minister in
1870, 71, 131
Bravay, L. F., 97
Broglie, Albert, Prince, later Due
de, 147 .
Broglie, Victor, Due de, 142
Brunet-Denon, V. J., General
Baron, 29
Bryas, Eugene, Comte de, his politi-
cal career, 32
BOcher de Chauvign^, Gustave, 33,
35
Buffet, Louis (1818-98), minister of
the second republic, the second
empire and the third republic,
opinion on the constitution (1857),
74 ; views in i860, 107-9 ; elec-
tion in 1863, 117; political
opinions and career, 145-7 > his
amendment of 1866, 132-3
Buquet, H. A. L., Baron, 28
Busson-Billault, J. H., 52
Caffarelli, E. A., Comte de, 28
Calvct-Rogniat, F., 31
Calvifere, C. F. M. A. J., Marquis
de, 33
Cambac6r6s, E. A. N., Comte de,
28, 52
Carayon-Latour, M. P, C. E., Baron
de, 33. 64
Came, L. M., Comte de, 142
Carnot, L. H., minister of Educa-
tion in 1848, '73
Camel de St-Martin, Paul, Baron, 32
Cassagnac, Adolphe de Granier dc,
Bonapartist journalist and poli-
tician, how he became M.P., 30 ;
his career, 59 ; and Emile Ollivier’
124 ; his power in Gers, 165
Caulaincourt, Marquis de, 28
Cavaignac, General L. E., 73, 113
Chabrillan, L. O. T., Comte de, 28
Chambrun, J. D. A. de P., Comte
de, 59, 118, 132
Champagny, Napoleon, Comte de,
28
Chanterac, B. P. L., Comte de, 33
Charente, Bonapartism in, 165-6
Charlier, L. V., 31
Chasseloup-Laubat, Prosper, Mar-
quis de (1805-73), minister of
Marine and Colonies (1851 and
1860-7), minister of Algeria and
Colonies (1859-60), minister presi-
dent of the Council of State
(1869) : his financial integrity,
62 ; and the theory of the liberal
empire, 152 ; mentioned, 33
Chateaubriand on royalism, 8
Chauchard, J. B. H., Baron, 33
Chaumont-Quitry, O. C. J., Marquis
de, 81
Chazellcs, P. L. B. de, 33
Cher, department of, Bonapartism
in, 29
Chevalier, Auguste (brother of Mi-
chel), 138
Chevalier, Michel, on the politics of
Herault, 37
Chevandier de Valdr6me, J. P. E. N.
(1810-78), minister of the Interior
(1870), his career and opinions,
150-1
Chevreau, Henri, prefect and later
minister, letter to Billault, 98
Chevreau, J. H. (father of the pre-
fect), 29
Cheque, E. L. J., 33
Civrac, M. H. L., Comte Durfort de,
33, 70-1
Clebsattel, A. de, 33
Clergy, 44, 69, 116, 141, 162
Committees, as a method of politi-
cal organisation, 22-5
Conneau, Dr. F. A. H. (1803-77),
Napoleon Ill’s physician, 29, 3°,
60
Conseil, A. B., 21, 31
Conservatives, 46-g
Corneille, P. A., descendant of the
poet, 52
Coup d’etat, why impossible in 1869,
1 143
I Cmssol, Due de, 142
190
Index
Curi, L- J A G , 71
Cumier, D L , 33
Daguilhon-Pujol, P J M G , 5®
Dam, Napoleon, Comte (1807-90),
minister, his career, 147
Daurat-Dembartire, P M B , 28
David, B F, of Niort, 33
Da'vid, Baron Jerome (1823-82),
leader of the conservatives, 46-7 ,
hi3 cousin Dufrui, ss ', his party
at the me de 1’ Arcade, 13*
Da’vid, Jean, 31
Debretonne, M A , 33
Decazes, L C E A., Due (son of
the Restoration minister), 1 16, 14*
Decentralisation, 49
Dektnarre, E , 28
Delangle, C. A , minister of Justice,
52
Delapalme, Adolphe, notary,
brother-in-law of Baroche, 29, S*
Delavau, F C , 33
Delthiel, J , 33
Demesmay, P A , 33
Democracy, views on, 48
Descat, L J T , 31
Deseilbeny, A N P , S*
Desjebert, Am^d^e, 33
Devmck, F J , chocolate manu-
facturer, 31
Didier, H P M , *9
Dollfuss, C , 52
Dordogne, republicanism m, 73 •
Bonapartism m, 166
Dowries, 64 . _
Duboys, E E , career and opinions.
30-1 , tdso 28
DuchStel. C M Tanneguy. Comte.
DucIm, E j M , notary of Rennes.
33 „ £
Dufaure, J A S , no
Dugas, A E H , 3 • ir T
Du^^ de La Faucoonerie. H J ,
views and career, 4® . 33
Duplan, Joseph, 28
Eu"v.er,*G™emlR-‘c.a(?
Elections,
66-77 t
191
1869, 13S-42 . of >^77. t7S,
see also Waps, 169-7S , electoral
professions of faith, 38 , opposi-
tion m, 41 . election circulare, 89-
90 See also Majors, Voting,
Pj'^f,£^t*, Official Candidates
England, compatisons with, 78, 97,
111,151-2 „ f
Eschassenaui, Ren4 Frances tu-
rfne, Baron, ‘King of theCharen-
tes’, 33 , his political methods,
»6s
Eure, Bonapartism m, ri?, 102-3
Exelmans. Marshal, his committee.
23
Falloux, Alfred, Comte de, 142
Faugier, V A , 18, 33
Favre, Ferdinand, Bonapamst, 33
Favre, Jules, his break with Olli-
Fmistfere, legitimists of, 34 »
in 1863, us , Bonapartist strength
FUv.^y.M A C
pohtical strength of, 30 . also 33
Fleury, Anselme, 31 v A de
Foroade La Roquere, J ^ % ", 7
{782^4), half-brother of Mar-
shal de St-Arnaud, minister of
loanee (1860-1),
of the Council of State
minister of Agricnlmre
he Works (1857-8), mmist« of
money out of politic, 61 , poUoy
lion, attitude td *^1' ”
FonouhJ B F . brother of the
minister, *9. 33 „ „ p
Fouch6-Lepelletier, E
Fould, Achille (1800-67),
of Finance several
republic and again
stTr of State (1852-60)
tical impottance, *04 , Kis oppos
non to Persigoy, J 13 . also
lalJia, Bonspartist journalist, 23
Jard, legitimists m. 38
3areati. F E , 3 a
ister 18+8 and 1S70, 73
The Poliiical System of Napoleon III
Garonne, Haute-, politics in, 1 1
Gaudin, E. F., son-in-law of
Delangic, minister plenipotentiary
and M.P., 52
Geiger, A. G. F. M., Baron de, M.P.
and later Sdnator, 29, 13:
Gcllibertdcs Seguins, General N.P.,
29. 52
Germain, A. M. H., financier, 52
Gironde, abstention in, 41
Girou de Buzareingues, F. A. L. E.,
31
Gisclard, J. J. (of Albi), 33
Godart de Juvigny, A., 32
Gorsse, General Baron J. A., 29,
S2_
Gouin, A. H., financier, 33, 57
Government patronage, effect of, 39
Grammont, F., Marquis de, 33
Grouchy, Ernest H., Vicomte dc,
118
Gufiroult, Adolphe, journalist, 113
Guistiiirc, A. G. dc La, 52
Guyard-Delalain, A. P., industrial-
ist, 29
Haentjens, A. A., 32
Haichois, J. H. A. Lcmelorol do La,
barrister, 33
Hallcz Claparfedc, L., Comte dc, 28
Halligon, A. E., 71
Haussmann, Georges Eug6nc, Baron
(1809-91), sub-prefect (1830-48),
prefect of Var, Yonne and Gi-
ronde (1850-3), prefect of Seine
(1853-70) : policy and success in
Gironde, 19-20 ; on legitimists,
34 : report to the emperor on the
election of 1857, 76 ; also 52, 104
Havin, L. J., owner of Le Sidcle, 72,
1 12-13, 1 17
H^rambault, A. R. d’, 33
Hirault, legitimists in, 36
Herlincourt, L. M. W., Baron d’,
son of an ultra-royalist M.P., 33
Houdetot, F. C., Vicomte d’, pre-
fect, 29
Isere, Bonapartism in (1848-52), 23
Janvier de La Motte, Elie, Comte,
33
Janvier de La Motte, Eugene (1823-
1884), prefect of Eure (1856-69) :
his political work as prefect, 162-3
Janzd', C. A., Baron dc, 131
Javal, Leopold, 71
Jollivct dc Cnstellot, F. M., 31
jonage, M. A. C. Y., Comte de (of
the Ro}^!! Bodyguard till 1830),
33
Jouvenel, J. L., Baron de, 33, 93
Jubinal, M. L. A., Professor, 29
ICersaint, G. H. H. C., Comte de,
52
Kcrvdgucn, Aim6, Vicomte de, 29
Kocnigswarter, M. J., Baron, 29
Lacavc, L. H. H. (of Pouts cl Chaus-
33
Ladoucette, E. F. F., Baron de, 28
Lnfon de Cayx, J. J. (nephew of
King Murat), 28, 51
Lagrange, J. B. F., Comte dc, 28
La Gudronni&rc, Arthur, Vicomte
de, 33
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 73
Landowners, 58
Landownership, small, 65 ; politics
of, 166-7
Lanquetin, J. S., 33
Larabit, M. D., sometime of St.
Helena, 29
Larcy, C. P. R. dc S., Baron dc,
legitimist leader, 142
Larochc-Joubert, J. E., 57, 97
La Tour, Gustave de. Catholic
leader, 33
La Tour du Moulin, P. C., 131,
132
La Tour du Pin, Bonapartists in,
25
La Valette, C. J. M. F., Marquis de,
ambassador and minister, 52
Law, study of, as training for poli-
tics, 55
Lccomte, Eugfene L. J., 33
Ledier, S. X. S., 32
Lcdru-Rollin, A. A., 73
Lefebure, J. C. B. E., 31, 33) 52
Lefebvre-Hermant, 33
Legislature, views on its importance,
74 ; role in government, 102
Legitimists, under the second re-
public, 6 ; strength in Haute-
Garonne, 12 ; government policy
towards. 12, 21, 34 J strength, 13-
14 ; attitude to the second empire,
34-g ; elected in 1852, 40 I op-
Index
Macdonald, Due de Tarente, aS
Magnan, Marshal,
Magne, Pierre* (1606-79), minister,
52
Mame-et-Loire, Bonapartism in,
1 17
Mane, A T, 117
Marrast, Francois (of Landes), 32
Marriages, 64
Massabiau, Dr , ig
Afaopas, C E, (fi% minister <?/
Police, policy aa prefect, i*
Maupas, M R de (father of the
minister), ag
position Of, m 1851,43-4; land-
ownent, 65 , mayors, S3; news-
95 # 186^1 hojf
they T^on popular support* 157-8 ;
nature and composition of their
patty, 157-8 , Bonapartist gams
at their expense, 166-8
Le Gorrcc, C I M , 33
Lelut,L,P F, 3j
Letnaire, P J, fl" , of Valenciennes,
32
Lemaire, T E , 18. 33
Ijcmeicier, Vicomte Afiatole, 33
Lemercier, J. B N., Colonel Baron,
, 29, 33
Lenardi^re, C. E, L. C Chauvin de,
23
LepelJetier d’Aunay, O , Comte, gfi
Lequien, A P, A , sub-prefect, later
M P of Pas-de-Calais, 33
IrfrouT, Alfred, mentster in r86g,
29
Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre, 33
Lespemt, F,, Baron, de, 28
Leaseps, Ferdinand de, candidate
for parliament, 138
Levavasseur, Charles, 33
Liberal Empire, early origins, 101 ,
Napoleon Ill’s vietvs on, loi-s ,
other views on, 103 , decree of 24
November jS6o, 104 ff J not the
victory of the opposition, lao ;
growth of a party ui favour of,
129, reasons for, 134 , its theory |
of government, 151-2
Loire- InKrieure, Bonapartism in,
74. 167
Lormet, M N A , Vincent de. 33
Louvet, Charles (1806—82), minister
in 1870, 32, t34, I 49 ~S 0
Mayors, their importance, 80-5 ,
weakening of their mfluence, g2-3
Alige, Jacques Philippe, career, 54
Members of Parliament, 46-65,
under the July monarchy, 15S,
under the second empire, 163-5
Mepieu, J G T A Flocart de, 1 8,
33
Mercicr, Jacques, Baron, sg
Mercier, T L , Baron, 33
Mesonan, Le Duff de, 21, 29
Migeon, J , 33
Millet, j B P , 29
Mmisters, financial rewards of, 6l ;
role in the hberal empire, 131
Moi6, M L , Comte (1781-1855),
letter to Tocqueville, 79
Money from politics, 60-2 ; in
elections, 96
Monier de La Siaeranne, J P A H ,
33
Montalembert, Charles Forbes,
Comte de {i8io-J)o), 33 , elec-
tions, 70, Ij 6 , letter to Flavigny,
74 , opuiion on E OUivier, 124 ,
and Le Correspondant, 147
Montani, Michel, 31
Montmartre, committee of the me
de, 22
Morbihan, Bonapaitist gains in, 74
Morgan, M P E de, 71
Momy, Auguste, Due de (1811-65),
MP (1842-8 and 1849-^5), min-
ister of the Interior (1851-2),
president of the legislature (1854-
1 865) dissolves the old Bonapart-
ist party, 2J ! policy as minister
of the Interior, 22 , in parhanvent,
28 , example of the Orleanist
Sonspartist, 30, as a financier,
57 , his speculations, 61 , viewa
on the liberal empire, 103 ; his
qualities, 125 , his dominance
over the legislature, 126 , and the
opposition, 127 , hts political
Views, 127-8, his work for the
liberal empire, 12S-9
Mouchy, Due de, 33, 51
Murat, family, 28, 51
Murat, Joachim, 52
Napoleon III, empeior of the French
(1808-73), 1“* supporters, 1.5 ;
why elected 1S4S, 6 , attitude to
upper classes, 10; part m the
193
The Political System of Napoleon III
election of 1852, 15-16; aims,
46 ; letter to Bcimontet, 60 ; his
wealth, 61 ; letters of 1857, 75,
77 ; his electoral system and its
results, 78-99; his isolation, 105;
his reasons for making liberal con-
cessions, 105 ; letter to Persigny
(1863), 1 19 ; allows demand for
liberty, 133-4 ! h‘s power in the
liberal empire, 150-3
Napoleonists, as distinct from Bona-
partists, 5
National Electoral Association, 23-5
National Guard, the Orlcanist
‘army’, 160
New men, demand for, 7 ; in trade
and industry, 56 ; among the
republicans, 65
Normand, Colonel P. F. H., 29
Notables, policy towards, 10-13.
See also Aristocracy
Noualhicr, M. J., 28
Noubcl, R. H., 29
Nougaridc dc Fayet, Baron, 28
Official Candidates, 38-9, 69, 78-80,
136-7
Ollivier, Emile (1825-1913), minister
in 1870 ; his integrity, 62 ; his
development, 121, his aims, 122-
123; his break with the opposition,
123 ; his dislike of parliamentary
government, 124; and Morny,
125, 129 ; his creation of a new
party, 130-1 ; how elected in
1869, 138; his ministry, 134 ff.
Opposition to the second empire, 41
ff., 88-99, 138-41
O’Quin, Patrick, 33
Orleanists, relations with Bona-
partists, 4; in 1852, 32, 41-2;
in 1857, 74 ; in 1869, 141 ; their
newspapers, 95 ; the nature and
composition of their party, 155-6
Orne, Bonapartist gains in, 117
Ouvrard, Julien, 33
Parchappe, General C. J. B., 29
Paricu, J. H. Esquirou de, 33
Paris, concern about revolutionary
elements in, 75-7 ; 101869,138-40
Parliamentary government, and the
liberal empire, 151
Parmenticr, Louis, 33
Partouneauic, A. A., Vicomte, 33
Party of Order, 7, 12
Pas-de-Calais, election of 1852 in,
20 ; Bonapartist gains in, 74
Peasants, how the Bonapartists won
their support, 160-3
Pelet, General, his committee, 23
Pereire, the financiers, 56, 98, 115
Pdricr, Casimir- (son of the minister
of Louis Philippe), 116, 142
Perret, J. M., 31
Persigny, Victor Fialin, Due de
(1808—72), minister of the Interior
(1852—4 and 1860-3), ambassador
to London (1855-8 and 1859-60) :
attitude to upper classes, ri ; atti-
tude to opponents, 15 ; policy in
election of 1852, 16 ff. ; his
moderation, 17; his relations with
his prefects, 20 ; and the com-
mittee of the rue de Montmartre,
22 ; attitude to Orleanists, 33 ;
friendship with Falloux, 35 >
the official candidates, 38-9 ; made
no money out of politics, 61 ;
hostility to Fould, 104 ; policy in
1863,111-19; abandonment of his
system, 136
Petiet, A. L., Baron, 28
Peyronnet, 79
Peyruc, Pons, 140
Piat, General, 22
Pictri, P. M., prefect, views on Bona-'
partism, ii
Pinard, A. E., policy as minister of
the Interior, 138
Plantd, R. J. C., 32
Plichon, C. I., 71
Politicians, patterns in their careers,
9 ; strength of established, 12 ;
how men became, 51-60 ; occupa-
tions of, 62-4 ; methods of can-
vassing, 89-98 ; in the provinces,
162-8
Pongdrard, E. J., 33
Portalis, J. J., Baron, 28
Postmen, political role of, 87
Poz20 di Borgo, jnr., 142
Prefects, political aims of, ii-i 5 »
conciliatory and weak prefects,
14; Haussmann’s views on their
power, 19 ; their political power,
19-22 ; blank cheques given to,
31 ; attitude to legitimists, 36-8 ;
creators of Bonapartism, 158-63 ;
decline in their power, 163-6
194
Index
Press, 94-6
^vost-Parsdol, L A , 199 , U 2
^Pri^tmres, and gentlemen. <8
Pyat. Fillet, 73
Quesne, H M,3i, sa
Randoing, J B . 33
F V.-Jj
^vinel, L F D , Baron de, 33
Redle, G C P , Vicomte, 5a
Remade, B B , 33
Remusat, C F M de. 12, 1:6,
14a
Renouard, J P F L , 33
Renouard de Busaiire. Alfred,
Baron, 33
Republicans, under Louis Philippe,
S-6, in 1853, 40, 42, 111 1837,
7*"3 • their newspapers, 95 , in
1863, 112-14 J in 1869, i; 38'42,
nature and composition of their
party, 156-7, and the Bona-
pirtists, J57
Reveil, J E,3a
Revolutions, views on the causes
of, 7, OlUvier's views on, 113-3 ,
the liberal empire’s attempt to end,
IS 1-3
Key, General, Bonapattist leader m
ls6re, 33
Richard, Maurice (1832-88), mini-
ster m 1870, isi
Pich6-Tirman, J F E , 32
Rigaud, J E , his income, 64- S ,
<i/jo 33
Rochemure, J X V C P de L ,
Cotnte de, 33
Rog6, General A , 39
Rolle. H A , SI
Romeuf, B , Baron de, 28
Roques-Salvaza P P A , 33
Rotoura, A A , Baron des, s 3
Rouland, Gustave, minister of
Education and later governor of
the Bank of France, letter of 1857,
76 ; Views on the liberal empire,
Sallandrouze de Lamomatx, C J ,
33
Saone, Haute-, politics m 1851-1,
14
SapeUTi-t'ompiers, in politics, 160,
163
Say, Leon, 142
Schneider, Eugine, 19, 52, S 7
Schoolmasters, m politics, 85-6 , re-
publican, 94
Schjler, J H , 31
Segns, Alexis Emile (1811-80), min-
ister in 1870, 82, 148-9
Sevres, Deux-, Bonapartism in, 74
Seydoux, J J E C , 33
Simon, Joseph Franfois, 51
Society of 10 December, 23
Soldiers, politics of. 47
Soulli6, P D , barrister, 33
TaiUefer, Louis Auguste Timoleon
Horace Sydney, his career, 32 ,
his conversion to Bonapartism,
53 I bis political opinions, 148
Talhouet'Roy, Auguste E J Bona-
mour, Marquis de (1819-84),
minister m 1870, 33, his political
opmions, 148
Taunac, E A A , Marqun de, 33
Thiers Adolphe (1797-1877), why
did not stand for the presidency
in 1848,6, his views in i860, 106,
1 09-10, ‘the king reigns but does
not rule’, 124 , his party, 130
Thieullen, J B N , Baron de, 29
Thil, Charles, 30
Timer, M F , 33
Tocqueville, Alexis de, on place-
hunting, 8 , on official candidates,
79
Torcy, W N W , Marquis ViUe-
dieu de, 33, 36, jt
Towns, opposition in, 40-1, 9I,
iii'i3
Travot, General Baron M V , 28
Tromelm, G J F B , Comte de,
33
103
RouHeaux-Dugage, C H , 33
Roust am, Bonapartist organiser, 23
St-Albio, N de, 23, 30
St-Maic Girardm, tl6
St-Paul, A C Calley de, S9
Ste-Hetmine, Marquis de, 33
Ui^s, A C V J E de Crussol,
Due U’, 33, 71
Vast-Vimeux, General Baron C L-
29, 52
Vaucluse, pohtics in, 38 ; legitimist
organisation m, 157-8
*95
The Political System of Napoleon III
Vautier, F. A., 33
Vcauce, C. E. de C., Baron de, 32
Vendde, Bonapartist gains in, 74,
117
Verclos, Marquis de, 29
Vdron, Dr. L. D., 29
Viard, L. R., Baron, 28
Vienne, Bonapartist gains in, 117
Vienne, Haute-, Bonapartist gains
in, 1 17
Villfele, circular of 1822, 79
Vogiid, L., Marquis de, 142
Voi2e, Adolphe de, 32
Voting, methods of, 80-5
■ Vuitry, Adolphe, 52
Walewski, Alexandre, Comte {1810-
1868), minister of Foreign Af-
fairs (1855-60), minister of State
(1860—3), president of the legis-
lature (1865-7), 104
Wattcbled, A. J. D., notary, 29
Welles de La Valette, Samuel, 52, 13 1
Wendel, A. C. dc, 33
Wilson, Daniel, 97
Witt, Cornells de, 142
THE END
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